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Abstract
We obtain the first constant-round post-quantummulti-party computation protocol for gen-
eral classical functionalities in the plainmodel, with security against malicious corruptions. We
assume mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and quan-
tum polynomial hardness of an LWE-based circular security assumption. Along the way, we
also construct the following protocols that may be of independent interest.
• Constant-round zero-knowledge against parallel quantum verifiers from quantum poly-
nomial assumptions.
Here, we develop a novel parallel no-cloning non-black-box simulation technique. This uses
as a starting point the recently introduced no-cloning technique of Bitansky and Shmueli
(STOC 2020) and Ananth and La Placa (ePrint 2019), which in turns builds on the classical
non-black-box technique of Bitansky, Khurana and Paneth (STOC 2019). Our approach
relies on a new technical tool, spooky encryption for relations computable by quantum
circuits, that we also construct.
• Constant-round post-quantum non-malleable commitments frommildly super-polynomial
quantum hardness of LWE.
This is the first construction of post-quantum non-malleable commitments in the plain
model, and is obtained by transforming the construction of Khurana and Sahai (FOCS
2017) to obtain post-quantum security.
We achieve quantum security by building a new straight-line non-black-box simulator against
parallel verifiers that does not clone the adversary’s state. This technique may also be relevant
to the classical setting.
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1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute a joint function of their
inputs, revealing only the output of the function while keeping their inputs private. General se-
cure MPC, initiated in works such as [Yao86, GMW87, BGW88, CCD88], has played a central role
in modern theoretical cryptography. The last few years have seen tremendous research optimiz-
ing MPC in various ways, enabling a plethora of practical applications that include joint computa-
tions on distributed medical data, privacy-preserving machine learning, e-voting, distributed key
management, among others. The looming threat of quantum computers naturally motivates the
problem of constructing protocols with provable security against quantum adversaries.
In this workwe initiate the study ofMPC protocols that allow classical parties to securely com-
pute general classical functionalities, and where security is guaranteed against malicious quantum
adversaries. Our focus is on MPC in the plain model: fully classical participants interact with each
other with no access to trusted/pre-processed parameters or a common reference string. Multi-
party protocols achieving security in these settings do not seem to have been previously analyzed
in any number of rounds.
After Watrous’ breakthrough work on zero-knowledge against quantum adversaries [Wat09],
the works of [DL09, LN11, HSS11] considered variants of quantum-secure computation protocols,
in the two-party setting. Very recently, Bitansky and Shmueli [BS20] obtained the first constant-
round classical zero-knowledge arguments with security against quantum adversaries. Their tech-
niques (and those of [AP19] in a concurrent work) are based on the recent non-black-box simula-
tion technique of [BKP19], who constructed two-message classically-secure weak zero-knowledge
in the plain model. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether these protocols compose under parallel
repetition. As a result, they become largely inapplicable to the constant-roundmulti-party setting.
There has also been substantial effort in constructing protocols for securely computing quan-
tum circuits [DNS10, DNS12, DGJ+20] (see Section 2.5 for further discussion). However, to the best
of our knowledge, generic multi-party computation protocols satisfying security against quan-
tum adversaries with classical communication have only been studied in models with trusted
pre-processing or setup. This is particulary unsatisfactory considering that [DGJ+20] construct a
maliciously-secure multi-party protocol for computing quantum ciruits, assuming the existence
of a maliciously-secure post-quantum classical MPC protocol. This means that, prior to our work,
the only available implementations of such a building block required trusted pre-processing or a
common reference string.
Because quantum information behaves in a fundamentally different way than classical infor-
mation, designing post-quantum protocols often requires new techniques to achieve provable se-
curity. As a key contribution, we propose a new powerful parallel no-cloning non-black-box simula-
tion technique that extends the work of [BS20], to achieve security against multiple parallel quan-
tum verifiers in constant rounds. By carefully combining this with additional technical ideas, we
directly obtain constant-roundMPC for classical circuits with security against quantum adversaries.
1.1 Our Results
Webegin by summarizing ourmain result: Classical multi-party computationwith security against
quantum circuits in the plain model. Here, parties communicate classically via authenticated
point-to-point channels as well as broadcast channels, where everyone can send messages in the
same round. In each round, all parties simultaneously exchange messages. The network is as-
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sumed to be synchronous with rushing adversaries, i.e. adversaries may generate their messages
for any round after observing the messages of all honest parties in that round, but before observ-
ing the messages of honest parties in the next round. The (quantum) adversary may corrupt upto
all but one of the participants. In this model, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assuming mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE and AFS-spooky
encryption for relations computable by polynomial-size quantum circuits, there exists a constant-round clas-
sical MPC protocol (in the plain model) maliciously secure against quantum polynomial-time adversaries.
In more detail, our protocol is secure against any adversary A = {Aλ, ρλ}λ, where each Aλ
is the (classical) description of a polynomial-size quantum circuit and ρλ is some (inefficiently
computable) non-uniform quantum advice. Beyond being interesting in its own right, our plain-
model protocol may serve as a useful stepping stone to obtaining interesting protocols for securely
computing quantum circuits in the plain model, as evidenced by the work of [DGJ+20]. This
protocol is constructed in Sections 8 and 9.
By “mildly” super-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE, we mean to assume that there ex-
ists a constant c ∈ N, such that for large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, no quantum poly-
nomial time algorithm can distinguish LWE samples from uniform with advantage better than
negl(λilog(c,λ)), where ilog(c, λ) denotes the c-times iterated logarithm log log · · ·c times(λ). We note
that this is weaker than assuming the quasi-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE, i.e. the as-
sumption that quantum polynomial-time adversaries cannot distinguish LWE samples from uni-
form with advantage better than 2−(log λ)
c
for some constant c > 1.
A central technical ingredient of our work is an additive function sharing (AFS) spooky en-
cryption scheme [DHRW16] for relations computable by quantum circuits. An AFS-spooky en-
cryption scheme has a publicly-computable algorithm that, on input a set of ciphertextsEnc(pk1,m1),
. . . ,Enc(pkn,mn) encrypted under independently sampled public keys and a (possibly quantum) cir-
cuit C , computes a new set of ciphertexts
Enc(pk1, y1), . . . ,Enc(pkn, yn) s.t.
n⊕
i=1
yi = C(m1, . . . ,mn).
In Section 4 we show how to construct AFS-spooky encryption for relations computable by quan-
tum circuits, under an LWE-based circular security assumption. We refer the reader to Section 4.4
for the exact circular security assumption we need, which is similar to the one used in [Mah18].
As a corollary, this immediately yields the first multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption [LTV12]
for quantum circuits with classical key generation and classical encryption of classical messages.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Under an appropriate LWE-based circular security assumption, there exists an
AFS-spooky encryption scheme for relations computable by polynomial-size quantum circuits with classical
key generation and classical encryption of classical messages.
Along the way to proving our main theorem, we construct and rely on constant-round zero-
knowledge arguments against parallel quantum verifiers, and constant-round extractable commit-
ments against parallel quantum committers. Parallel extractable commitments and zero-knowledge
are formally constructed and analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. We point out that we
do not obtain protocols that compose under unbounded parallel repetition. Instead we build a
bounded variant (that we also refer to as multi-verifier zero-knowledge and multi-committer ex-
tractable commitments) that suffices for our applications.
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Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Assuming the quantum polynomial hardness of LWE and the existence of AFS-
spooky encryption for relations computable by polynomial-size quantum circuits, there exists:
• A constant-round classical argument for NP that is computational-zero-knowledge against parallel
quantum polynomial-size verifiers.
• A constant-round classical commitment that is extractable against parallel quantum polynomial-size
committers.
In addition, we initiate the study of post-quantum non-malleable commitments. Specifically,
we construct and rely on constant-round post-quantum non-malleable commitments based on the
super-polynomial hardness assumption described above. The formal construction and analysis
can be found in Section 7.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). Assuming the mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE and the ex-
istence of fully-homomorphic encryption for quantum circuits, there exists a constant-round non-malleable
commitment scheme secure against quantum polynomial-size adversaries.
We also obtain quantum-secure non-malleable commitments in O(ilog(c, λ)) rounds for any
constant c ∈ N based on any quantum-secure extractable commitment. In particular, plugging in
these commitments instead of our constant round non-malleable commitments gives anO(ilog(c, λ))
round quantum-secure MPC from any quantum AFS-spooky encryption scheme.
2 Technical Overview
Our starting point is any constant-round post-quantum MPC protocol maliciously secure in the
programmable common reference string (CRS) model. Such a protocol can be obtained, for exam-
ple, based on the semi-maliciously secure MPC protocols of [AJL+12, MW16] in the CRS model.
Specifically, assuming the existence of post-quantum zero-knowledge in the CRS model (that
can be obtained based on the quantum hardness of LWE [PS19]) and the quantum hardness of
LWE, these works obtain multi-party computation for classical circuits in the CRS model with
the following property. There exists an ideal-world simulator that programs the CRS, interacts in a
straight-line, black-box manner with any quantum adversary corrupting an arbitrary subset of the
players, and outputs a view that is indistinguishable from the real view of the adversary, including
the output of honest parties.
A natural approach to achieving post-quantum MPC in the plain model is to then securely
implement a multi-party functionality that generates the afore-mentioned CRS. Specifically, we
would like a set of n parties to jointly execute a coin-flipping protocol. Such a protocol outputs
a uniformly random string that may then be used to implement post-quantum secure MPC ac-
cording to [AJL+12, MW16]. The programmability requirement on the CRS roughly translates to
ensuring that for any quantum adversary, there exists a simulator that on input a random string
s, can force the output of the coin-flipping protocol to be equal to s. A protocol satisfying this
property is often referred to as a fully-simulatable multi-party coin-flipping protocol.
Post-Quantum Multi-Party Coin-Flipping. Existing constant-round protocols [Wee10, Goy11]
for multi-party coin-flipping against classical adversaries make use of the following template.
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Each participant first commits to a uniformly random string using an appropriate perfectly bind-
ing commitment.1 In a later phase, all participants reveal the values they committed to, without
actually revealing the randomness used for commitment. Additionally, each participant proves
(in zero-knowledge) to every other participant that they opened to the same value that they orig-
inally committed to. If all zero-knowledge arguments verify, the protocol output is computed as
the sum of the openings of all participants.
In general, zero-knowledge arguments form a back-bone of general MPC as well as multi-
party coin-flipping. While the recent work of Bitansky and Shmueli [BS20] builds constant-round
post-quantum zero-knowledge, their protocol and its guarantees turn out to be insufficient for the
multi-party setting. In the (constant-round) multi-party setting, a single prover would typically
need to interact in parallel with (n−1) different verifiers, a subset or all of which may be adversar-
ial. In addition, these arguments should continue to satisfy soundness, even if a subset of verifiers
colludes with a (cheating) prover.
Post-Quantum Parallel Zero-Knowledge. We build the first constant-round zero-knowledge ar-
gument against parallel quantum verifiers from quantum polynomial hardness of an LWE-based
circular security assumption. This improves upon the work of [BS20, AP19] who provided such
an argument against a single quantum verifier.
Very roughly, the approach in [BS20, AP19] relies on a modification of the [BKP19] encrypted
trapdoors paradigm. This requires a simulator to homomorphically evaluate the verifier’s (quan-
tum) circuit over the ciphertext of a quantum fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, and
then use the result of this evaluation to “unlock” an LWE-based compute-and-compare obfusca-
tion. The initial FHE ciphertext and public key, as well as the compute-and-compare obfuscation
are generated by the verifier. We refer the reader to [BS20] for additional details about this proto-
col.
However, when a prover interacts with several verifiers at once, each verifier will generate its
own initial FHE ciphertext and public key, as well as its own compute-and-compare obfuscation.
When a quantum adversary controls several of these verifiers, the simulator can no longer perform
individual homomorphic evaluations, due to no-cloning. To address this issue, we develop a novel
parallel no-cloning simulation strategy. Our simulator relies on a strong variant of quantum fully-
homomorphic encryption that allows for homomorphic operations under multiple keys at once,
and a special methodology that allows us to peel away secret keys of this FHE scheme layer-by-
layer. An overview of this technique can be found in Section 2.1.
The special encryption scheme that we use is a quantum generalization of the notion of AFS-
spooky encryption. We give an overview of our construction in Section 2.2.
Post-Quantum Non-malleable Commitments. Our construction of zero-knowledge against par-
allel quantum verifiers gives rise to a coin-flipping protocol that is secure as long as at least one
participant is honest, and all committed strings are independent of each other. However, ensur-
ing such independence is not straightforward, even in the classical setting. In fact, upon seeing
an honest party’s commitment string c, a malicious, rushing adversary may be able to produce
a string c′ that commits to a related message. This is known as a malleability attack, and can be
prevented by relying on non-malleable commitments. In this work, we devise the first post-quantum
non-malleable commitments based on slightly superpolynomial hardness of LWE. An overview
1We actually require this commitment to also satisfy a property called non-malleability, which we discuss later in
this section.
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of our construction can be found in Section 2.3.
Finally, we discuss how to combine all these primitives to build our desired coin-tossing pro-
tocol, and a few additional subtleties that come up in the process, in Section 2.4.
2.1 A New Parallel No-Cloning Non-Black-Box Simulation Technique
In the following we give a high-level overview of our constant-round zero-knowledge protocol
secure against parallel quantum verifiers. In favor of a simpler exposition, we first describe a par-
allel extractable commitment protocol. A parallel extractable commitment is a commitment where
a single receiver interacts in parallel with multiple committers, each committing to its own in-
dependent message. The main challenge in this setting is to simulate the view of an adversary
corrupting several of these committers, while simultaneously recovering all committed messages.
Once we build a parallel extractable commiment, obtaining a parallel zero-knowledge protocol
becomes a simple exercise (that we discuss towards the end of this overview).
Throughout the following overview we only consider adversaries that are (i) non-aborting, i.e.
they never interrupt the execution of the protocol, and (ii) explainable, i.e. their messages always
lie in the support of honestly generated messages, though they can select their random coins
and inputs arbitrarily. We further simplify our overview by only considering (iii) classical adver-
saries, while being mindful to avoid any kind of state cloning during extraction. In the end of this
overview we discuss how to remove these simplications.
Cryptographic Building Blocks. Before delving into the description of our protocol, we intro-
duce the technical tools needed for our construction. A fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme [Gen09] allows one to compute any function (in its circuit representation) over some en-
crypted message Enc(pk,m), without the need to decrypt it first. We say that an FHE is multi-
key [LTV12] if it supports the homomorphic evaluation of circuits even over messages encrypted
under independently sampled public keys:
{Enc(pki,mi)}i∈[n]
Eval((pk1,...,pkn),C,·)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), C(m1, . . . ,mn)).
Clearly, decrypting the resulting ciphertext should require the knowledge of all of the correspond-
ing secret keys (sk1, . . . , skn). Other than semantic security, we require that the scheme is compact,
in the sense that the size of the evaluated ciphertext is proportional to |C(m1, . . . ,mn)| (and pos-
sibly the number of parties n) but does not otherwise depend on the size of C .
The second tool that we use is compute and compare obfuscation [WZ17, GKW17]. A compute
and compare program CC[f, u, z] program is defined by a function f , a lock value u, and an
output z. On input a string x, the program returns z if and only if f(x) = u. The obfuscator Obf
is guaranteed to return an obfuscated program C˜C that is indistinguishable from a program that
rejects any input, as long as u has sufficient entropy conditioned on f and z. Finally, we use a
conditional disclosure of secret (CDS)2 scheme, which is an interactive protocol parametrized by
an NP relation R where both the sender and the recevier share a statement x and in addition, the
sender has a secret messagem. At the end of the interaction, the receiver obtains m if and only if
it knows a valid witness w such thatR(x,w) = 1.
2In the body of the paper we actually resort to a slightly stronger tool, namely a secure function evaluation protocol
with statistical circuit privacy.
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A Strawman Solution. We now describe a naive extension of the [BS20, AP19] approach to the
parallel setting (where a receiver interacts with multiple committers), and highlight its pitfalls. We
do not assume familiarity with [BS20, AP19]. To commit to messages (m1, . . . ,mn), the committers
and the receiver engage in the following protocol.
• Each committer samples a key pair of a multi-key FHE scheme (pki, ski), a uniform trapdoor
tdi, and a uniform lock value lki, and sends to the receiver:
1. A commitment ci = Com(tdi).
2. An FHE encryption Enc(pki, tdi).
3. An obfuscation C˜Ci of the programCC[Dec(ski, ·), lki, (ski,mi)].
• The receiver engages each committer in a (parallel) execution of a CDS protocol where the
i’th committer sends lki if the receiver correctly guesses a valid pre-image of ci.
At a high level, the fact that the protocol hides the message mi is ensured by the following argu-
ment. Since the receiver cannot invert ci, it cannot guess tdi and therefore the CDS protocol will
return 0. This in turn means that the lock lki is hidden from the receiver, and consequently that
the obfuscated program is indistinguishable from a null program. This is, of course, an informal
explanation, and we refer the reader to [BKP19, BS20, AP19] for a formal security analysis.
We now turn to the description of the extractor. The high-level strategy is the following: Upon
receiving the first message from all committers, the extractor uses the FHE encryption Enc(pki, tdi)
and the code of the adversary to run the CDS protocol homomorphically (on input tdi) to recover
an FHE encryption of lki. Then the extractor feeds it as an input to the obfuscated program C˜Ci,
which returns (ski,mi).
Unfortunately this approach has a major limitation: It implicitly assumes that each corrupted
party is a local algorithm. In other words, we are assuming that the adversary consists of individ-
ual subroutines (one per corrupted party), which may not necessarily be the case. As an example,
if the adversary were to somehow implement a strategy where corrupted machines do not re-
spond until all receiver messages have been delivered, then the above homomorphic evaluation
would get stuck and return no output. It is also worth mentioning that what makes the problem
challenging is our inability to clone the state of the adversary. If we were allowed to clone its state,
then we could extract messages one by one, by running a separate thread under each FHE key.
Multi-Key Evaluation. A natural solution to circumvent the above issue is to rely on multi-key
FHE evaluation. Using this additional property, the extractor can turn the ciphertexts Enc(pk1, td1),
. . . ,Enc(pkn, tdn) into a single encryption
Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), (td1, . . . , tdn))
under the hood of all public keys (pk1, . . . , pkn). Given this information, the extractor can homo-
morphically evaluate all instances of the CDS protocol at once, using the code of the adversary,
no matter how intricate. This procedure allows the extractor to obtain the encryption of each lock
value Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), lki). In the single committer setting, we could then feed this into the
corresponding obfuscated program and call it a day.
However, in the parallel setting it is less clear how to proceed. If the compute and compare
program C˜Ci tried to decrypt such a ciphertext, it would obtain (at best) an encryption under
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the remaining public keys. Glossing over the fact that the structure of single-key and multi-key
ciphertexts might be incompatible, it is unlikely that
Dec(ski,Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), lki)) = lki
which is what we would need to trigger the compute and compare program. The general problem
here is that each compute and compare program cannot encode information about other secret
keys, thus making it infeasible to decrypt multi-key ciphertexts. One approach to resolve this
issue would be to ask all committers to jointly obfuscate a compute and compare program that
encodes all secret keys at once. However, this seems to require a general-purpose MPC protocol,
which is what we are trying to build in the first place.
AFS-Spooky Encryption. We resolve this conundrum by leveraging a special kind of multi-key
FHE scheme. A spooky encryption3 scheme [DHRW16] is an FHE scheme that supports a spe-
cial spooky evaluation algorithm, that generates no-signaling correlations among independently
encrypted messages. We will restrict attention to a sub-class of no-signaling relations called ad-
ditive function sharing (AFS) relations, and we will call the scheme AFS-spooky. More concretely,
on input a circuit C and n independently generated ciphertexts (under independently generated
public keys), the algorithm Spooky.Eval produces
{Enc(pki,mi)}i∈[n]
Spooky.Eval((pk1,...,pkn),C,·)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ {Enc(pki, yi)}i∈[n] s.t.
n⊕
i=1
yi = C(m1, . . . ,mn).
It is not hard to see that AFS-spooky encryption is a special case ofmulti-key FHEwheremulti-key
ciphertexts have the following structure
Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn),m) = {Enc(pki, yi)}i∈[n] s.t.
n⊕
i=1
yi = m.
This additional structure is going to be our main leverage for constructing an efficient extractor.
To complete the description of the extractor, we will find a mechanism to peel away encryption
layers one by one from an AFS-spooky (multi-key) ciphertext. We do this via careful homomorphic
evaluation of the independently generated programs (C˜C1, . . . , C˜Cn), as described below.
• First, homomorphically execute the code of the adversary using the AFS-spooky scheme to
obtain
ct1 = Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), lk1), . . . , ctn = Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), lkn),
as described above.
• Parse ctn as a collection of individual ciphertexts
Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn), lkn) = {Enc(pki, yi)}i∈[n] = {Enc(pki, yi)}i∈[n−1] ∪ {Enc(pkn, yn)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
c˜tn
.
3As a historical remark, while the name is inspired by Einstein’s quote “spooky action at a distance” referring to
entangled quantum states, the concept of spooky encryption (as defined in [DHRW16]) is entirely classical.
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Note that we can interpret the first n − 1 elements as an AFS-spooky ciphertext encrypted
under (pk1, . . . , pkn−1) :
c˜t = {Enc(pki, yi)}i∈[n−1] = Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
,
n−1⊕
i=1
yi
)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
, y˜
)
where y˜ =
n−1⊕
i=1
yi.
• Let Γ be the following function
Γ(ζ) : Spooky.Eval(pkn, ζ ⊕ ·, c˜tn)
which homomorphically computes the XOR of ζ with the plaintext of c˜tn. Compute the
following nested AFS-spooky correlation
ĉt = Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn−1),Γ, c˜t)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
,Spooky.Eval(pkn, y˜ ⊕ ·, c˜tn)
)
(1)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
,Enc
(
pkn,
n⊕
i=1
yi
))
(2)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
,Enc (pkn, lkn)
)
(3)
by interpreting c˜tn as a single key ciphertext. Here (1) follows by substituting Γ, and (2)
follows by correctness of the AFS-spooky evaluation.
• Run the obfuscated compute and compare program homomorphically to obtain an encryp-
tion of skn andmn under (pk1, . . . , pkn−1)
Spooky.Eval
(
(pk1, . . . , pkn−1), C˜Cn, ĉt
)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
, C˜Cn (Enc (pkn, lkn))
)
= Enc
((
pk1, . . . , pkn−1
)
, (skn,mn)
)
.
• Using the encryption of skn under (pk1, . . . , pkn−1), update the initial ciphertexts (ct1, . . . , ctn−1)
by homomorphically decrypting their last component and adding the resulting string. This
allows the extractor to obtain
Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn−1), lk1), . . . ,Enc((pk1, . . . , pkn−1), lkn−1).
• Recursively apply the procedure described above until Enc(pk1, lk1) is recovered, then feed
this ciphertext as an input to C˜C1 to obtain (sk1,m1) in the clear. Iteratively recover (sk2, . . . , skn)
by decrypting the corresponding ciphertexts. At this point the extractor knows all secret
keys and can decrypt the transcript of the interaction togetherwith the committedmessages.
To summarize, we used the special structure of AFS-spooky encryption to isolate single-key ci-
phertexts (albeit in a nested form), which are compatible with compute and compare programs.
In turn, evaluating the program under the encryption allows us to escape from the newly introduced
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layer. Repeating this procedure recursively eventually leads to a complete recovery of the plain-
texts.
We stress that, although the extraction algorithm repeats the nesting operation n times, the
additional encryption layer introduced in each iteration is immediately peeled off by executing the
obfuscated compute and compare program. Thus the above procedure runs in (strict) polynomial
time for any polynomial number of parties n.
Parallel Zero Knowledge. The above outline is deliberately simplified and ignores some subtle
issues that arise during the analysis of the protocol. As an example, we need to ensure that the
adversary is not able to maul the commitment of the trapdoor into a CDS encryption to be used
in the CDS protocol. This issue also arose in [BS20], and we follow their approach of using non-
uniformity in a reduction to the semantic security of the quantum FHE scheme. [BS20] also present
the technical tools needed to lift the protocol to the setting of malicious and possibly aborting ad-
versaries (as opposed to explainable), and we roughly follow their approach. However, it is worth
pointing out that [BS20] directly construct a zero-knowledge argument, without first constructing
and analyzing a stand-alone extractable commitment. Since we use a parallel extractable commit-
ment as a building block in the our coin-flipping protocol, we analyze the above as a stand-alone
commitment, which requires a few modifications to the protocol and proof techniques. More dis-
cussion about this can be found in Section 5.
Now, we describe how to obtain parallel zero-knowledge (i.e. zero-knowledge against multi-
ple verifiers) from parallel extractable commitment. This is accomplished in a routine manner by
enhancing a standard Σ protocol with a stage where each verifier commits to its Σ protocol chal-
lenge using a parallel extractable commitment. Using the extractor, the simulator can obtain the
challenges ahead of time and can therefore simulate the rest of the transcript, without the need to
perform state cloning.
It remains to argue that our extraction strategy does not break down in the presence of quan-
tum adversaries. Observe that the only step that involves the execution of a quantum circuit is
the AFS-spooky evaluation of the CDS protocol, under the hood of (pk1, . . . , pkn). Assuming that
we can construct AFS-spooky encryption for relations computable by quantum circuits (which we
show in Section 2.2), the remainder of the extraction algorithm only depends on the encryptions
of (lk1, . . . , lkn), which are classical strings. Once the extractor recovers all the secret keys, it can
decrypt the (possibly quantum) state of the adversary resulting from the homomorphic evaluation
of the CDS, and resume the protocol execution, without the need to clone the adversary’s state.
2.2 Quantum AFS-Spooky Encryption
We now turn to the construction of AFS-spooky encryption for relations computable by quan-
tum circuits. The main technical contribution of this section is a construction of multi-key fully-
homomorphic encryption for quantum circuits with classical key generation and classical en-
cryption of classical messages. Such schemes were already known in the single-key setting, due
to [Mah18, Bra18].
Background. At a very high level, these single-key schemes follow a paradigm introduced by
Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15], which makes use of the quantum one-time pad (QOTP). The QOTP
is a method of perfectly encrypting arbitrary quantum states with a key that consists of only classi-
cal bits. [BJ15] suggest to encrypt a quantum state with a quantum one-time pad (QOTP), and then
encrypt the classical bits that comprise the QOTP using a classical fully-homomorphic encryption
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scheme. One can then apply quantum gates to the encrypted quantum state, and update the clas-
sical encryption of the one-time pad appropriately. A key feature of this encryption procedure is
that while an encryption of a quantum state necessarily must be a quantum state, an encryption of
classical information does not necessarily have to include a quantum state. Indeed, one can sim-
ply give a classical one-time pad encryption of the data, along with a classical fully-homomorphic
encryption of the pad.
However, the original schemes presented by Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] and subsequent
work [DSS16] based on their paradigm left much to be desired. In particular, they required even
a classical encryptor to supply quantum “gadgets” encoding their secret key. These gadgets were
then used to evaluate a particular non-Clifford gate over encrypted data.4 The main innovation in
the work of [Mah18] was to remove the need for quantum gadgets, instead showing how to eval-
uate an appropriate non-Clifford gate using just classical information supplied by the encryptor.
Encrypted CNOT Operation. In more detail, evaluating a non-Clifford gate on a ciphertext
(ct, |φ〉), where ct is an FHE encryption of a QOTP key and |φ〉 is a quantum state encrypted
under the QOTP key, involves an operation (referred to as encrypted CNOT) that somehow must
“teleport” the bits encrypted in ct into the state |φ〉. [Mah18] gave a method for doing this, as long
as the ciphertext ct is encrypted under a scheme with some particular properties. Roughly, the
scheme must support a “natural” XOR homomorphic operation, it must be circuit private with
respect to this homomorphism, and perhaps most stringently, there must exist some trapdoor that
can be used to recover the message and the randomness used to produce any ciphertext.
[Mah18] observed that the dual-Regev encryption scheme [GPV08] (with large enoughmodulus-
to-noise ratio) does in fact satisfy these properties, as long as one generates the public key matrix
A along with a trapdoor. However, recall that ct was supposed to be encrypted under a fully-
homomorphic encryption scheme. [Mah18] resolves this by observing that ciphertexts encrypted
under the dual variant of the [GSW13] fully-homomorphic encryption scheme actually already
contain a dual-Regev ciphertext. In particular, a dual-GSW ciphertext encrypting a bit µ is amatrix
M = AS+E+µG, whereG is the gadgetmatrix. The final column ofM isAs+e+µ[0, . . . , 0, q/2]⊤,
which is exactly a dual-Regev ciphertext encrypting µ under public keyA. Note that, crucially, if
the dual-GSW public keyA is drawn with a trapdoor, then this trapdoor also functions as a trap-
door for the dual-Regev ciphertext. Thus, an evaulator can indeed perform the encrypted CNOT
operation on any ciphertext (ct, |φ〉), by first extracting a dual-Regev ciphertext ct′ from ct and
then proceeding.
Challenges in the Multi-Key Setting. Now, it is natural to ask whether this approach readily ex-
tends to themulti-key setting. Namely, does there exist a multi-key FHE schemewhere any (multi-
key) ciphertext contains within it a dual-Regev ciphertext with a corresponding trapdoor? Unfortu-
nately, this appears to bemuch less straightforward than in the single-key setting, for the following
reason. Observe that (dual) GSW homomorphic operations over ciphertextsMi = ASi+Ei+µiG
always maintain the same A matrix, while updating Si, Ei, and µi. Thus, a trapdoor for A natu-
rally functions as a trapdoor for the dual-Regev ciphertext that consitutes the last column of Mi.
However, LWE-basedmulti-key FHE schemes from the literature [CM15, MW16, PS16, BHP17] in-
clude a ciphertext expansion procedure, which allows an evaluator, given public keys pk1, . . . , pkn,
and a ciphertext ct encrypted under some pki, to convert ct into a ciphertext cˆt encrypted under
4We also remark here that [Goy18] presented a multi-key scheme based on this paradigm, but with the same draw-
backs. Note that compactness and classical encryption are crucial in our setting, as per the discussion in the previous
section.
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all keys pk1, . . . , pkn. Now, even if these public keys are indeed matrices A1, . . . ,An drawn with
trapdoors τ1, . . . , τn, it is completely unclear how to combine τ1, . . . , τn to produce a trapdoor τˆ
for the “expanded” ciphertext. Indeed, the expanded ciphertext generally can no longer be writ-
ten as some AS + E + µG, since the expansion procedure constructs a highly structured matrix
that includes components from the ciphertexts ct1, . . . , ctn, as well as auxiliary encryptions of the
randomness used to produce the ciphertexts (see e.g. [MW16]).
A Solution Based on Key-Switching. Thus, we take a different approach. Rather than attempting
to tweak known ciphertext expansion procedures to also support “trapdoor expansion”, we rely
on the notion of key-switching, which is a method of taking a ciphertext encrypted under one
scheme and converting it into a ciphertext encrypted under another scheme. The observation,
roughly, is that we do not need to explicitly maintain a trapdoor for the multi-key FHE scheme, as
long as it is possible to convert a multi-key FHE ciphertext into a dual-Regev ciphertext that does
explicitly have a trapdoor. In fact, we will consider a natural multi-key generalization of dual-
Regev, as described below. Key switching is possible as long as the second scheme has sufficient
homomorphic properties, namely, it can support homomorphic evaluation of the decryption circuit
of the first scheme.
Fortunately, the dual-Regev scheme is already linearly homomorphic, and many known clas-
sical multi-key FHE schemes [CM15, MW16, PS16, BHP17] support nearly linear decryption, which
means that decrypting a ciphertext simply consists of applying a linear function (derived from the
secret key) and then rounding. Thus, as long as the evaluator has the secret key of the multi-key
FHE ciphertext encrypted under a dual-Regev public key with a trapdoor, they can first key-
switch the multi-key FHE ciphertext ct into a dual-Regev ciphertext ct′, and then proceed with the
encrypted CNOT operation.
It remains to show how an evaluator may have access to such a dual-Regev encryption. Since
we are still in the multi-key setting, we will need a ciphertext and corresponding trapdoor expan-
sion procedure for dual-Regev. However, we show that such a procedure is much easier to come
by when the scheme only needs to support linear homomorphism (as is the case for the dual-
Regev scheme) rather than full homomorphism. Each party can draw its own dual-Regev public
key Ai along with a trapdoor τi, and encrypt its multi-key FHE secret key under Ai to produce
a ciphertext cti. The evaluator can then treat the block-diagonal matrix Aˆ = diag(A1, . . . ,An)
as an “expanded” public key.5 Now, the message and randomness used to generate a ciphertext
encrypted under Aˆ may be recovered by applying τ1 to the first set of entries of the ciphertext,
applying τ2 to the second set of entries and so on. This observation, combined with an appropri-
ate expansion procedure for the ciphertexts cti, allows an evaluator to convert any multi-key FHE
ciphertext into a multi-key dual-Regev ciphertext with trapdoor. Given a classical multi-key FHE
scheme with nearly linear decryption, this suffices to build multi-key quantum FHEwith classical
key generation and encryption.
Distributed Setup. We showed above how to convert any classical multi-key FHE scheme into a
quantum multi-key FHE scheme, as long as the classical scheme has nearly linear decryption.
However, most LWE-based classical multi-key FHE schemes operate in the common random
string (CRS) model, which assumes that all parties have access to a common source of random-
ness, generated by a trusted party. Thinking back to our application to parallel extractable com-
mitments, it is clear that this will not suffice, since we have no CRS a priori, and a receiver that
5Actually this expansion should be done slightly more carefully, see Section 4.4 for details.
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generates a CRS maliciously may be able to break hiding of the scheme. Thus, we rely on the
multi-key FHE scheme of [BHP17], where instead of assuming a CRS, the parties participate in
a distributed setup procedure. In particular, each party (and in our application, each committer)
generates some public parameters ppi, which are then combined publicly to produce a single set
of public parameters pp, which can be used by anyone to generate their own public key / secret
key pair.
This form of distributed setup indeed suffices to prove the hiding of our parallel commitment,
so it remains to show that our approach, combined with [BHP17], yields a quantum multi-key
FHE scheme with distributed setup. First, the [BHP17] scheme does indeed enjoy nearly linear
decryption, so plugging it into our compiler described above gives a functional quantum multi-
key FHE scheme. Next, we need to confirm that our compiler does not destroy the distributed
setup property. This follows since each party draws its own dual-Regev public key with trapdoor
without relying on any CRS, or even any public parameters.
Quantum AFS-Spooky Encryption. Finally, we show, via another application of key-switching,
how to construct a quantum AFS-spooky encryption scheme (with distributed setup). Recall that
we only require “spooky” interactions to hold over classical ciphertexts. That is, for any quan-
tum circuit C with classical outputs, given ciphertexts ct1, . . . , ctn encrypting |φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉 respec-
tively under public keys pk1, . . . , pkn, an evaluator can produce ciphertexts ct
′
1, . . . , ct
′
n where ct
′
i
encrypts yi under pki, and such that
n⊕
i=1
yi = C(|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉).
Now, using our quantummulti-key FHE scheme, it is possible to compute a single (multi-key)
ciphertext cˆt that encrypts C(|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉) under all public keys pk1, . . . , pkn. Then, if each party
additionally drew a key pair (pk′i, sk
′
i) for a classical AFS-spooky encryption scheme, and released
c˜t1, . . . , c˜tn, where c˜ti = Enc(pk
′
i, ski) encrypts the i-th party’s quantum multi-key FHE secret key
under their AFS-spooky encryption public key, then the evaluator can homomorphically evaluate
the quantum multi-key FHE decryption circuit (which is classical for classical ciphertexts) with cˆt
hardcoded, where cˆt is the multi-key ciphertext defined at the beginning of this paragraph. This
circuit on input c˜t1, . . . , c˜tn produces the desired output ct
′
1, . . . , ct
′
n. Finally, note that the classical
AFS-spooky encryption scheme must also have distributed setup, and we show (see Section 4.5)
that one can derive a distributed-setup AFS-spooky encryption scheme from [BHP17] using stan-
dard techniques [DHRW16].
2.3 Post-Quantum Non-malleable Commitments
In this section, we describe how to obtain constant-round post-quantum non-malleable com-
mitments under the assumption that there exists a natural number c > 0 such that quantum
polynomial-time adversaries cannot distinguish LWE samples from uniform with advantage bet-
ter than λ−ilog(c,λ), where ilog(c, λ) = log log · · ·c times log(λ) and λ denotes the security parameter.
We will focus on perfectly binding and computationally hiding constant-round interactive
commitments. Loosely speaking, a commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if no ad-
versary (also called a man-in-the-middle), when participating as a receiver in an execution of an
honest commitment Com(m), can at the same time generate a commitment Com(m′), such that
the message m′ is related to the original message m. This is equivalent (assuming the existence
of one-way functions with security against quantum adversaries) to a tag-based notion where the
commit algorithm obtains as an additional input a tag in {0, 1}λ , and the adversary is restricted
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to using a tag, or identity, that is different from the tag used to generate its input commitment.
We will rely on tag-based definitions throughout this paper. We will also only focus on the sy-
chronous setting, where the commitments proceed in rounds, and the man-in-the-middle sends its
own message for a specific round before obtaining an honest party’s message for the next round.
Before describing our ideas, we briefly discuss existingwork on classically-secure non-malleable
commitments. Unfortunately, existing constructions of constant-round non-malleable commit-
ments against classical adversaries from standard polynomial hardness assumptions [Bar02, PR05,
PR08, LPV, PPV08, LP09,Wee10, PW10, LP11, Goy11, GLOV12, GRRV14, GPR16, COSV16, COSV17,
Khu17, GR19] either rely on rewinding, or use Barak’s non-black-box simulation technique, both
of which require the reduction to perform state cloning. As such, known techniques fail to prove
quantum security of these constructions.
We now discuss our techniques for constructing post-quantum non-malleable commitments.
Just like several classical approaches, we will proceed in two steps.
• We will obtain simple base commitment schemes for very small tag/identity spaces from
slightly superpolynomial hardness assumptions.
• Then assuming polynomial hardness of LWE against quantum adversaries, and making use
of constant-round post-quantum zero-knowledge arguments, wewill convert non-malleable
commitments for a small tag space into commitments for a larger tag space, while only
incurring a constant round overhead.
For the base schemes, there are known classical constructions [PW10] that assume hardness
of LWE against 2λ
δ
-size adversaries, where λ denotes the security parameter and 0 < δ < 1 is
a constant. We observe that these constructions can be proven secure in the quantum setting,
resulting in schemes that are suitable for tag spaces of O(log log λ) tags.
Tag Amplification. Since an MPC protocol could be executed among up to poly(λ) parties where
poly(·) is an arbitrary polynomial, we end up requiring non-malleable commitments suitable for
tag spaces of poly(λ). This is obtained by combining classical tools for amplifying tag spaces [DDN91]
with constant round post-quantum zero-knowledge protocols. Our tag amplification protocol, on
input a scheme with tag space 2t, outputs a scheme with tag space 2t, for any t ≤ poly(λ). This
follows mostly along the lines of existing classical protocols, and as such we do not discuss the
protocol in detail here. Our protocol can be found in Section 7.3.
Base Schemes from λ−ilog(c,λ) Hardness. Returning to the question of constructing appropriate
base schemes, we also improve the assumption from 2λ
δ
-quantum hardness of LWE (that follows
based on [PW10]) to the mildly superpolynomial hardness assumption discussed at the beginning
of this subsection. Recall that we will only need to assume that there exists an (explicit) natural
number c > 0 such that quantum polynomial time adversaries cannot distinguish LWE samples
from uniform with advantage better than negl(λilog(c,λ)) where ilog(c, λ) = log log · · ·c times log(λ).
Our base scheme will only be suitable for identities in ilog(c + 1, λ), where c > 0 is a natural
number, independent of λ. We will then repeatedly apply the tag amplification process referred
to above to boost the tag space to 2λ, by adding only a constant number of rounds.
To build our base scheme, we take inspiration from the classically secure non-malleable com-
mitments of Khurana and Sahai [KS17]. However, beyond considering quantum as opposed
to classical adversaries, our protocol and analysis will have the following notable differences
from [KS17]:
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• The work of [KS17] relies on sub-exponential hardness (i.e. 2λδ security), which is stronger
than the type of superpolynomial hardness we assume. This is primarily because [KS17]
were restricted to two rounds, but we can improve parameters while allowing for a larger
constant number of rounds.
• [KS17] build a reduction that rewinds an adversary to the beginning of the protocol, and
executes the adversary several times, repeatedly sampling the adversary’s initial state. This
may be undesirable in the quantum setting.6 On the other hand, we have a simpler fully
straight-line reduction that only needs to run the adversary once.
Specifically, following [KS17], we will establish an erasure channel between the committer and
receiver that transmits the committed message to the receiver with probability ǫ. To ensure that
the commitment satisifies hiding, ǫ is chosen to be a value that is negligible in λ. At the same
time, the exact value of ǫ is determined by the identity (tag) of the committer. Recall that tag ∈
[1, ilog(c+ 1, λ)]. We will set ǫ = η−tag where η = λilog(c+1,λ) is a superpolynomial function of λ.
Next, for simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a case where the adversary’s tag (which we de-
note by tag′) is smaller than that of the honest party (which we denote by tag). In this case, the
adversary’s committed message is transmitted with probability ǫ′ = η−tag
′
, whereas the honest
committer’s message is transmitted with probability only ǫ = η−tag, which is smaller than ǫ′.
We set this up so that the transcript of an execution transmits the adversary’s message with
probability ǫ′ (over the randomness of the honest receiver), and on the other hand, an honestly
committed message will remain hidden except with probability ǫ < ǫ′ (over the randomness of the
honest committer). This gap in the probability of extraction will help us argue non-malleability,
using a proof strategy that bears resemblance to the proof technique in [BL18] (who relied on
stronger assumptions to achieve such a gap in the non-interactive setting).
We point out one subtlety in our proof that does not appear in [BL18]. Wemust rule out a man-
in-the-middle adversary that on the one hand, does not commit to a related message if its message
was successfully transmitted, but on the other hand, can succesfully perform a mauling attack if
its message was not transmitted. To rule out such an adversary, just like [KS17], wewill design our
erasure channel so that the adversary cannot distinguish transcripts where his committedmessage
was transmitted from those where it wasn’t.
Finally, our erasure channel can be cryptographically established in a manner similar to prior
work [KS17, KKS18, BFJ+20] via an indistinguishability-based variant of two-party secure func-
tion evaluation, that can be based on quantum hardness of LWE. Specifically, we would like to
ensure that the SFE error is (significantly) smaller than the transmission probabilities of our era-
sure channels: therefore, we will set parameters so that SFE error is λ−ilog(c,λ). We refer the reader
to Section 7 for additional details about our construction.
On Super-Constant Rounds from Polynomial Hardness. We also observe that for any t(λ) ≤
poly(λ), non-malleable commitments for tag space of size t(λ) can be obtained in O(t(λ)) rounds
based on any extractable commitment using ideas from [DDN91, CR87], where only one party
speaks in every round. These admit a straight-line reduction, and can be observed to be quantum-
secure. As such, based on quantum polynomial hardness of LWE and quantum FHE, we can
obtain a base protocol for O(log log . . .c times log λ) tags requiring O(log log . . .c times log λ) rounds,
for any constant c ∈ N. Applying our tag-amplification compiler to this base protocol makes it
6In particular this state may not always be efficiently sampleable, in which case it would be difficult to build an
efficient reduction.
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possible to increase the tag space to 2λ while only adding a constant number of rounds. Therefore,
this technique gives O(log log . . .c times log λ) round non-malleable commitments for exponentially
large tags from quantum polynomial hardness. It also yields constant round non-malleable com-
mitments for a constant number of tags from polynomial hardness.
2.4 Putting Things Together
Finally, we show how to combine the primitives described above to obtain a constant-round coin-
flipping protocol that supports straight-line simulation. As we saw above, in the setting of multi-
verifier zero-knowledge, simultanesouly simulating the view of multiple parties without rewind-
ing can be quite challenging, so a careful protocol and proof is needed.
Recall the outline presented at the beginning of this section, where each party first commits to
a uniformly random string, then broadcasts the committed message, and finally proves in ZK that
the message broadcasted is equal to the previously committed message. If all proofs verify, then
the common output is the XOR of all broadcasted strings. Recall also that the coin-tossing protocol
should be fully-simulatable. This means that a simulator should be able to force the common output
to be a particular uniformly drawn string given to it as input.
It turns out that in order to somehow force a particular output, the simulator should be able to
simultaneously extract in advance all the messages that adversarial parties committed to. In particu-
lar, we require commitments where a simulator can extract from multiple committers committing
in parallel. Here, we will rely on our parallel extractable commitment described above. Note that
we will also need to simulate the subsequent zero-knowledge arguments given by the malicious
parties in parallel, and thus we instantiate these with our parallel zero-knowledge argument de-
scribed above. However, an issue remains. What if an adversary could somehow maul an honest
party’s commitment to a related message and then broadcast that commitment as their own? This
could bias the final outcome away from uniformly random.
Thus, we need to introduce some form of non-malleability into the protocol. Indeed, we will
add another step at the beginning where each party commits to its message ci and some random-
ness ri using our post-quantum many-to-one non-malleable commitment.
7 Each party will then
commit to ci again with our extractable commitment, using randomness ri. Finally, each party
proves in zero-knowledge that the previous commitments were consistent.
This protocol can be proven to be fully simulatable. Intuitively, even though the simulator
changes the behavior of honest players in order to extract from the adversary’s commitments and
then later force the appropriate output, the initial non-malleable commitments given by the ad-
versarymust not change in a meaningful way, due the the guarantee of non-malleablity. However,
additional subtleties arise in the proof of security. In particular, during the hybrids the simulator
will first have to simulate the honest party zero-knowledge arguments, before changing the hon-
est party commitments in earlier stages. However, when changing an honest party’s commitment,
we need to rely on non-malleability to ensure that the malicious party commitments will not also
change in a non-trivial way. Here, we use a proof technique that essentially invokes soundess of
the adversary’s zero-knowledge arguments at an earlier hybrid but allows us to nevertheless rely
on non-malleable commitments to enforce that the adversary behaves consistently in all future
hybrids. More discussion and a formal analysis can be found in Section 8.
7Above we described a construction of one-to-one non-malleable commitment, though a hybrid argument [LPV]
shows that one-to-one implies many-to-one.
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2.5 Related Work
Classical secure multi-party computation was introduced and shown to be achievable in the two-
party setting by [Yao82] and in the multi-party setting by [GMW87]. Since these seminal works,
there has been considerable interest in reducing the round complexity of classical protocols. In
the setting of malicious security against a disjonest majority, [Lin03] gave the first constant-round
protocol for two-party computation, and [KOS03] gave the first constant-round protocol for multi-
party computation. Since then, there has been a long line of work improving on the exact round
complexity and assumptions necessary for classical multi-party computation (see e.g. [Pas04,
GMPP16]).
Post-quantum classical protocols. The above works generally focus on security against classical
polynomial-time adversaries. Another line of work, most relevant to the present work, has consid-
ered the more general goal of proving the security of classical protocols against arbitrary quantum
polynomial-time adversaries.
This study was initiated by van de Graaf [VDG98], who observed that the useful rewind-
ing technique often used to prove zero-knowledge in the classical setting may be problematic in
the quantum setting. In a breakthrough work, Watrous [Wat09] showed that several well-known
classical zero-knowledge protocols are in fact zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers, via a
careful rewinding argument. However, these protocols require a polynomial number of rounds
to achieve negligible security against quantum attackers. Later, Unruh [Unr12] developed a more
powerful rewinding technique that suffices to construct classical zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge secure against quantum adversaries, though still in a polynomial number of rounds. In a
recent work, [BS20] managed to construct a constant-round post-quantum zero-knowledge pro-
tocol, under assumptions similar to those required to obtain classical fully-homomorphic encryp-
tion. In another recent work, [AP19] constructed a constant-round protocol that is zero-knowledge
against quantum verifiers under the quantum LWE assumption, though soundness holds against
only classical provers.
There has also been some work on the more general question of post-quantum secure compu-
tation. In particular, [DL09] used the techniques developed in [Wat09] to build a two-party coin-
flipping protocol, and [LN11, HSS11] constructed general two-party computation secure against
quantum adversaries, in a polynomial number of rounds. More recently, [BS20] gave a constant-
round two-party coin-flipping protocol, with full simulation of one party. However, prior to this
work, nothing was known in the most general setting of post-quantum multi-party computation
(in the plain model).
Finally, we remark that post-quantum classical protocols do exist in the literature, as long
as some form of trusted setup is available. For example, the two-round protocol of [MW16]
from LWE is in the programmable common random string model, and was shown to be semi-
maliciously secure via straight-line simulation. Thus, applying the semi-malicious to malicious
compiler of [AJL+12] instantiated with a NIZK from LWE [PS19] gives a post-quantum mali-
ciously secure protocol in the common random string model from the quantum hardness of LWE.
Another example is the maliciously secure OT-based two-round protocol of [GS18] instantiated
with maliciously-secure oblivious transfer from LWE [PVW08].
Quantum protocols. Yet another line of work focuses on protocols for securely computing quan-
tum circuits. Generalmulti-party quantum computationwas shown to be achievable in the information-
theoretic setting (with honest majority) in the works of [CGS02, BCG+06]. In the computational
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setting, [DNS10] gave a two-party protocol secure against a quantum analogue of semi-honest
adversaries, and [DNS12] extended security of two-party quantum computation to the malicious
setting. In a recent work [DGJ+20] constructed a maliciously secure multi-party protocol for com-
puting quantum ciruits, assuming the existence of a maliciously secure post-quantum classical
MPC protocol. We remark that all of the above protocols operate in a polynomial number of
rounds.
3 Preliminaries
Various parts of this section are taken nearly verbatim from [BS20]. All algorithms of crypto-
graphic functionalities in this work are implicitly efficient and classical (i.e. require no quantum
computation or a quantum communication channel), unless noted otherwise. We rely on the stan-
dard notions of classical Turing machines and Boolean circuits:
• We say that a Turing machine (or algorithm) is PPT if it is probabilistic and runs in polyno-
mial time.
• We sometimes think about PPT Turing machines as polynomial-size uniform families of cir-
cuits (as these are equivalent models). A polynomial-size circuit family C is a sequence of
circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N, such that each circuit Cλ is of polynomial size λO(1) and has λO(1)
input and output bits. We say that the family is uniform if there exists a polynomial-time
deterministic Turing machineM that on input 1λ outputs Cλ.
• For a PPT Turing machine (algorithm) M , we denote by M(x; r) the output of M on input
x and random coins r. For such an algorithm, and any input x, we may write m ∈ M(x) to
denote the fact thatm is in the support ofM(x; ·).
Miscellaneous notation.
• For a distributionD that may explicitly take its random coins r as input, we denote by x← D
the process of sampling from D, and denote by x := D(r) the fixed outcome x that results
from sampling from D with random coins r.
• We denote by Uλ the uniform distribution over {0, 1}λ .
• Given an NP language Lwith associated relationRL, and an instance x, we letRL(x) denote
the set {w : RL(x,w) = 1}.
• For some natural number c and security parameter λ, we use ilog(c, λ) to denote log log · · · log︸ ︷︷ ︸
c times
(λ).
• We will use∆(X ,Y) to denote the statistical distance between two distributions X and Y .
3.1 Quantum Computation
We use standard notions from quantum computation.
• We say that a Turing machine (or algorithm) is QPT if it is quantum and runs in polynomial
time.
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• We sometimes think about QPT Turing machines as polynomial-size uniform families of
quantum circuits (as these are equivalent models). We call a polynomial-size quantum circuit
familiy C = {Cλ}λ∈N uniform if there exists a polynomial-time deterministic Turingmachine
M that on input 1λ outputs Cλ.
• Classical communication channels in the quantum setting are identical to classical commu-
nication channels in the classical setting, except that when a set of qubits is sent through a
classical communication channel, then the qubits are automatically measured in the stan-
dard basis, and the measured (now classical-state) qubits are then sent through the channel.
• A quantum interactive algorithm (in a 2-party setting) has input divided into two registers
and output divided into two registers. For the input qubits, one register is for an input
message from the other party, and a second register is for a potential inner state the machine
holds. For the output, one register is for the message to be sent to the other party, and
another register is for a potential inner state for the machine to keep to itself.
QuantumAdversarialModel. Wewould like to consider security definitions that not only achieve
quantum security, but are also composable and can be used modularly inside other protocols.
For this we think by default of security against polynomial-size quantum adversaries with non-
uniform polynomial-size quantum advice (i.e. an arbitrary quantummixed state that is not neces-
sarily efficiently generatable).
An adversary will be usually denoted by A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, where {A∗λ}λ∈N is a polynomial-
size non-uniform sequence of quantum circuits, and {ρλ}λ∈N is some polynomial-size sequence of
mixed quantum states. All adversaries are implicitly unrestricted in their behaviour (i.e. they are
fully malicious and can arbitrarily deviate from protocols). We conclude with notions regarding
indistinguishability in the quantum setting.
• A function f : N→ [0, 1] is:
– negligible if for every constant c ∈ N there exists N ∈ N such that for all n > N ,
f(n) < n−c.
– noticeable if there exists c ∈ N, N ∈ N s.t. for every n ≥ N , f(n) ≥ n−c.
• A quantum random variable is simply a random variable that can have values that are quan-
tum states. That is, a quantum random variable induces a probability distribution over
a (possibly infinite) set of quantum states. Such quantum random variables can also be
thought of as a mixed quantum state, which is simply a distribution over quantum states.
• For two quantum random variables X and Y , quantum distinguisher D with quantum
mixed state ρ as auxiliary input, and µ ∈ [0, 1], we writeX ≈D(ρ),µ Y if
|Pr[D(X; ρ) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ; ρ) = 1]| ≤ µ.
• Two ensembles of quantum random variables X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are said
to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈c Y , if for every polynomial-size
non-uniform quantum distinguisher with quantum advice D = {Dλ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a
negligible function µ such that for all λ ∈ N,
Xλ ≈Dλ(ρλ),µ(λ) Yλ.
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• The trace distance between two quantum distributions X,Y , denoted by TD(X,Y ), is a
generalization of statistical distance to the quantum setting and represents the maximal
distinguishing advantage between two quantum distributions by an unbounded quantum
algorithm. We thus say that X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are statistically indistin-
guishable (and write X ≈s Y ), if for every unbounded non-uniform quantum distinguisher
D = {Dλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ such that for all λ ∈ N, TD(Xλ, Yλ) ≤ µ(λ).
3.2 Notation for Interactive Protocols
Throughout, we will be considering interactive protocols, generally defined by a set of classical
interactive Turing machines {Mi}i∈[n]. We denote by τ ← 〈{Mi(yi)}i∈[n]〉(x) the public transcript
of their interaction on common input x, where each Mi has private input yi. More precisely, τ
consists of the messages sent between the {Mi}i∈[n], and is a random variable over the random
coins of eachMi. We let VIEWMj(〈{Mi(yi)}i∈[n]〉(x)) denote the view of some partyMj that results
from this interaction, which consists of the portion of the transcript τ that includes messages sent
by or received by Mj , along with Mj’s private state st at the end of the interaction. If Mj is a
quantum machine, then st may be a quantum state. If Mj is defined to have some specific output
at the end of the interaction, we denote this by OUTMj(〈{Mi(yi)}i∈[n]〉(x)).
Definition 3.1 (Explainable Transcript). Let {Mi}i∈[n] be a (classical) interactive protocol, and consider
some subset of participants {Mi}i∈I . We say that a transcript τ consisting of messages sent by and received
by {Mi}i∈I is explainable with respect to set I if there exists some {M∗i }i/∈I , inputs {yi}i∈I and random
coins {ri}i∈I such that τ is consistent with the transcript of an execution 〈{M∗i }i/∈I , {Mi(yi; ri)}i∈I〉.
Handling Abort and Misbehaviour. We set a general convention to handle publicly checkable
misbehavior by parties in any interactive protocol.
• For security parameter λ, for each message in the protocol, it will be known (publicly) based
on λ, what is the length of each message (or upper and lower bounds on that length). If a
party sends a message in an incorrect length, the receiving party fixes it locally and trivially;
if the message is too long, it cuts the message in a suitable place, and if it’s too short then
pads with zeros.
• Whenever a party aborts, all other parties ends communication and output ⊥.
3.3 Witness Indistinguishability
We use classical constant-round proof systems for NP (where both honest prover and verifier are
classical efficient algorithms) that are witness-indistinguishable against quantum verifiers. That
is, transcripts generated by the prover for twowitnesses to the same instance are indistinguishable
to quantum attackers.
Definition 3.2 (WI Proof System for NP). A witness-indistinguishable proof system for a language
L ∈ NP is a pair (P,V) of classical PPT interactive Turing machines. P and V interact on common input
1λ and x, and P additionally takes a private inputw. At the end of the interaction, V outputs a bit indicating
whether it accepts or rejects. The proof system should satisfy the following properties.
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1. Perfect Completeness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x),
Pr[OUTV〈P(w),V〉(1λ , x) = 1] = 1.
2. Statistical Soundness: For any non-uniform unbounded prover P∗ = {P∗λ}λ∈N, there exists a
negligible function µ(·) such that for any security parameter λ ∈ N and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr[OUTV〈P∗λ,V〉(1λ, x) = 1] = µ(λ).
3. Witness Indistinguishability: For every non-uniform quantum polynomial-size verifier V∗ =
{V∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, for any two sequences of witnesses {wλ}λ∈N, {vλ}λ∈N s.t. for every λ ∈ N, wλ and vλ
are both witnesses for the same xλ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, we have,
{VIEWV∗
λ
〈P(wλ), V ∗λ (ρλ)〉(1λ, x)}λ∈N ≈c {VIEWV∗λ〈P(vλ), V ∗λ (ρλ)〉(1λ, x)}λ∈N.
3.4 Sigma Protocol for NP
Definition 3.3 (Sigma Protocol forNP). A sigma protocol for anNP relationR is a pair (P = (P1,P2),V =
(V1,V2)) of classical PPT Turing machines with the following syntax. Given an instance x and witness w,
P1(x,w) outputs a string α and a prover state st. V1(1
|x|) is public-coin, and outputs a uniformly random
string β. Next, P2(x,w, st, α, β) outputs a string γ and finally, V2(x, α, β, γ) either accepts or rejects. The
proof system should satisfy the following properties.
1. Completeness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x),
Pr[OUTV〈P(w),V〉(x) = 1] = 1.
2. Statistical Soundness: For any non-uniform unbounded prover P∗ = {P∗λ}λ∈N, there exists a
negligible function µ(·) such that for any λ ∈ N and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr[OUTV〈P∗λ,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ).
3. Special Zero-Knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any {xλ, wλ}λ∈N where
|xλ| = λ and (xλ, wλ) ∈ R, and {βλ}λ∈N where |βλ| = λ,
{(α, γ) | (α, st)← P1(xλ, wλ), γ ← P2(xλ, wλ, st, α, βλ)}λ∈N ≈c {(α, γ)← Sim(xλ, βλ)}λ∈N.
Observe that due to the prover’s first message being generated independently of the verifier’s message,
this implies that for any {xλ, wλ}λ∈N where |xλ| = λ and (xλ, wλ) ∈ R,
{α← P1(xλ, wλ)}λ∈N ≈c {α | (α, γ)← Sim(xλ, 0λ)}λ∈N.
We refer to this as First-Message Indistinguishability.
Sigma protocols are known to follow from classical zero-knowledge proof systems such as the
(parallel repetition) of the 3-coloring protocol [GMW91], which is in turn based on non-interactive
perfectly-binding and computationally hiding commitments.
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3.5 Non-Interactive Commitment
Definition 3.4 (Quantum-secure Non-interactive Commitment). A non-interactive commitment is
defined by a PPT algorithm Com that takes as input security parameter 1λ and x ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a
commitment c. The commitment algorithm satisfies:
1. Perfect Binding: For any x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ of the same length, if c ∈ Com(1λ, x), c ∈ Com(1λ, x′),
then x = x′.
2. Quantum Computational Hiding: For any pair of poly(λ)-length strings x0 = {x0,λ}λ∈N, x1 =
{x1,λ}λ∈N, we have,
{Com(1λ, x0,λ)}λ∈N ≈c {Com(1λ, x1,λ)}λ∈N.
Instantiations. Non-interactive commitments with quantum hiding are known based on various
standard assumptions, including LWE [GHKW17].
3.6 Compute and Compare Obfuscation
We start by defining the class of compute and compare circuits.
Definition 3.5 (Compute and compare). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ be a circuit, and let u ∈ {0, 1}λ and
z ∈ {0, 1}∗ be two strings. Then CC[f, u, z](x) is a circuit that returns z if f(x) = u, and 0 otherwise.
We now define compute and compare (CC) obfuscators with perfect correctness. In what fol-
lows Obf is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a CC circuit CC[f, u, z] and outputs a new circuit
C˜C. (We assume that the CC circuitCC[f, u, z] is given in some canonical description from which
f , u, and z can be read.)
Definition 3.6 (CC obfuscator). An algorithm Obf is a compute and compare obfuscator if it satisfies:
1. Perfect correctness: For any circuit f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ, u ∈ {0, 1}λ, z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
Pr
[
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n : C˜C(x) = CC[f, u, z](x)
∣∣∣ C˜C← Obf(CC[f, u, z])] = 1 .
2. Simulation: There exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any polynomial-size quantum circuit
family f = {fλ}λ∈N and polynomial-length output string z = {zλ}λ∈N,
{C˜C|u← Uλ, C˜C← Obf(CC[fλ, u, zλ])}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(1|fλ|, 1|zλ|, 1λ}λ∈N.
Instantiations. Compute and compare obfuscators with almost perfect correctness are constructed
in [GKW17, WZ17] based on quantum LWE, and recently with perfect correctness in [GKVW19]
based on quantum LWE.
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3.7 Function-Hiding Secure Function Evaluation
We define secure function evaluation protocols with statistical circuit privacy and quantum input
privacy.
Definition 3.7 (2-Message Function Hiding SFE). A two-message secure function evaluation protocol
(SFE.Gen,SFE.Enc,SFE.Eval,SFE.Dec) has the following syntax:
• dk← SFE.Gen(1λ) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ and outputs a secret
key dk.
• ct ← SFE.Enc(dk, x) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a
ciphertext ct.
• ĉt← SFE.Eval(C, ct) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a classical circuit C and ciphertext ct and
outputs an evaluated ciphertext ĉt.
• x̂ = SFE.Dec(dk, ĉt) : a deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext ĉt and outputs a string x̂.
For any polynomial-size family of classical circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N the scheme satisfies:
• Perfect Correctness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and circuit C ∈ Cλ,
Pr[SFE.Decdk(ĉt) = C(x)|dk← SFE.Gen(1λ), ct← SFE.Encdk(x), ĉt← SFE.Eval(C, ct)] = 1
• Quantum Input Privacy: For polynomial ℓ(λ) and polynomial-size quantum adversary A∗ =
{A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every two length ℓ(λ) messages
{x0,λ}λ∈N, {x0,λ}λ∈N for every λ ∈ N:
Pr[A∗λ(ct) = b|dk← SFE.Gen(1λ), ct← SFE.Encdk(x)] ≤
1
2
+ µ(λ)
• Statistical Circuit Privacy: There exist unbounded algorithms, probabilistic Sim and deterministic
Ext such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, ct ∈ SFE.Enc(x), the extractor outputs Ext(ct) = x and:
{SFE.Eval(C, ct∗)} λ∈N,C∈Cλ,
ct∗∈{0,1}poly(λ)
≈s {Sim(C(Ext(ct∗; 1λ)); 1λ)} λ∈N,C∈Cλ,
ct∗∈{0,1}poly(λ)
Specifically, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for large enough λ, the statistical distance between
the two distributions is at most 2−λ
c
.
Wewill use the following claim in our analysis. This follows directly from the statistical circuit
privacy property.
Claim 3.1 (Evaluations of Agreeing Circuits are Statistically Close). Let ct∗ = {ct∗λ}λ∈N be any
(possibly non-ciphertext) poly(λ) length string and let C0 = {C0,λ}λ∈N, C1 = {C1,λ}λ∈N be two families
of circuits such that for all λ ∈ N, C0,λ and C1,λ have identical truth tables. Then
{SFE.Eval(C0, ct∗)}λ∈N,C0∈C0,λ ≈s {SFE.Eval(C1, ct∗)}λ∈N,C1∈C1,λ
Specifically, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for large enough λ, the statistical distance between the
two distributions is at most 2−λ
c
.
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Secure function evaluation schemes satisfying Definition 3.7 for functions in NC1 are known
based on quantum hardness of LWE [BD18].
We also define a superpolynomially secure variant of 2-message function hiding SFE where
the quantum input privacy property restricts adversaries to having smaller than inverse super-
polynomial advantage, for a small superpolynomial function.
Definition 3.8 (2-Message Function Hiding SFE). A two-message SFE protocol with superpolynomial
security is identical to the definition in Definition 3.7, except that it modifies the quantum input privacy
requirement as follows: There exists a constant c > 0 such that for polynomial ℓ(λ) and polynomial-size
quantum adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every two length
ℓ(λ) messages {x0,λ}λ∈N, {x0,λ}λ∈N for every λ ∈ N:
Pr[A∗λ(ct) = b|dk← SFE.Gen(1λ), ct← SFE.Encdk(x)] ≤
1
2
+ µ(λilog(c,λ))
Secure function evaluation schemes satisfying Definition 3.8 for functions in NC1 can be based
on quantum slightly superpolynomial hardness of LWE [BD18]. Specifically, we assume that QPT
distinguishers have advantage at most negl(λilog(c,λ)) in distinguishing LWE samples from uni-
formly randommatrices.
3.8 Quantum Rewinding Lemma
We will make use of the following lemma from [Wat09] and re-worded in [BS20].
Lemma 3.1. There is a quantum algorithm R that gets as input:
• A general quantum circuit Q with n input qubits that outputs a classical bit b and an additional m
qubits.
• An n-qubit state |ψ〉.
• A number t ∈ N.
R executes in time t · poly(|Q|) and outputs a distribution overm-qubit states Dψ := R(Q, |ψ〉, t) with the
following guarantees.
For an n-qubit state |ψ〉, denote by Qψ the conditional distribution of the output distribution Q(|ψ〉),
conditioned on b = 0, and denote by p(ψ) the probability that b = 0. If there exist p0, q ∈ (0, 1), ǫ ∈ (0, 12 )
such that:
• Amplification executes for enough time: t ≥ log(1/ǫ)4·p0(1−p0) ,
• There is some minimal probability that b = 0 : For every n-qubit state |ψ〉, p0 ≤ p(ψ),
• p(ψ) is input-independent, up to ǫ distance: For every n-qubit state |ψ〉, |p(ψ) − q| < ǫ, and
• q is closer to 12 : p0(1− p0) ≤ q(1− q),
then for every n-qubit state |ψ〉,
TD (Qψ,Dψ) ≤ 4
√
ǫ
log(1/ǫ)
p0(1− p0) .
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4 QuantumMulti-Key Fully-Homomorphic Encryption
4.1 Learning with Errors and Lattice Trapdoors
The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE), introduced by [Reg05], is parameterized by
a modulus q, positive integers n,m, and an error distribution χ. It asks to distinguish between the
distributions (A,As+e mod q) and (A,u), whereA is uniformly random in Zm×nq , s is uniformly
random in Znq , u is uniformly random in Z
m
q , and e is chosen from χ
m. As shown in [Reg05,
PRS17], for any sufficiently large modulus q, the LWE problem where χ is a discrete Gaussian
distribution with parameter σ = αq ≥ 2√n (i.e. the distribution over Z where the probability
of x is proportional to e−π(|x|/σ)
2
), is at least as hard as approximating the shortest independent
vector problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ = O˜(n/α) in worst case dimension n lattices. One
can truncate the discrete Gaussian distribution to have support only over integers bounded in
absolute value by σ ·ω(√log(λ))while only introducing a negligible difference. Thus, we will use
the fact that χmay be a B-bounded distribution, for some value B.
We will make use of the notion of a lattice trapdoor, defined in the following theorem [MP12].
Theorem 4.1 ([Ajt99, MP12]). There is an efficient randomized algorithm GenTrap(1n, 1m, q) that, given
any integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and sufficiently large m = O(n log q), outputs a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq and
a trapdoor τA such that the distribution of A is negligibly (in n) far from the uniform distribution.
Moreover, there is an efficient deterministic algorithm Invert that on input A, τA, and As + e, where
s is arbitrary in Znq and ||e|| ≤ q/(O(n log q)), returns s and e with overwhelming probability over
(A, τA)← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q).
In fact, we’ll need a slightly stronger version of the above statement. In particular, we will
actually need the correctness of Invert to hold perfectly rather than statistically over the randomness
of GenTrap. This can be arranged by slightly tweaking the GenTrap procedure.
Lemma 4.1. There exist algorithms GenTrap and Invert as described in Theorem 4.1 where Invert returns
s, e with probability 1.
Proof. (Sketch) Call a matrix-trapdoor pair (A, τA) “functional” if A is full rank (rank n) mod q,
τA is an m × m matrix such that τA · A = 0 mod q,8 each entry of τA is “small enough”, and τA
is full rank over the rationals. Such a functional matrix-trapdoor pair may be used to invert any
vector v = As + e, for small enough e, as follows. Left multiply v by τA over Zq, and then left
multiply the result by τ−1
A
over the rationals, which recovers e. Then subtract e from v and recover
s by linear algebra. Now observe that the four conditions for (A, τA) to be functional are all effi-
ciently checkable. Thus, the modified GenTrap algorithm can operate as follows. Sample (A, τA)
as before, then check if it is functional, and if not replace (A, τA) with some fixed functional pair.
Since GenTrap only outputs a non-functional pair with negligible probability, this modification
maintains the requirement that the distribution ofA is negligibly close to uniform.
4.2 Definition
Definition 4.1 (QuantumMulti-Key Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (QMFHE)). A quantummulti-
key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme is given by six algorithms (QMFHE.KeyGen, QMFHE.Enc,
8The trapdoor generation procedure presented in [MP12] actually results in an “inhomogeneous” trapdoor, where
it holds that τA ·A = G, for the gadget matrix G. However, one can derive a trapdoor satisfying τA ·A = 0 from an
inhomogeneous trapdoor.
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QMFHE.QEnc, QMFHE.Eval, QMFHE.Dec, QMFHE.QDec) with the following syntax.
• (pk, sk) ← QMFHE(1λ) : A PPT algorithm that given a security parameter, samples a classical
public key and a classical secret key.
• c ← QMFHE.Enc(pk, b) : A PPT algorithm that takes as input a bit b and outputs a classical
ciphertext.
• |φ〉 ← QMFHE.QEnc(pk, |ψ〉) : A QPT algorithm that takes as input a qubit |ψ〉 and outputs a
ciphertext represented in qubits.
• ĉ, |φ̂〉 ← QMFHE.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn), C, (|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉)): A QPT algorithm that takes as input
1. A set of n public keys.
2. A general quantum circuit with ℓ1+ · · ·+ ℓn input qubits and ℓ′ output qubits, out of whichm
are measured.
3. A set of n ciphertexts where |φi〉 encrypts an ℓi-qubit state under public key pki. Some of the
ℓi ciphertexts are possibly classical ciphertexts (generated by the classical encryption algorithm)
encrypting classical bits.
The evaluation algorithm outputs a classical ciphertext ĉ encryptingm bits (under keys pk1, . . . , pkn),
plus a quantum ciphertext |φ̂〉 encrypting an (ℓ′−m)-qubit quantum state (under keys pk1, . . . , pkn).
• b ← QMFHE.Dec((sk1, . . . , skn), c): A PPT algorithm that takes as input a set of n secret keys and
a classical ciphertext c and outputs a bit.
• |ψ〉 ← QMFHE.QDec((sk1, . . . , skn), |φ〉): A QPT algorithm that takes as input a set of n secret
keys and a quantum ciphertext |φ〉 and outputs a qubit.
The scheme satisfies the following.
1. Quantum Semantic Security: The encryption algorithm maintains quantum semantic security.
2. Compactness: There exists a polynomial poly(·) s.t. for every quantum circuit C with ℓ′ output
qubits and an encryption of an input for C , the output size of the evaluation algorithm is poly(λ, ℓ′),
where λ is the security parameter of the scheme.
3. Classicality-Preserving Quantum Homomorphism: Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a polynomial-
size quantum circuit, where Cλ has ℓ1(λ) + · · · + ℓn(λ) input qubits and ℓ′(λ) output qubits, of
which m(λ) are measured. Let |φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉 = {|φ1〉λ, . . . , |φn〉λ}λ∈N be an input state for C ,
let (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn) = {(pk1, sk1)λ, . . . , (pkn, skn)λ}λ∈N be pairs of public and secret keys
(∀i ∈ [n], λ ∈ N, (pki, ski)λ ∈ QMFHE.KeyGen(1λ)) and let r1, . . . , rn = {(r1)λ, . . . , (rn)λ}λ∈N
be n random strings for the encryption algorithm. Then there exists a negligible function µ(·) such
that for all λ ∈ N,
TD(ρ0,λ, ρ1,λ) ≤ µ(λ),
where ρ0, ρ1 are quantum distributions defined as follows:
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• ρ0,λ: For each i ∈ [n], encrypt each classical bit of |φi〉 with QMFHE.Enc(pki, ·) and the rest
withQMFHE.QEnc(pki, ·) (using randomness ri). ExecuteQMFHE.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn), C, ·)
on the n encryptions to get ĉ, |φ̂〉, where ĉ is a classical ciphertext encrypting m(λ) bits. Then
output QMFHE.Dec((sk1, . . . , skn), ĉ),QMFHE.QDec((sk1, . . . , skn), |φ̂〉).
• ρ1,λ: Output C(|φ1, . . . , φn〉).
Known classical LWE-based constructions of multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption [CM15,
MW16, PS16, BHP17] do not quite satisfy the above syntax.9 Instead, they relax the syntax to allow
for some notion of setup. In this work, we will be interested in the notion of distributed setupwhich
was achieved in the classical setting by [BHP17].
Definition 4.2 (QMFHE with Distributed Setup). A QMFHE scheme QMFHE has distributed setup if
it includes the following algorithm.
• QMFHE.Setup(1λ, 1n, i): A PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter, a number of
parties, and an index i ∈ [n], and outputs a string ppi.
We then define the public parameters of the scheme pp = (pp1, . . . , ppn) and assume that all other algo-
rithms take pp as input.
Remark 4.1. This notion of distributed setup gives rise to a stronger notion of semantic security,
which considers rushing adveraries that may generate {ppj}j 6=i maliciously, possibly depending
on ppi. More formally, in the security game the adversary first picks n and an i ∈ [n] and sends
these to its challenger. The challenger then runs ppi ← QMFHE.Setup(1λ, 1n, i), and returns ppi
to the adversary. Then, the adversary generates {ppj}j∈[n]\{i} arbitrarily and sends these to its
challenger. Finally, the challenger draws a public key secret key pair based on {ppi}i∈[n], and the
semantic security game continues are usual. This notion of semantic security was achieved in the
classical setting by [BHP17].
In this work, we also consider amore stringent requirement on the operation of theQMFHE.Dec
algorithm, which we call nearly linear decryption of classical ciphertexts. Essentially, this states that
decrypting a classical ciphertext c encrypted under keys sk1, . . . , skn amounts to computing a lin-
ear function Lc (defined by c) on the concatenated secret keys [sk1 | . . . | skn]modulo some integer
q, and then rounding.
Definition 4.3 (QMFHEwithNearly Linear Decryption of Classical Ciphertexts). AQMFHE scheme
QMFHE has nearly linear decryption of classical ciphertexts if the QMFHE.Dec algorithm operates as fol-
lows.
• QMFHE.Dec((sk1, . . . , skn), c): There is an efficiently computable linear function Lc (determined by
c) and an (even) integer q such that the decryption prodecure computes
Lc(sk1, . . . , skn) = b · q/2 + e mod q
(where e < q/4) and returns b ∈ {0, 1}. Equivalenty, we can define linear functions L(1)c , . . . ,L(n)c
such that the decryption procedure computes∑
i∈[n]
L(i)c (ski) = b · q/2 + e mod q.
9Though there are NTRU-based constructions that do [LTV12, AJJM20].
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Finally, we remark that we do not consider an additional security property often found in
classical constructions ofmulti-key FHE,which roughly stipulates that partial decryptions of other
parties may be simulated. This property is most relevant when considering the direct application
of multi-key FHE to MPC, but we will not need it in this work.
4.3 Background
We follow the template given by [Mah18] for constructing a quantum fully-homormorphic en-
cryption scheme. [Mah18] essentially showed that a classical fully-homomorphic scheme FHE can
be converted into a quantum fully-homomorphic scheme, as long as it has a few additional prop-
erties, necessary for computing the so-called encrypted CNOT operation (properties 2-4 in Defini-
tion 4.4).
Unfortunately, no known fully-homomorphic schemes immediatedly satisfy these properties.
However, [Mah18] observed that the dual Regev (non-fully-homomorphic) encryption scheme
of [GPV08] does satisfy these properties, and moreover, and that there exists a fully-homomorphic
encryption scheme FHE (the dual version of [GSW13]) with an efficient procedure for converting
an FHE ciphertext into a dual Regev ciphertext encrypting the same message. In fact, the conver-
sion procedure presented in [Mah18] simply consists of taking the last column of the FHE cipher-
text. This suffices to give a quantum fully-homomorphic encryption scheme, since before every
encrypted CNOT operation, the evaluator can convert any FHE ciphertext needed during the op-
eration into a dual Regev ciphertext, and then proceed. The fourth property below is needed in
order to convert an evaluated dual Regev ciphertext back into an FHE ciphertext upon completion
of the encrypted CNOT operation.10
This motivated the definition of a quantum-capable fully-homomorphic encryption scheme
given in [Mah18]. Such a scheme admits an efficient procedure that converts ciphertexts into ci-
phertexts of an alternate encryption scheme AHE that satisfies the properties necessary to carry
out the encrypted CNOT operation. [Mah18] showed that any such FHE scheme gives rise to an
FHE scheme that can additionally encrypt quantum states and evaluate quantum circuits. Below
we give the analogous definition for multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption, and follow with a
sketch of the analogous conversion from quantum-capable multi-key fully-homomorphic encryp-
tion to quantum multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption.
Definition 4.4 (Quantum-Capable Multi-Key Fully-Homomorphic Encryption Scheme). LetMFHE
be a classical multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme. MFHE is quantum-capable if i) its KeyGen
procedure outputs a public key pk, secret key sk, and “trapdoor” τ , and ii) there exists an alternate encryp-
tion scheme AHE such that the following properties holds.
1. There exists an algorithm MFHE.Convert that takes as input a set of public keys pk1, . . . , pkt and a
ciphertext c encrypted under pk1, . . . , pkt, and outputs an encryption ĉ under AHE with public keys
pk1, . . . , pkt, where c and ĉ encrypt the same value.
2. There exists an invertible operation ⊕H (which may depend on pk1, . . . , pkt) on AHE ciphertexts such
that, for all x0, x1, a ∈ {0, 1}, AHE.Enc((pk1, . . . , pkt), x0) ⊕H a · AHE.Enc((pk1, . . . , pkt), x1) is
an AHE encryption of x0 ⊕ a · x1 under pk1, . . . , pkt.
10For technical reasons, the randomness in the dual Regev ciphertext must also be recovered, which motivates the
need for a trapdoor rather than merely a secret key.
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3. There exists a distribution D (which may depend on pk1, . . . , pkt) such that for all ciphertexts c that
can arise during homomorphic evaluation,11
{AHE.Enc((pk1, . . . , pkt), x; r) | (x, r)← D}
≈s{AHE.Enc((pk1, . . . , pkt), x; r)⊕H c | (x, r)← D},
and there is an efficient procedure for generating the superposition
∑
x,r
√
D(x, r)|x, r〉.
4. There exists an efficient function f such that for any c = AHE.Enc((pk1, . . . , pkt), x; r), f((τ1, . . . , τt), c) =
(x, r).
From quantum-capability to multi-key quantum FHE. We now sketch, following [Mah18]’s ap-
proach in the single-key setting, how a quantum-capable multi-key FHE scheme gives rise to a
full-fledged quantum multi-key FHE scheme. The following description makes use of the quan-
tum one-time pad (QOTP), which is a method of perfectly encrypting arbitrary quantum states
|φ〉 using classical bits k. We refer the reader to [Mah18] for details about how the QOTP is con-
structed and proven secure. We do not present details about how individual quantum gates are
evaluated, or the inner workings of the encrypted CNOT operation, electing instead to present a
high-level picture. Again we refer the reader to [Mah18] for all of these details. The following as-
sumes a quantum-capable multi-key FHE scheme QCMFHE, and describes a quantum multi-key
FHE scheme QMFHE.
• Key generation. This procedure generates (pk′, sk′, τ) ← QCMFHE.KeyGen(1λ), computes a
ciphertext ct(τ) ← QCMFHE.Enc(pk′, τ), and sets the public key ofQMFHE to pk := (pk′, ct(τ))
and the secret key to sk := sk′.
• Encryption. To encrypt a quantum state |φ〉, sample a random QOTP key k and release the
ciphertext ct = (QCMFHE.Enc(pk′, k),QOTP(k, |φ〉)). To encrypt a classical stringm, sample
a classical one-time pad key k and release ct = (QCMFHE.Enc(pk′, k), k ⊕m).
• Homomorphic evaluation. This operation takes as input t public keys {pki = (pk′i, ct(τ)i )}i∈[t]
and t ciphertexts {cti = (ci, |c〉i)}i∈[t]. It first expands each ci into a multi-key ciphertext c′i
encrypted under all public keys pk′1, . . . , pk
′
t, and gathers all components into a quantum
multi-key ciphertext (cˆ, |cˆ〉) = ((c′1, . . . , c′t), (|c〉1, . . . , |c〉t)). It also expands and concatenates
the ciphertexts {ct(τ)i }i∈[t] to produce an evaluation key cˆt(τ) that encrypts the trapdoors
(τ1, . . . , τt) under all public keys pk
′
1, . . . , pk
′
t. Next, it applies a quantum circuit gate by gate
on the ciphertext, as follows.
– If the gate is of a particular type, namely, it is a Clifford operator, then homomorphically
evaluating the gate can be done via a parallel procedure, where a classical circuit is
applied homomorphically over cˆ to produce cˆ′, and a quantum circuit is applied directly
to |c〉 to produce |cˆ′〉.
– Any universal gate set for quantum computation must contain at least one non-Clifford
operator, and [Mah18] includes the Toffoli gate. [Mah18] gives a procedure for homo-
morphically applying the Toffoli gate that involves parallel operations as above along
11This set will consist of all ciphertexts with noise below some fixed bound.
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with an encrypted CNOT operation, which requires the following manipulation. First,
QCMFHE.Convert is run on cˆ to produce an AHE ciphertext dˆ. This ciphertext is used to
define a quantum circuit that is applied to |c〉 to produce |c′〉 along with a (measured)
AHE ciphertext dˆ′. Finally, the function f (defined in property 4 of Definition 4.4), with
ciphertext dˆ′ hard-coded, is applied homomorphically over cˆt
(τ)
to produce a classical
ciphertext c′ encrypting the message and randomness from dˆ′.
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext (cˆ, |cˆ〉) encrypting a qubit under pk1, . . . , pkt, and corre-
spondingQCMFHE secret keys sk′1, . . . , sk
′
t, this operation runsQCMFHE.Dec.((sk
′
1, . . . , sk
′
t), cˆ)
to produce a key k, and then uses k to decrypt the one-time padded state |cˆ〉. The same pro-
cedure works if |cˆ〉was instead a classical string k ⊕m.
4.4 Construction
Existing classical multi-key fully-homorphic encryption schemes [LTV12, CM15, MW16, PS16,
BHP17, AJJM20] in the literature do not appear to admit a simple conversion procedure nec-
essary for quantum-capability, such as the one enjoyed by dual-GSW in the single-key setting.
However, we show that indeed there exists a general conversion procedure that works for any
multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with nearly linear decryption (see Definition 4.3).
This method is essentially key-switching (see for example [BV11, BDGM19]), and relies on the
existence of a multi-key linearly-homomorphic encryption scheme. This multi-key linearly homo-
morphic scheme is an extension of dual Regev encryption, and is implicit in the construction that
follows.
Let MFHE be a classical multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with nearly linear
decryption. Consider the following scheme QCMFHE, which is identical to MFHE except that it
has a differentKeyGen algorithm and it additionally supports a Convert algorithm. Let q be an even
k-bit modulus, let g = (1, 2, . . . , 2k), and for y ∈ Zq, let g−1(y) ∈ {0, 1}k be the binary expansion of
y, i.e. it holds that g⊤ · g−1(y) = y.
• QCMFHE.KeyGen(1λ):
1. Compute (MFHE.pk,MFHE.sk) ← MFHE.KeyGen(1λ), where MFHE.sk ∈ Zℓq and ℓ =
poly(λ).
2. Let n,m be positive integers and χ be a B-bounded error distribution, where n,m,B =
poly(λ).
3. Draw (B, τ)← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q), b← Znq , and setA =
(
B
b⊤
)
.
4. ParseMFHE.sk ∈ Zℓq as µ1, . . . , µℓ ∈ Zq, and for each i ∈ [ℓ], compute the following.
(a) Draw S← Zn×kq and E← χ(m+1)×k .
(b) SetCi := A · S+E+ µi · g⊤ · um+1, where um+1 is the (m+ 1)-dimensional vector
with all 0s except the final coordinate is 1.
5. Output pk := (MFHE.pk,C1, . . . ,Cℓ), sk := MFHE.sk, and τ .
• QCMFHE.Convert((pk1, . . . , pkt), c): Let the linear function Lc determined by c consist of co-
efficients a1,1, . . . , a1,ℓ, . . . , at,1, . . . , at,ℓ. Parse each pki to obtainCi,1, . . . ,Ci,ℓ and define Ĉi,j
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as follows. Let C¯i,j be the firstm rows ofCi,j and ci,j be the last row. Then Cˆi,j ∈ Z(mℓ+1)×kq
is the matrix with 0s everywhere except that the (i− 1)m+1, . . . , im rows are set to C¯i,j and
the last row is set to ci,j . Output ∑
i∈[t],j∈[ℓ]
Cˆi,j · g−1(ai,j).
We assume that the parameters of MFHE are instantiated in a particular way, namely, the
modulus q is set such that for any well-formed ciphertext c (encrypted under a set of t public
keys) that may arise during homomorphic evaluation, Lc(sk1, . . . , skt) = q/2 + e mod q, where
q ≥ ω(poly(λ)) · |e|. Recall that the linear function Lc is guaranteed to exist by the nearly linear
decryption property.
Theorem 4.2. Assuming the existence of a multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme MFHE with
nearly linear decryption and a particular circular security property, there exists a quantum multi-key fully-
homomorphic encryption scheme QMFHE. Moreover, QMFHE satisfies the following properties.
1. The QMFHE.Setup algorithm is equivalent toMFHE.Setup.
2. If MFHE is perfectly correct, then QMFHE satisfies Classicality-Preserving Quantum Homomor-
phism.
Proof. QMFHE is obtained by first applying the construction described in Section 4.4 to MFHE to
obtain QCMFHE, followed by the construction sketched in Section 4.3.
First, we argue thatQCMFHE is indeed quantum-capable. Consider the output of theQCMFHE.Convert
algorithm. It is straightforward to verify that if c is a well-formed encryption under public keys
pk1, . . . , pkt of the bit µ, where each pki may be parsed as
(
Bi
b⊤i
)
, then the resulting vector may be
written as 
B1
. . .
Bt
b⊤1 . . . b
⊤
t
 · s∗ + e∗ + q2

0
...
0
µ
 ,
for some s∗ ∈ Ztnq , e∗ ∈ Z(m+1)ℓ. This is exactly an encryption of µ under the dual Regev scheme
with public key 
B1
. . .
Bt
b⊤1 . . . b
⊤
t
 .
Thus the AHE scheme we use in Definition 4.4 is identical to the scheme used in [Mah18]. This
shows that QCMFHE satisfies the first requirement in Definition 4.4, and the fact that it satisfies
also the second requirement is immediate.
To confirm that QCMFHE satisfies the third requirement, we take a closer look at e∗. The dis-
tribution D used by [Mah18] samples µ and s uniformly at random, and e from a discrete Guas-
sian distribution with “large enough” parameter B′. This requirement will hold if B′ is super-
polynomially larger than the entries of e∗ (see Lemma 3.3 and Section 5.3 of [Mah18] for more
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details). Note that the modulus q is super-polynomially larger than each entry of e∗, by the as-
sumption on parameters ofMFHE. Indeed, all but the last entry are bounded by ℓ · k ·B = poly(λ),
and the last entry is bounded by t · ℓ ·k ·B plus the error that results from the nearly linear decryp-
tion, which is super-polynomially smaller than q. This allows us to define B′ to be large enough
such that the third requirement will hold.
To confirm that QCMFHE satisfies the fouth requirement, note that s∗ may be written as a
concatenation of t n-dimensional vectors, and that the i’th such vector may be recovered by using
τi, by Lemma 4.1. This process also recovers all but the last entry of e
∗. The last entry of e∗ may
then be recovered by subtracting the public key times s∗ and rounding the last element of the
resulting vector.
The above shows that QCMFHE is quantum-capable according to Definition 4.4. Next, we dis-
cuss security of the schemeQMFHE obtained by applying the construction sketched in Section 4.3.
Observe that QMFHE.KeyGen outputs a public key that contains aMFHE public key, a dual Regev
public key, an encryption of the MFHE secret key under the dual Regev public key, and an en-
cryption of the dual Regev trapdoor under theMFHE secret key. Since QMFHE encryption involves
encrypting a QOTP key under MFHE and using that key to perfectly hide the message, it follows
that security ofQMFHE reduces to the security ofMFHE in the presence of the particular two-cycle
of keys described above (which at the very least relies on LWE to ensure security of dual Regev).
Thus, as stated in the theorem, security follows from a particular circular security property of
MFHE.12
It remains to argue that the two extra properties promised by the theorem statement hold.
First, note that the constructions given in Section 4.4 and Section 4.3 do not alter anyMFHE.Setup
algorithm that may exist. Next, the second property boils down to showing that for every choice of
random coins used in QMFHE.KeyGen, homomorphic evaluation of quantum (or classical) circuits
will be statistically correct. Perfect correctness of any Clifford operation follows directly from
perfect correctness of MFHE. Statistical correctness of the encrypted CNOT operation follows
from properties 2 and 3 of Definition 4.4 (this analysis can be found in [Mah18]), plus the perfect
correctness of property 4, which is ensured by using the variant of theGenTrap algorithm promised
by Lemma 4.1.
4.5 Quantum Spooky Encryption
We define the notion of spooky encryption for (classical) relations computable by quantum cir-
cuits, generalizing the purely classical notion from [DHRW16]. In favor of a simpler exposition
we present the additive function sharing (AFS) variant of the notion, but we note that considering
more general relations (in the same spirit as [DHRW16]) is also possible.
Definition 4.5 (Quantum AFS-Spooky Encryption). A quantum AFS-spooky encryption scheme is
given by six algorithms (Spooky.KeyGen, Spooky.Enc, Spooky.QEnc, Spooky.Eval, Spooky.Dec, Spooky.QDec)
with the same syntax as the corresponding QMFHE algorithms defined in Definition 4.1, except for the fol-
lowing differences.
• b← QMFHE.Dec(sk, c): A PPT algorithm that takes as input a secret key and a classical ciphertext
c and outputs a bit. (This algorithm takes only one secret key, as opposed to n secret keys in QMFHE.)
12This property is similar to the one needed by [Mah18] in the single-key setting, in the sense that encryption of a
dual Regev trapdoor is part of the circular security requirement.
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• ĉ1, . . . , ĉn, |φ̂〉 ← Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn), C, (|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉)): A QPT algorithm that takes as
input
1. A set of n public keys.
2. A general quantum circuit with ℓ1+ · · ·+ ℓn input qubits and ℓ′ output qubits, out of whichm
are measured.
3. A set of n ciphertexts where |φi〉 encrypts an ℓi-qubit state under pki. Some of the ℓi ciphertexts
are possibly classical ciphertexts (generated by the classical encryption algorithm) encrypting
classical bits.
The evaluation algorithm outputs n classical ciphertexts (ĉ1, . . . , ĉn) each encrypting m bits under
the corresponding pki, plus a quantum ciphertext |φ̂〉 encrypting an (ℓ′ − m)-qubit quantum state
(under keys pk1, . . . , pkn). (This algorithm outputs n classical ciphertexts, as opposed to one in
QMFHE.)
The scheme satisfies the same properties of quantum semantic security and compactness as defined in Defi-
nition 4.1. In the following we present the notion of correctness for quantum AFS-spooky encryption.
• Correctness of Spooky Evaluation: Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a polynomial-size quantum circuit,
where Cλ has ℓ1(λ)+ · · ·+ ℓn(λ) input qubits and ℓ′(λ) output qubits, of whichm(λ) are measured.
Let |φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉 = {|φ1〉λ, . . . , |φn〉λ}λ∈N be an input state for C , let (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn) =
{(pk1, sk1)λ, . . . , (pkn, skn)λ}λ∈N be pairs of public and secret keys (∀i ∈ [n], λ ∈ N, (pki, ski)λ ∈
Spooky.KeyGen(1λ)) and let r1, . . . , rn = {(r1)λ, . . . , (rn)λ}λ∈N be n random strings for the en-
cryption algorithm. Then there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
TD(ρ0,λ, ρ1,λ) ≤ µ(λ),
where ρ0, ρ1 are quantum distributions defined as follows:
– ρ0,λ: For each i ∈ [n], encrypt each classical bit of |φi〉 with Spooky.Enc(pki, ·) and the rest
with Spooky.QEnc(pki, ·) (using randomness ri). Execute Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn), C, ·)
on the n encryptions to get (ĉ1, . . . , ĉn), |φ̂〉, where (ĉ1, . . . , ĉn) are classical ciphertexts each
encrypting m(λ) bits. Then output
n⊕
i=1
Spooky.Dec(ski, ĉi),Spooky.QDec((sk1, . . . , skn), |φ̂〉).
– ρ1,λ: Output C(|φ1, . . . , φn〉).
(Classical) AFS-Spooky Encryption with Distributed Setup. As a stepping stone towards the
main result of this section, we show how to construct spooky encryption for classical relations
with a distributed setup. More precisely, assuming the hardness of the LWE problem, we show
an instantiation of spooky encryption for any polynomial-size (classical) circuit where the parties
jointly compute the public parameters of the system via a local algorithm Spooky.Setup (with the
same syntax as Definition 4.2). This stands in contrast with the scheme of [DHRW16], where
the common reference string is assumed to be sampled by a trusted party. Before describing the
construction, we recall a useful lemma (rephrased) from [DHRW16].
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Lemma 4.2 ([DHRW16]). Let Spooky be an AFS-spooky encryption scheme that supports (i) single key
additive homomorphism and (ii) two-key spooky multiplication. Then the same scheme supports the AFS-
spooky evaluation of all polynomial-size (classical) circuits.
It follows that it suffices to construct a spooky encryption that supports a single multiplication
over an arbitrary pair of keys. We do this by showing that the scheme from [BHP17] supports two-
key spookymultiplication. This follows from the fact that the decryption circuit is identical to that
of [CM15, MW16], which was shown to support two-key spooky multiplication in [DHRW16].
For completness, we recall the modified algorithms in the following.
• Spooky.Enc(pk,m): Same asMFHE.Enc but append an extra δ = 0 to the resulting ciphertext.
• Spooky.Dec(sk, c): Let Lc be the linear function defined by c, compute
v = Lc(sk) + δ mod q
and return 0 if |v| < q/4 and 1 otherwise.
• Spooky.Eval((pk1, pk2), C, (c1, c2)): Compute
ĉ← MFHE.Eval
(
(pk1, pk2),
∏
, (c1, c2)
)
and let L(1)ĉ and L
(2)
ĉ be the linear functions defined by the resulting ĉ. Sample a uniform δ
from Zq and return (L(1)ĉ , δ) and (L
(2)
ĉ ,−δ).
As discussed above, the scheme is quantum semantically secure assuming the hardness of the
LWE problem. Correctness follows, for the same choice of parameters of [BHP17], by an invoca-
tion of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 ([DHRW16]). Fix a modulus q ∈ Z, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a value v ∈ Zq such that v = q/2·b+e
mod q, for some |e| < q/4. Sample v1 and v2 uniformly at random from Zq constrained on the fact that
v1 + v2 = v mod q, and let bi = 0 if |vi| < q/4 and bi = 1 otherwise. Then
Pr[b1 ⊕ b2 = b] > 1− 2(|e|+ 1)/q
over the random choice of v1 and v2.
Quantum AFS-Spooky Encryption with Distributed Setup. Finally, we show how to combine a
classical AFS-spooky encryption scheme Spooky (with distributed setup) with a quantum multi-
key fully-homomorphic encryption QMFHE (with distributed setup) to obtain a quantum AFS-
spooky encryption scheme QSpooky. Since both of the building blocks have a distributed setup,
then so does the resulting encryption scheme. The scheme is described below.
• QSpooky.Setup(1λ): Compute pp ← QMFHE.Setup(1λ) and p˜p ← Spooky.Setup(1λ) and re-
turn (pp, p˜p).
• QSpooky.KeyGen(1λ, pp): Sample
(pk′, sk′)← QMFHE.KeyGen(1λ, pp) and (p˜k, s˜k)← Spooky.KeyGen(1λ, p˜p)
and compute c˜ ← Spooky.Enc(p˜k, sk′). Return pk := (pk′, p˜k, c˜) as the public key and sk :=
(sk′, s˜k) as the secret key.
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• QSpooky.Enc(pk,m): Return QMFHE.Enc(pk′,m).
• QSpooky.QEnc(pk, |ψ〉): Return QMFHE.QEnc(pk′, |ψ〉).
• QSpooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkn), C, (|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉)): Compute
(ĉ, |φ̂〉)← QMFHE.Eval((pk′1, . . . , pk′n), C, (|φ1〉, . . . , |φn〉))
and let (c˜1, . . . , c˜n) be the corresponding element of each public key. Compute
(ĉ1, . . . , ĉn)← Spooky.Eval((p˜k1, . . . , p˜kn),QMFHE.Dec(·, ĉ), (c˜1, . . . , c˜n))
and return (ĉ1, . . . , ĉn, |φ〉).
• QSpooky.Dec(sk, c): Return Spooky.Dec(s˜k, c).
• QSpooky.QDec((sk1, . . . , skn), |φ〉): Return QMFHE.QDec((sk′1, . . . , sk′n), |φ〉).
The following theorem establishes our claim.
Theorem 4.3. Assuming that QMFHE is a quantum multi-key fully-homomorhic encryption scheme and
that Spooky is a classical AFS-spooky encryption, QSpooky is a quantumAFS-spooky encryption scheme.13
Proof. Assuming quantum semantic security of Spooky, the changes in the key generation algo-
rithm do not affect the security of the scheme. Then quantum semantic security follows from an
invocation of the quantum semantic security ofQMFHE. Correctness of spooky evaluation follows
from the classicality-preserving homomorphism of QMFHE and from the correctness of classical
spooky evaluation of Spooky.
In [DHRW16] it was shown that AFS-spooky encryption implies generically the existence of
homomorphic secret sharing [BGI16] for the same class of functions. As a corollary of the above
theorem, we obtain a homomorphic secret sharing scheme for quantum circuits (with classical
inputs and outputs).
5 Quantum-Secure Multi-Committer Extractable Commitment
In this section, we follow the outline presented in Section 2.1 to construct a commitment scheme
that allows for simultaneous extraction from multiple parallel committers. The protocol is some-
what more involved than the high-level description given earlier, so we briefly highlight the dif-
ferences.
First, the committer is instructed to (non-interactively) commit to its message and trapdoor
at the very beginning of the protocol. We use these commitments to take advantage of non-
uniformity in the reductions betwen hybrids in the extractability proof. In particular, hybrids
that come before the step where the simulator goes “under the hood” of the FHE may still need
access to the trapdoor and commitment, and this can be given to any reduction via non-uniform
advice consisting of each committer’s first message and corresponding openings.
13In fact, we also need the quantum spooky encryption scheme to be multi-hop, which follows if the classical AFS-
spooky scheme is multi-hop (which is satisfied by [DHRW16]).
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Next, the CDS described earlier is replaced with a function-hiding secure function evalua-
tion (SFE) protocol. In order to rule out the malleability attack mentioned in Section 2.1, where
a malicious receiver mauls the AFS-spooky encryption of the committer’s trapdoor into an SFE
encryption of the trapdoor, we do the following. The first message sent by the receiver to each
committer Ci will actually be a commitment to some key ki of a generic secret-key encryption
scheme. After Ci sends its AFS-spooky encryption ciphertext and compute and compare obfusca-
tion, the receiver prepares and sends a secret-key encryption of an arbitrary message. Then, the
receiver’s input to the SFE consists of the opening to its earlier commitment ki, and the SFE checks
if the secret-key encryption sent by the receiver is actually an encryption of the committer’s trap-
door under secret key ki. If so, it returns the lock and otherwise it returns ⊥. This setup ensures
that a malicious receiver cannot maul the AFS-spooky encryption of the committer’s trapdoor, for
the following reason. If it could, then a non-uniform reduction to the semantic security of AFS-
spooky encryption may obtain the receiver’s committed ki as advice and decrypt the receiver’s
secret-key encryption to obtain the trapdoor. Of course, this assumes the receiver actually acted
explainably in sending a valid commitment at the beginning of the protocol, and this is ensured
by the opening check performed under the SFE. We note that this mechanism is somewhat dif-
ferent than what was presented in [BS20], as they directly build a zero-knowledge argument (i.e.
without first constructing a stand-alone extractable commitment) and are able to take advantage
of witness indistinguishability to enforce explainable behavior.
Compliant Distinguishers. Finally, we discuss the issue of committer explainability. Recall from
the high-level overview that a simulator is able to extract from a committer by homomorphically
evaluating its code on an AFS-spooky encryption ciphertext generated by the committer. Thus, if the
committer acts arbitrarily maliciously and does not return a well-formed ciphertext, the extraction
may completely fail. Again, [BS20] address this issue by only analyzing their commitment within
the context of a larger zero-knowledge argument protocol, and having the verifier prove to the
prover using a witness indistinguishable proof that it performed the commitment explainably.
Thus, without adding zero-knowledge and performing [GK96]-style analysis to handle non-
explainable and aborting committers, we will only obtain extractability against explainable com-
mitters. However, since we will be using this protocol inside larger protocols where participants
are not assumed to be acting explainably, restricting the class of committers we consider in our
definition is problematic. We instead consider arbitrary committers but restrict the class of distin-
guishers (who are supposed to decide whether they received the view of a committer interacting in
the real protocol or the view of a committer interacting with the extractor) to those that always out-
put 0 on input a non-explainable transcript. In other words, any advantage these distinguishers
may have must be coming from their behavior on input explainable views. Even though checking
whether a particular view is explainable or not is not efficient, it turns out that this definition lends
itself quite nicely to composition, since one can use witness indistinguishability/zero-knowledge
to construct provably compliant distinguishers between hybrids for the larger protocols.
For completeness, and because post-quantum multi-committer extractable commitments may
be of independent interest, we also show in Appendix B how to add zero-knowledge within the
extractable commitment protocol itself to obtain security against arbitrary committers.
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5.1 Definition
Definition 5.1 (Quantum-Secure Multi-Committer Extractable Commitment). A quantum-secure
multi-committer extractable commitment scheme is a pair (C,R) of classical PPT interactive Turing ma-
chines. In the commit phase, R interacts with n copies {Ci}i∈[n] of C (who do not interact with each other)
on common input 1λ and 1n, with each Ci additionally taking a private inputmi ∈ {0, 1}∗. This produces a
transcript τ , which may be parsed as a set of n transcripts {τi}i∈[n], one for each set of messages exchanged
between R and Ci. In the decommitment phase, each Ci outputs mi along with its random coins ri, and R
on input (1λ, τi,mi, ri) either accepts or rejects. The scheme should satisfy the following properties.
• Perfect Correctness: For any λ, n ∈ N, i ∈ [n],
Pr[R(1λ, τi,mi, ri) = 1 | {τi}i∈[n] ← 〈R,C1(m1; r1), . . . ,Cn(mn; rn)〉(1λ, 1n)] = 1.
• Perfect Binding: For any λ ∈ N and string τ ∈ {0, 1}∗, there does not exist (m, r) and (m′, r′)
withm 6= m′ such that R(1λ, τ,m, r) = R(1λ, τ,m′, r′) = 1.
• Quantum Computational Hiding: For any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size receiver
R∗ = {R∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, any polynomial ℓ(·), and any sequence of sets of strings {m(0)λ,1, . . . ,m
(0)
λ,n}λ,n∈N,
{m(1)λ,1, . . . ,m(1)λ,n}λ,n∈N where each |m(b)λ,i| = ℓ(λ),
{VIEWR∗
λ
(〈R∗λ(ρλ),C1(m(0)λ,1), . . . ,Cn(m(0)λ,n)〉(1λ, 1n))}λ,n∈N
≈c{VIEWR∗
λ
(〈R∗λ(ρλ),C1(m(1)λ,1), . . . ,Cn(m(1)λ,n)〉(1λ, 1n))}λ,n∈N.
The extractability property will require the following two definitions. First, for any adversary C∗ =
{C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a subset I ⊆ [n] of n committers, any honest party messages {mi}i/∈I , and any
security parameter λ ∈ N, define VIEWmsgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)) to consist of the following.
1. The view of C∗λ on interaction with the honest receiver R and set {Ci(mi)}i/∈I of honest parties; this
view includes a set of transcripts {τi}i∈I and a state st.
2. A set of strings {mi}i∈I , where each mi is defined relative to τi as follows. If there exists m′i, ri such
that R(1λ, τi,m
′
i, ri) = 1, thenmi = m
′
i, otherwise, mi = ⊥.
Next, we consider distinguishers D = {Dλ, σλ}λ∈N that take as input a sample ({τi}i∈I , st, {mi}i∈I) from
the distribution just described. We say that D is compliant if whenever {τi}i∈I is not an explainable
transcript with respect to the set I , D outputs 0 with overwhelming probability (over the randomness of D).
• Multi-Committer Extractability: There exists a quantum expected-polynomial-time extractor Ext
such that for any compliant non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D = {Dλ, σλ}λ∈N,
there exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for all adversaries C∗ = {C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a
subset of n committers, namely, {Ci}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n], the following holds for all polynomial-
size sequences of inputs {{mi,λ}i/∈I}λ∈N and λ ∈ N.∣∣Pr[Dλ(VIEWmsgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[Dλ(Ext(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ), σλ) = 1]
∣∣ ≤ µ(λ).
Remark 5.1. Observe that the above definition of quantum computational hiding does not consider
potentially malicious committers that interact in the protocol to try to gain information about com-
mitments made by other committers. This is without loss of generality, since all communication
occurs between R and some Ci. In particular, no messages are sent between any Ci and Cj .
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5.2 Construction
Ingredients: All of the following are assumed to be quantum-secure.
• A non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment Com.
• A secret-key encryption scheme (Enc,Dec).14
• A compute-and-compare obfuscator Obf.
• AquantumAFS-spooky encryption schemewith distributed setup (Spooky.Setup,Spooky.KeyGen,
Spooky.Enc, Spooky.QEnc, Spooky.Eval, Spooky.Dec, Spooky.QDec).
• A two-message function-hiding secure function evaluation scheme (SFE.Gen,SFE.Enc,SFE.Eval,SFE.Dec).
5.3 Hiding
Perfect correctness and perfect binding are immediate, so we move to quantum computational
hiding.
Lemma 5.1. Protocol 1 is quantum computational hiding.
Proof. Fix any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size receiver R∗ = {R∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, a polynomial
ℓ(·), and two sequences of sets {m(0)λ,1, . . . ,m
(0)
λ,n}λ,n∈N, {m
(1)
λ,1, . . . ,m
(1)
λ,n}λ,n∈N where each |m
(b)
λ,i| =
ℓ(λ). Consider the following sequence of hybrids for each i ∈ [n], where each alters the view of
R∗ in its interaction with Ci. The lemma follows immediately once we show that for all i ∈ [n],
Hi,0 ≈c Hi,6.
• Hi,0: {VIEWR∗
λ
(〈R∗λ,Ci(m(0)λ,i)〉)(1λ, 1n)}λ∈N.
• Hi,1: Same asHi,0 except that in Step 1, c(msg)i and c(td)i are commitments to 0.
• Hi,2: Same asHi,1 except that in Step 7, Ci computes SFE.Eval on the circuit C⊥ that always
outputs ⊥.
• Hi,3: Same asHi,2 except that in Step 5, the compute-and-compare obfuscation is simulated:
C˜C← SimCC(1|Spooky.Dec(ski,·)|, 1|ski|+|ℓ(λ)|, 1λ).
• Hi,4: Same asHi,3 except that in Step 5, the compute-and-compare obfuscation is performed
honestly with respect to messagem
(1)
λ,i .
• Hi,5: Same asHi,4 except that in Step 7, the SFE.Eval is performed honestly.
• Hi,6: Same asHi,5 except that in Step 1, c(msg)i is a commitment tom(1)λ,i and c(td)i is a commit-
ment to tdi. Note that is this exactly {VIEWR∗
λ
(〈R∗λ,Ci(m(1)λ,i)〉)(1λ, 1n)}λ∈N.
Now we argue indistinguishability between each hybrid.
14We use the syntax that for key k, a ciphertext of message m is computed as ct ← Enc(k,m) and decrypted as
m := Dec(k, ct).
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Protocol 1
Common input: 1λ, 1n.
Ci’s additional input: A stringmi.
1. Each Ci computes tdi ← Uλ and sends c(msg)i ← Com(1λ,mi), c(td)i ← Com(1λ, tdi) to R.
2. For each i ∈ [n], R computes ki, ri ← Uλ and sends c(key)i := Com(1λ, ki; ri) to Ci.
3. Each Ci computes and sends ppi ← Spooky.Setup(1λ) to R.
4. R defines pp := {ppi}i∈[n], and sends pp to each Ci. Each Ci checks that the ppi it received
matches the ppi it sent in Step 3, and if not, it aborts.
5. Each Ci computes
• lki ← Uλ,
• (pki, ski)← Spooky.KeyGen(1λ, pp),
• cti ← Spooky.Enc(pki, tdi),
• and C˜Ci ← Obf (CC[Spooky.Dec(ski, ·), lki, (ski,mi)]),
and sends (pki, cti, C˜Ci) to R.
6. For each i ∈ [n], R computes ct(td)i ← Enc(ki, 0λ), dki ← SFE.Gen(1λ), and ct(SFE)i ←
SFE.Enc(dki, (ki, ri)) and sends (ct
(td)
i , ct
(SFE)
i ) to Ci.
7. Define the circuit C[c
(key)
i , ct
(td)
i , tdi, lki](·) to take as input (ki, ri), check if c(key)i opens to
ki with opening ri and if tdi = Dec(ki, c
(td)
i ), and if so output lki, and otherwise output
⊥. Each Ci computes and sends ĉt(SFE)i ← SFE.Eval(C[c(key)i , ct(td)i , tdi, lki], ct(SFE)i ).
Figure 1: A constant-round quantum-secure multi-committer extractable commitment.
• Hi,0 ≈c Hi,1: This follows directly from the quantum computational hiding of Com.
• Hi,1 ≈s Hi,2: We consider two cases. First, conditioned on Ci aborting in Step 4, the hybrids
are trivially indistinguishable. Next, conditioned on Ci not aborting in Step 4, we show
below that with overwhelming probability (over the randomness of Ci and R), the circuit
C[c
(key)
i , ct
(td)
i , tdi, lki] is functionally equivalent to C⊥. Given this, the indistinguishability of
hybridsHi,1 andHi,2 follows directly from the circuit privacy of SFE.
Assuming that the circuits are not functionally equivalent with noticeable probability, we
construct a non-uniform A = {Aλ, ρAλ}λ∈N that breaks the distributed-setup quantum seman-
tic security of Spooky (see Definition 4.2). In the security game, A interacts with a challenger
to generate pp := {ppi}i∈[n] for n parties. Then, the challenger draws a public key pki based
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on pp, a random tdi ← Uλ, and outputs an encryption cti of tdi under pki. Awins if it returns
tdi, which would clearly break semantic security.
Now, we describe the distribution ρAλ that A receives as non-uniform advice (this distribu-
tion will ultimately be fixed to the advice state that gives A the best advantage). It will be
generated as follows.
1. RunR∗λ on ρλ, and feed toR
∗
λ the firstmessages {c(msg)i , c(td)i }i∈[n] it expects from {Ci}i∈[n]
(which are commitments to 0).
2. Continue running R∗λ until it outputs its set of messages {c(key)i }i∈[n].
3. Output the inner state of R∗λ, the messages exchanged so far, and the following. For
c
(key)
i , check (inefficiently) if it is a commitment to some ki and if so, output ki.
Finally, we describe A. Aλ receives from its challenger the i’th public parameters ppi. It then
runs R∗λ on the state it received as advice and ppi. R
∗
λ returns pp = {ppj}j∈[n], where by
assumption pp includes the same ppi that it took as input. Aλ then forwards {ppj}j∈[n]\{i}
to its challenger, who returns with a public key pki and a ciphertext cti. At this point, Aλ
generates {(pkj , ctj , C˜Cj)}j∈[n]\{i} honestly and for party i, fixes (pki, cti) along with C˜Ci ←
SimCC(1|Spooky.Dec(ski,·)|, 1|ski|+|ℓ(λ)|, 1λ). It then continues to runR∗λ on input all of these tuples.
When R∗λ returns ct
(td)
i , Aλ checks if it received some ki as part of its non-uniform advice, and
if so, it decrypts ct
(td)
i using key ki to recover a message tdi. It returns tdi to the challenger,
who then determines if Aλ succeeded.
Note that, by the simulation security of compute-and-compare obfuscation, the probability
that Aλ succeeds in this game is negligibly close to the probability it succeeds if it gave
R∗λ an honest compute-and-compare obfuscation C˜Ci. This follows because the lock value
lki is completely independent of R
∗
λ’s view through Step 6. Finally, the probability that Aλ
succeeds in returning td is at least the probability that c
(key)
i is a well-formed commitment
to ki and ct
(td)
i is an encryption of td under key ki, which is exactly the probability that
the circuits described above are not functionally equivalent. Thus Aλ has non-negligible
advantage in this game, a contradiction.
• Hi,2 ≈c Hi,3: This follows directly from the simulation security of compute-and-compare
obfuscation, since at this point, the lock value lki is independent of the rest of the distribution.
• Hi,3 ≈c Hi,4: Same argument asHi,2 ≈c Hi,3.
• Hi,4 ≈c Hi,5: Same argument asHi,1 ≈c Hi,2.
• Hi,5 ≈c Hi,6: Same argument asHi,0 ≈c Hi,1.
5.4 Extractability
Lemma 5.2. Protocol 1 is multi-committer extractable.
39
Proof. In the following we describe the extractor. For notational convenience we assume that the
set of corrupted parties I is of size |I| = ℓ and we assume without loss of generality that I = [ℓ].
Ext(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ):
1. Set ρλ to be the inner state of C
∗
λ. Begin running C
∗
λ until it outputs {c(msg)i , c(td)i }i∈I .
2. Compute the commitments {c(key)i }i∈I as specified in the protocol.
3. Receive {ppi}i∈I from C∗λ, draw ppi ← Spooky.Setup(1λ) for each i /∈ I , and send |I| copies
of pp := {ppi}i∈[n] to C∗λ.
4. Receive {pki, cti, C˜Ci}i∈I .
5. Let |φ〉 be the inner state of C∗λ at this point, compute ct|φ〉 ← Spooky.QEnc(pk1, |φ〉).
6. For each i ∈ I , compute c˜t(td)i ← Spooky.Eval(pki,Enc(ki, ·), cti) and c˜t(SFE)i ← Spooky.Enc(pki, ct(SFE)i )
where ct
(SFE)
i is computed as specified in the protocol.
7. Let C∗Final be the quantum circuit (derived from the adversary) that, on input the ciphertexts
{ct(td)i , ct(SFE)i }i∈I and the quantum state of the adversary, computes the messages of the
corrupted parties (corresponding to Step 7 of the protocol) and the updated quantum state
of the adversary. Compute the following spooky evaluation procedure:
(c¯t1, . . . , c¯tℓ, ĉt|φ〉)← Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkℓ),C∗Final, (ct|φ〉, {c˜t(td)i , c˜t(SFE)i }i∈I))
where each c¯ti = (c¯t
(1)
i , . . . , c¯t
(ℓ)
i ) are classical ciphertexts encrypted under pk1, . . . , pkℓ.
8. For all i ∈ I compute
(ĉt
(1)
i , . . . , ĉt
(ℓ)
i )← Spooky.Eval
(pk1, . . . , pkℓ),SFE.Dec
dki, ℓ⊕
j=1
·
 , c¯ti
 .
9. For all i ∈ [ℓ] define CNest,i to be the classical circuit that, on input a set of strings {yj}j∈[i−1],
a public key pk, and a ciphertext ct, computes
ct′ ← Spooky.Eval(pk, y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yj ⊕ ·, ct).
The circuit returns C˜Ci(ct
′).
10. For all i ∈ [ℓ, . . . , 2] compute iteratively
(c˜tsk,i, c˜tm,i)← Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pki−1),CNest,i(·, pki, ĉt(i)i ), (ĉt(1)i , . . . , ĉt(i−1)i ))
and for all j ∈ [i− 1] update the variables
(ĉt
(1)
j , . . . , ĉt
(i−1)
j )← Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pki−1),CRec,i[ĉt(i)j ], (ĉt(1)j , . . . , ĉt(i−1)j , c˜tsk,i))
where CRec,i[ĉt
(i)
j ] is the circuit that takes as input 2i−2 strings (z1, . . . , zi−1) and (s1, . . . , si−1)
and computes
i−1⊕
k=1
zk ⊕ Spooky.Dec
(
i−1⊕
k=1
sk, ĉt
(i)
j
)
.
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11. At the end of the iteration compute (sk1,m1)← C˜C1(ĉt(1)1 ), then for all i ∈ [2, . . . , ℓ] compute
ski ←
i−1⊕
k=1
Spooky.Dec(skk, c˜t
(k)
sk,i)
and
mi ←
i−1⊕
k=1
Spooky.Dec(skk, c˜t
(k)
m,i).
12. Use the extracted keys (sk1, . . . , skℓ) to decrypt the state of the adversary from ĉt|φ〉 and
the ciphertexts (ĉt
(SFE)
1 , . . . , ĉt
(SFE)
ℓ ) from the ciphertexts (c¯t1, . . . , c¯tℓ) as defined in Step 7
of the extractor. Return the transcript together with the state and the extracted messages
(m1, . . . ,mℓ).
We are now going to show that the transcript output by the extractor is computationally indistin-
guishable (with respect to compliant distinguishers) from that resulting from the real execution of
the protocol. We do this by defining a sequence of hybrid distributions (for all i ∈ I) where we
modify the interaction with the i-th corrupted party. In some of the following hybrids, the simula-
tor inefficiently extracts the messagesmi and the trapdoors tdi from the messages (c
(msg)
i , c
(td)
i ) of
the corrupted parties. Note that this implies that each distribution is not necessarily computable
in polynomial time. However, these hybrids should be thought of as mental experiments, which
are going to be helpful in arguing about the indistinguishability of the simulator (which instead
runs in strict quantum polynomial time).
• H0: {VIEWmsgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)}λ∈N. Recall that this distribution includes
the messages {mi}i∈I committed by the transcript (if they exist).
• Hi,1: Same asH0 except that ct(SFE)i is computed as SFE.Enc(dki, (0λ, 0λ)).
• Hi,2: Same asHi,1 except that c(key)i is computed as a commiment to 0λ.
• Hi,3: Same as Hi,2 except that ct(td)i is computed as Enc(ki, tdi), where tdi is extracted (inef-
ficiently) from c
(td)
i .
• Hi,4: Same as Hi,3 except that c(key)i is computed as a commitment to ki, as specified in the
protocol.
• Hi,5: Same asHi,4 except that ct(SFE)i is computed as SFE.Enc(dki, (ki, ri)), as specified in the
protocol.
We then define the last hybrid below. Note that the distribution induced by this hybrid is com-
putable in (quantum) polynomial time.
• H6: This is the output of the extractor as described above.
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Now we argue indistinguishability between each hybrid. All reductions for distinguishers be-
tween hybrids belowmay receive the state of C∗ after Step 1 alongwith the corresponding commit-
ted values {mi, tdi}i∈I (if they exist) as non-uniform advice. Also, we only consider distinguishers
that succeed with non-negligible probability, even conditioned on the event that the transcript re-
ceived is explainable, i.e., each message lies in the support of the corresponding algorithm. This is
because we consider only distinguishers that are compliant, i.e., they output 0with overwhelming
probability if the transcript is not explainable.
• H0 ≈c Hi,1: This follows from the quantum input privacy of the SFE protocol. The reduction
takes the transcript of the protocol after executing Step 1 (including the state of the adversary
and themessages {mi}i∈I ) as non-uniform advice and continues to run the protocol honestly
through Step 5. It then sets (0, 0) and (ki, ri) as the challenge messages for SFE. In Step 6, the
reduction sets ct
(SFE)
i = ct
∗, where ct∗ is the challenge ciphertext. The rest of the protocol
proceeds without changes. The reduction returns whatever the distinguisher returns.
Clearly if ct∗ = SFE.Enc(dki, (0, 0)), then the distribution is identical to Hi,2. On the other
hand if ct∗ = SFE.Enc(dki, (ki, ri)), then the distribution induced by the reduction is identical
toHi,1. This implies that the two hybrids are computationally indistinguishable.
• Hi,1 ≈c Hi,2: This follows from an invocation of the (non-uniform) quantum computational
hiding of the commitment scheme.
• Hi,2 ≈c Hi,3: This follows from a (non-uniform) reduction to the quantum semantic security
of the secret-key encryption scheme, where tdi (together with the transcript so far and the
messages {mi}i∈I ) is given as non-uniform advice to the reduction.
• Hi,3 ≈c Hi,4: Same argument asHi,1 ≈c Hi,2.
• Hi,4 ≈c Hi,5: Same argument asH0 ≈c Hi,1.
• Hi,5 ≈s H6: We are going to argue that, conditioned on the event that the messages of
the corrupted parties are explainable, the two hybrids are identical, except if an error in
the evaluation (and consequently in the decryption) of the AFS-spooky encryption scheme
occurs. Once that is estabilshed, statistical indistinguishability follows from the correctness
of the AFS-spooky encryption scheme (which holds for all choices of the random coins used
in the setup, key generation, and encryption algorithms). To substantiate this claim, recall
that
(ĉt|φ〉, c¯t1, . . . , c¯tℓ)← Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkℓ),C∗Final, (ct|φ〉, {c˜t(td)i , c˜t(SFE)i }i∈I))
where
c˜t
(SFE)
i = Spooky.Enc(pki, ct
(SFE)
i )
= Spooky.Enc(pki,SFE.Enc(dki, (ki, ri)))
and
c˜t
(td)
i = Spooky.Eval(pki,Enc(ki, ·), cti)
= Spooky.Eval(pki,Enc(ki, ·),Spooky.Enc(pki, tdi))
= Spooky.Enc(pki,Enc(ki, tdi)).
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Therefore, by definition of C∗Final we have that for all i ∈ [ℓ] and j ∈ [ℓ]
c¯t
(j)
i = Spooky.Enc(pkj , x
(j)
i )
such that
ℓ⊕
j=1
x
(j)
i = ĉt
(SFE)
i = SFE.Eval(C[c
(key)
i , ct
(td)
i , tdi, lki], ct
(SFE)
i ).
Recall that
(ĉt
(1)
i , . . . , ĉt
(ℓ)
i ) = Spooky.Eval
(pk1, . . . , pkℓ),SFE.Dec
dki, ℓ⊕
j=1
·
 , c¯ti

and therefore for all i ∈ [ℓ] and j ∈ [ℓ] we have that ĉt(j)i = Spooky.Enc(pkj , y(j)i ) such that
ℓ⊕
j=1
y
(j)
i = SFE.Dec
dki, ℓ⊕
j=1
x
(j)
i

= SFE.Dec
(
dki,SFE.Eval(C[c
(key)
i , ct
(td)
i , tdi, lki], ct
(SFE)
i )
)
= lki
by the perfect correctness of the SFE protocol. Now recall that
(c˜tsk,ℓ, c˜tm,ℓ) = Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkℓ−1),CNest,ℓ(·, pkℓ, ĉt(ℓ)ℓ ), (ĉt(1)ℓ , . . . , ĉt(ℓ−1)ℓ ))
which implies that the two ciphertexts encode the output of the obfuscated program C˜Cℓ(ct
′
ℓ)
where
ct′ℓ = Spooky.Eval(pkℓ, y
(1)
ℓ ⊕ · · · ⊕ y(ℓ−1)ℓ ⊕ ·, ĉt
(ℓ)
ℓ )
= Spooky.Enc(pkℓ, y
(1)
ℓ ⊕ · · · ⊕ y(ℓ)ℓ )
= Spooky.Enc(pkℓ, lkℓ).
By the perfect correctness of the compute-and-compare obfuscation, the two variables (c˜tsk,ℓ, c˜tm,ℓ)
are AFS-spooky encryptions of (skℓ,mℓ), under (pk1, . . . , pkℓ). This implies that the variables
(ĉt1, . . . , ĉtℓ−1) are correctly updated to
ĉti = (ĉt
(1)
i , . . . , ĉt
(ℓ−1)
i )
= Spooky.Eval((pk1, . . . , pkℓ−1),CRec,ℓ[ĉt
(ℓ)
i ], (ĉt
(1)
i , . . . , ĉt
(ℓ−1)
i , c˜tsk,ℓ))
where ĉt
(j)
i = Spooky.Enc(pkj, y˜
(j)
i ) such that
ℓ−1⊕
j=1
y˜
(j)
i =
ℓ−1⊕
k=1
zk ⊕ Spooky.Dec
(
ℓ−1⊕
k=1
sk, ĉt
(ℓ)
i
)
=
ℓ−1⊕
k=1
y
(k)
i ⊕ Spooky.Dec
(
skℓ, ĉt
(ℓ)
i
)
= y
(1)
i ⊕ · · · ⊕ y(ℓ)i
= lki.
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by the definition of CRec,ℓ[ĉt
(ℓ)
i ]. Recursively applying the above procedure, we obtain that
C˜C1(ĉt1) = C˜C1(Spooky.Enc(pk1, lk1))
= (sk1,m1)
by the perfect correctness of the compute-and-compare obfuscation. It follows that the ex-
tractor successfully recomputes sk1, which allows it to iteratively recover (sk2, . . . , skℓ) from
(c˜tsk,2, . . . , c˜tsk,ℓ). Consequently, the decrypted transcript, the (possibly quantum) state of
the adversary, and the messages (m1, . . . ,mℓ) are distributed identically as in the previous
hybrid, conditioned on the fact that no error occurs during the evaluation algorithm.
6 Quantum-Secure Multi-Verifier Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we use standard techniques to derive a multi-verifier zero-knowledge protocol
from our multi-committer extractable commitment. We follow the approach given in [GK96] to
upgrade a commit-challenge-response Σ protocol to a full-fledged zero-knowledge protocol in
constant rounds. In particular, the (multiple) verifiers will each commit to their challenge before
the Σ protocol is executed, using our multi-committer extractable commitment scheme. A sim-
ulator will then be able to extract the challenge from all verifiers simultaneously and proceed to
simulate each Σ protocol.
As in [BS20], a couple of subtleties arise in the proof. First, the extractable commitment guar-
antee does not hold against arbitrary malicious verifiers, as captured by our notion of simulation
indistinguishability against compliant distinguishers. Thus, we have the verifier attach a witness
indistinguishable proof (WI) that it acted explainably during the commitment phase, and indeed
committed to the challenge that is sent during theΣ protocol. However, in the proof of soundness,
the verifier’s initial commitment must be switched to a commitment to 0, since the reduction will
receive the Σ protocol challenge from its challenger. This requires the verifier to prove a different
statement under the WI, which must only be possible when interacting with a cheating prover.
Details can be found in the description of Protocol 2.
Simulation Strategy. Following [BS20], we construct a zero-knowledge simulator that makes use
of two non-rewinding sub-routines. Given an arbitrary malicious (multi-)verifier V∗, we consider
the following two distributions. First, consider the real distribution over the final state of V∗ on
interaction with the honest prover, except that any time V∗ aborts, the distribution outputs only
a ⊥ symbol. We refer to this as RealNoAbort⊥(V∗). Next, consider the real distribution except
that any time V∗ does not abort, the distribution outputs only a ⊥ symbol. We refer to this as
RealAbort⊥(V
∗).
As a stepping stone towards proving zero-knowledge, we construct an entirely straight-line
simulator SimNoAbort⊥ such that SimNoAbort⊥(V
∗) is indistiguishable from RealNoAbort⊥(V
∗).
By entirely straight-line, we mean that not only does SimNoAbort⊥ not rewind V
∗, it never even
re-starts V∗ from the beginning. Analogously, we also construct a simulator SimAbort⊥ such that
SimAbort⊥(V
∗) is indistiguishable from RealAbort⊥(V
∗), and SimAbort⊥ is entirely straight-line.
Now, we combine the above simulators into a straight-line simulator SimComb⊥ that succeeds
with probability negligibly close to 1/2. SimComb⊥ simply chooses uniformly at random whether
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to run SimNoAbort⊥ or SimAbort⊥ and outputs the resulting view if the sub-routine is success-
ful and ⊥ otherwise. Finally, we invoke the Watrous rewinding lemma to amplify the success
probability of SimComb⊥, resulting in the final simulator Sim.
We will actually make use of the sub-routines SimNoAbort⊥ and SimAbort⊥ explicitly in later
sections, where the entirely straight-line nature of these procedureswill be useful. In particular, we
use both simulators in constructing non-malleable commitments (Section 7) and just SimNoAbort⊥
in the coin-flipping protocol in Section 8 (since we define an alternate/simpler abort generation
procedure in that protocol).
6.1 Definition
Definition 6.1 (Quantum-Secure Multi-Verifier Zero-Knowledge Argument for NP). A quantum-
secure multi-verifier zero-knowledge argument for a language L ∈ NP is a pair (P,V) of classical PPT
interactive Turing machines. P interacts with n copies {Vi}i∈[n] of V (who do not interact with each other)
on common input 1λ and 1n, with each Vi additionally taking an input xi ∈ L, and P additionally taking
inputs {xi, wi ∈ RL(xi)}i∈[n]. At the end of the interaction, each Vi outputs a bit, indicating whether it
accepts or rejects.
1. Perfect Completeness: For any λ, n ∈ N, i ∈ [n], x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ , and w ∈ RL(x),
Pr[OUTVi〈P(x,w),Vi(x)〉(1λ, 1n) = 1] = 1.
2. Quantum Computational Soundness: For any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size prover
P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ, n ∈ N, i ∈ [n], and any
x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr[OUTVi〈P∗λ(ρλ),Vi(x)〉(1λ, 1n) = 1] ≤ µ(λ).
3. Quantum Computational Zero-Knowledge: There exists a quantum expected polynomial-time
simulator Sim such that for any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size adversary V∗ = {V∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
representing a subset of n verifiers, namely, {Vi}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n],
VIEWV∗λ
〈
P({xi, wi}i∈[n]),
V∗λ({xi}i∈I , ρλ),
{Vi(xi)}i/∈I
〉
(1λ, 1n)

λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n]
≈c{Sim(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈n,V∗λ, ρλ)}λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n],
where λ ∈ N, xi ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, wi ∈ RL(xi).
6.2 Construction
Ingredients: All of the following are assumed to be quantum-secure.
• A non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment Com.
• A multi-committer extractable commitment eCom = (eCom.C, eCom.R).
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• AWI proof systemWI = (WI.P,WI.V).
• A sigma protocol for NP Σ = (Σ.P,Σ.V).
Remark 6.1. Observe that since the sigma protocolΣ is public-coin, Protocol 2 is publicly-verifiable.
That is, any third party, upon observing the transcript of interaction between P and V, can deduce
whether V accepted or not. This fact will be used in Section 8.
Protocol 2
Common input: 1λ and 1n.
Vi’s additional input: xi ∈ L.
P’s additional input: {xi, wi ∈ RL(xi)}i∈[n].
1. For each i ∈ [n], P computes and sends ci ← Com(1λ, wi) to Vi.
2. Each Vi computes a challenge βi ← Σ.V1(1|xi|). Then, P and {Vi}i∈[n] interact, with P
taking the role of eCom.R and Vi taking the role of eCom.Ci(βi), to produce {τi}i∈[n] ←
〈eCom.R, {eCom.Ci(βi)}i∈[n]〉(1λ, 1n).
3. For each i ∈ [n], P computes (αi, sti)← Σ.P1(xi, wi) and sends αi to Vi.
4. Each Vi sends βi.
5. For each i ∈ [n], P and Vi interact (in parallel) with P taking the role of WI.V and Vi
taking the role ofWI.P to give P a WI proof that
• τi is explainable, and opens to βi,
• OR, ci opens to a non-witness zi /∈ RL(xi).
6. For each i ∈ [n], P and Vi interact (in parallel) with P taking the role of WI.P and Vi
taking the role ofWI.V to give Vi a WI proof that
• ci opens to some string zi,
• OR, xi ∈ L.
7. For each i ∈ [n], P computes and sends γi = Σ.P2(xi, wi, sti, αi, βi) to Vi.
8. Each Vi accepts if Σ.V2(xi, αi, βi, γi) = 1.
Figure 2: A constant-round quantum-secure multi-verifier zero-knowledge argument for L ∈NP.
6.3 Soundness
Lemma 6.1. Protocol 2 has quantum computational soundness.
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Proof. Assume towards contradication that there exists a non-uniform quantum polynomial-size
prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρ∗λ}λ∈N that with noticeable probability, convinces Vi to accept on input instances
{xλ}λ∈N where |xλ| = λ and xλ /∈ L. Let V = Vi, and by averaging, we can assume that P∗λ sends
a fixed first message cλ to V. Furthermore, since P
∗
λ succeeds in convincing V to accept instances
xλ /∈ L with noticeable probability, the statistical soundness of the WI in Step 6 of the protocol
implies that cλ must be a well-formed commitment, that is, cλ = Com(1
λ, zλ; sλ) for some (zλ, sλ).
Now, consider the following sequence of computationally indistinguishable hybrid distributions.
• H0: {VIEWP∗〈P∗(ρλ),V〉(1λ, xλ)}λ∈N.
• H1: Same asH0 except that V uses (zλ, sλ) as the witness for the second part of the WI state-
ment given in Step 5 of the protocol. H0 ≈c H1 follows from the witness indistinguishability
of WI, where the reduction is given (zλ, sλ) as non-uniform advice.
• H2: Same asH1 except that in Step 2, V takes the role of eCom.C(0λ) rather than eCom.C(β).
H1 ≈c H2 follows from the computational hiding of eCom.
Using P∗, we construct a cheating prover Σ.P∗ = {Σ.P∗λ,Σ.ρ∗λ}λ∈N for the sigma protocol. The
non-uniform advice Σ.ρ∗λ is generated as follows. Run P
∗(ρ∗λ) until it outputs its first message cλ.
Extract from cλ the message zλ committed and the corresponding opening sλ and define the re-
sulting advice to consist of the state of P∗ at this point, along with (zλ, sλ).
Σ.P∗λ(Σ.ρ
∗
λ) :
1. Interact with P∗λ, taking the role of eCom.C(0
λ).
2. Continue running P∗λ, obtaining the message α.
3. Send α to Σ.V, receive β, and send β to P∗λ.
4. Interact with P∗λ to give P
∗
λ a WI proof as in Step 5 of the protocol, using witness (zλ, sλ).
5. Interact with P∗λ to receive a WI proof from P
∗
λ as in Step 6 of the protocol.
6. Continue running P∗λ, obtaining the message γ, and send γ to Σ.V.
Nownote that P∗λ’s view in this interaction is exactlyH2. Thus, since P
∗ succeeds in convincing
V to accept with noticeable probability, and H0 ≈c H2, it must be the case that Σ.V accepts with
noticeable probability, a contradiction.
6.4 Zero-Knowledge
Theorem 6.1. Protocol 2 is quantum computational zero-knowledge.
Proof. Webegin by describing the two sub-routines SimNoAbort⊥ and SimAbort⊥mentioned above.
Then we combine them into SimCombλ, which we use to derive the final simulator Sim.
SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ):
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1. Set ρλ to be the inner state of V
∗
λ. For each i ∈ I , compute and send ci ← Com(1λ, 0) to V∗λ.
2. Let V.eCom∗λ be the portion of V
∗
λ that interacts with P in Step 2 above. Note that its state at
the beginning of this interaction is ρλ, {ci}i∈I . Compute
({τi}i∈I , st, {β′i}i∈I)← eCom.Ext(1λ, 1n, I,V.eCom∗λ, (ρλ, {ci}i∈I)).
If eCom.Ext produced an abort transcript, then halt and return⊥. Otherwise continue, setting
st to be the inner state of V∗λ.
3. For all i ∈ I , compute (αi, γi)← Σ.Sim(xi, β′i) and send αi to V∗λ.
4. V∗λ returns {βi}i∈I .
5. Take the role of the honest proverWI.P in the |I|WI proofs that V∗λ gives. If V∗λ fails to prove
any of the statements, then halt and output ⊥.
6. Give V∗λ a total of |I|WI proofs using the |I| witnesses that show {ci}i∈I are valid commit-
ments. Then, send {γi}i∈I to V∗λ.
7. Output the inner state of V∗λ.
SimAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ):
1. Set ρλ to be the inner state of V
∗
λ.
2. Interact with V∗λ as the honest prover until the end of Step 6 of the protocol, with exactly 3
differences:
• The commitments ci in Step 1 are to 0 rather than wi.
• The messages αi sent in Step 3 are generated by the simulator of the sigma protocol,
(αi, γi)← Σ.Sim(xi, 0λ).
• In Step 6, the witnesses used for the WI proofs are for the first statement (that ci is a
valid commitment).
3. If at some point during the interaction V∗λ either aborts or fails in one of its WI proofs, halt
and output V∗λ’s inner state. Otherwise, output ⊥.
SimComb⊥(1
λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ): With probability 1/2, execute SimNoAbort⊥(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)
and otherwise execute SimAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ).
Sim(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ): Let SimComb⊥(·) := SimComb⊥(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ·) be the cir-
cuit SimComb⊥ with all inputs hard-coded except for ρλ, and output R(SimComb⊥, ρλ, λ), where R
is the algorithm from Lemma 3.1.
Next, we introduce some notation. For V∗ = {V∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, let Real(V∗) denoteVIEWV∗λ
〈
P({xi, wi}i∈[n]),
V∗λ({xi}i∈I , ρλ),
{Vi(xi)}i/∈I
〉
(1λ, 1n)

λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n]
for λ ∈ N, xi ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, wi ∈ RL(xi), and let
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• RealNoAbort⊥(V∗) be the distribution Real(V∗), except that whenever an abort occurs, the
distribution outputs ⊥, and
• RealAbort⊥(V∗) be the distribution Real(V∗), except that if an abort does not occur, the distri-
bution outputs⊥.
We continue by proving two lemmas that will be useful on their own in later sections, and will
also be useful in proving the quantum computational zero-knowledge of ZK.
Lemma 6.2. For any V∗, RealNoAbort⊥(V
∗) ≈c SimNoAbort⊥(V∗).
Proof. We prove this via a sequence of hybrids.
• H0: RealNoAbort⊥(V∗).
• H1: Same as H0 except that after Step 2, the values {β′i}i∈I committed by the transcripts
{τi}i∈I are inefficiently extracted, and after Step 4, if any β′i 6= βi, the hybrid aborts (outputs
⊥).
• H2: Same as H1 except that the transcript of the extractable commitment is simulated. In
particular, the hybrid computes
({τi}i∈I , st, {β′i}i∈I)← eCom.Ext(1λ, 1n, I,V.eCom∗λ, (ρλ, {ci}i∈I)),
and proceeds to run the verifier with inner state st.
• H3: Same as H2 except that the equality checks introduced in H1 are removed, and the
sigma protocol is simulated. In particular, for each i ∈ I , the hybrid computes (αi, γi) ←
Σ.Sim(xi, β
′
i).
• H4: Same as H3 except that each commitment for i ∈ I in the first message sent by the
prover is ci ← Com(1λ, 0).
• H5: Same as H4 except that the WI proofs given by the prover for i ∈ I are generated with
witnesses showing that ci is a valid commitment.
Observe thatH5 is exactly SimNoAbort⊥(V
∗). Nowwe show that each consecutive pair of hybrids
is indistiguishable.
• H0 ≈s H1: This follows from the statistical soundness of the WI proved in Step 5.
• H1 ≈c H2: Assume there exists a distinguisher D for H1 and H2 that succeeds with non-
negligible probability. We build a compliant15 distinguisher D′ that breaks the extractability
property of eCom.
First, we fix a sequence of instance-witness pairs {{xi,λ, wi,λ}i∈I}λ∈N, and first messages
{{ci,λ}i∈I}λ∈N for whichD succeedswith non-negligible probability. Thewitnesses {{wi,λ}i∈I}λ∈N
will be given as non-uniform advice to D′. Now, D′ will take as input either the real or the
simulated view with respect to committer {V.eCom∗λ, (ρλ, {ci,λ}i∈I)}λ∈N. This view includes
15Recall that such a distinguisher is guaranteed to output 0 with overwhelming probability on input any non-
explainable view.
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the messages committed and the final state of the committer, which is the state of V∗ after
Step 2 of the protocol. D′ proceeds to simulate the rest of the interaction between P and
V∗, making use of the witnesses it received as non-uniform advice during Steps 3 and 7, as
well as the committed messages it received from its challenger to implement the check in-
troduced in H1. If V
∗ aborts or fails to prove any of the WI statements in Step 5, D′ outputs
0. Otherwise, it queries D with V∗’s final view and outputs what D′ outputs.
Observe that D′’s advantage is equivalent to D’s advantage. This follows becuase i) when-
ever D′ queries D with a transcript, it is a faithful execution of either H1 or H2, depending
on whether eCom was simulated or not, and ii) whenever D′ does not query D, it means that
V∗ failed to prove one of its WI statements, so D’s input would have been ⊥. Finally, D′ is
compliant by the statistical soundness of the WI.
• H2 ≈c H3: This follows from the special zero-knowledge property of Σ.
• H3 ≈c H4: This follows from the computational hiding of Com.
• H4 ≈c H5: This follows from the witness indistinguishability of WI.
Lemma 6.3. For any V∗, RealAbort⊥(V
∗) ≈c SimAbort⊥(V∗).
Proof. We prove this via a sequence of hybrids.
• H0: RealAbort⊥(V∗). Note that if V∗ has not aborted at some point during Steps 1-6 of the
protocol, this distribution outputs ⊥.
• H1: Same asH0 except that in Step 3, for each i ∈ I , P sends αi where (αi, γi)← Sim(xi, 0λ).
• H2: Same as H1 except that each commitment for i ∈ I in the first message sent by the
prover is ci ← Com(1λ, 0).
• H3: Same as H2 except that the WI proofs for i ∈ I given by the prover are generated with
witnesses showing that ci is a valid commitment.
Observe thatH3 is exactly SimAbort⊥(V
∗). Now we show that each consecutive pair of hybrids in
indistinguishable.
• H0 ≈c H1: This follows from the first-message indistinguishability of Σ.
• H1 ≈c H2: This follows from the computational hiding of Com.
• H2 ≈c H3: This follows from the witness indistinguishability of WI.
To finish the proof of zero-knowledge, we introduce some more notation.
• Let PrAbortReal (V∗) be the probability that V∗ aborts in the real interaction with the honest prover.
• Let PrAbortSimNoAbort(V∗) be the probability that V∗ aborts in SimNoAbort⊥ (i.e. the outcome is ⊥).
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• Let PrAbortSimAbort(V∗) be the probability that V∗ aborts in SimAbort⊥ (i.e. the outcome is not ⊥).
• Let SimNoAbort⊥(V∗) := {SimNoAbort⊥(1λ, n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)}λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n] .
• Let SimAbort⊥(V∗) := {SimAbort⊥(1λ, n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)}λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n] .
• Let SimComb⊥(V∗) := {SimComb⊥(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)}λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n] .
• Let Sim(V∗) := {Sim(1λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)}λ,{xi}i∈[n],{wi}i∈[n] .
• Let RealNoAbort(V∗) be the distribution Real(V∗) conditioned on there not being an abort.
• Let RealAbort(V∗) be the distribution Real(V∗) conditioned on there being an abort.
• Let SimNoAbort(V∗) be the distribution SimNoAbort⊥ conditioned on there not being an abort
(i.e. conditioned on the output not being ⊥).
• Let SimAbort(V∗) be the distribution SimAbort⊥ conditioned on there being an abort (i.e.
conditioned on the output not being ⊥).
• Let SimComb(V∗) be the distribution SimComb⊥ conditioned on the output not being ⊥.
Following [BS20], we show that Real(V∗) ≈c SimComb(V∗) via a sequence on hybrids. In par-
ticular, we show that
Real(V∗)
(1)
≡ (1− PrAbortReal (V∗))RealNoAbort(V∗) + (PrAbortReal (V∗))RealAbort(V∗)
(2)
≈s(1− PrAbortSimNoAbort(V∗))RealNoAbort(V∗) + (PrAbortSimAbort(V∗))RealAbort(V∗)
(3)
≈c(1− PrAbortSimNoAbort(V∗))SimNoAbort(V∗) + (PrAbortSimAbort(V∗))RealAbort(V∗)
(4)
≈c(1− PrAbortSimNoAbort(V∗))SimNoAbort(V∗) + (PrAbortSimAbort(V∗))SimAbort(V∗)
(5)
≈sSimComb(V
∗),
where
1. The equality (1) follows by definition.
2. The indistinguishability (2) follows as a corollary of Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 6.3. Indeed,
RealNoAbort⊥(V
∗) ≈c SimNoAbort⊥(V∗) in particular implies that the difference in the prob-
ability that the verifier aborts in the real interaction versus the simulated interaction is neg-
ligible, and likewise for RealAbort⊥(V
∗) ≈c SimAbort⊥(V∗).
3. The indistinguishability (3) follows as a corollary of Lemma 6.2. This can be seen by con-
sidering two cases. First, if the probability that the verifier aborts in the real interaction is
negligible, then RealNoAbort(V∗) ≈c SimNoAbort(V∗) directly follows from Lemma 6.2, and
the indistinguishability follows. Otherwise, this probability is non-negligible, meaning that
RealAbort(V∗) is efficiently sampleable. Thus, a reduction to Lemma 6.2 can sample from the
distribution RealAbort(V∗)whenever it receives ⊥ from its challenger.16
16Amore formal analysis of this can be found in [BS20, Proposition 3.4].
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4. The indistinguishability (4) follows as a corollary of Lemma 6.3 via a similar analysis as the
last step.
5. The indistinguishability (5) follows from the definition of Sim(V∗) and the claim that the
difference between PrAbortSimNoAbort and Pr
Abort
SimAbort is negligible (which follows as a corollary
of Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 6.3).
Finally, this implies thatReal(V∗) ≈c Sim(V∗) by applying Lemma 3.1 for each (λ, {xi}i∈[n], {wi}i∈[n])
with the following parameters. Set Q := SimComb⊥ as defined in the description of Sim, and set
ǫ := negl(λ)+2−λ·
3
4 , p0 := 1/4, and q := 1/2, as described in [BS20, Proposition 3.5]. This completes
the proof of quantum computational zero-knowledge.
7 Quantum-Secure Non-Malleable Commitments
7.1 Definition
In this section, we define quantum-secure non-malleable commitments w.r.t. commitment. We
consider the synchronous setting where there is a quantum man-in-the-middle adversaryMIM =
{MIMλ, ρλ}λ∈N interacting with a classical honest committer C with tag tagC (where C commits to
value v) in the left session, and interacting with classical honest receiver R in the right session.
The MIM uses tag tagMIM in its interaction with R. Prior to the interaction, the value v is given to
C as local input.
Then the commit phase is executed. After obtaining an honest left message in any round, the
MIM sends its own right message. And after obtaining an honest right message in any round,
the MIM sends its own left message. Let View-ValMIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM) denote
a random variable that describes the value v′ committed by the MIM in the right session, jointly
with the view of the MIM in the full (both left and right sessions) experiment. If the tagC used by
C in the left interaction is identical to the tagMIM used by theMIM in the right interaction, then the
value v′ committed to in the right interaction is defined to be ⊥. If theMIM sends a message that
causes an honest party to abort in either the left or the right execution, then the value v′ committed
to in the right interaction is also defined to be ⊥.
We will concern ourselves with computationally hiding and statistically binding commitments
that additionally satisfy the non-malleability property defined below.
Definition 7.1 (Quantum-Secure Non-Malleable Commitments with respect to Commitment). For
any ℓ = ℓ(λ) and p = p(λ), a commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 is said to be quantum secure non-malleable
with respect to commitment for tags in [ℓ] if for every v1, v2 ∈ {0, 1}2p(λ), for every quantum polynomial-
size MIM = {MIMλ, ρλ}λ∈N and every quantum polynomial-size distinguisher D = {Dλ, σλ}λ∈N, there
exists a negligible function η(·) such that for all large enough λ ∈ N, and for all tagC , tagMIM ∈ [ℓ] where
tagC 6= tagMIM, the following holds:∣∣∣Pr[Dλ(View-ValMIMλ〈C(v1),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[Dλ
(
View-ValMIMλ〈C(v2),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ
)
= 1]
∣∣∣ = η(λ) (4)
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Wewill also consider a more general setting where theMIM interacts with polynomially many
committers in the left session, and a single honest receiver in the right session. For any polynomial
n = n(λ) number of left sessions,wewill letView-ValMIMλ〈C({vi}i∈[n]),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM)
denote a random variable that describes the value v′ committed by the MIM in the right session,
jointly with the view of theMIM in the full (both left and right sessions) experiment.
Definition 7.2 (Many-one Quantum-Secure Non-Malleable Commitments with respect to Com-
mitment). For any ℓ = ℓ(λ), p = p(λ) and n = n(λ), a commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 is said to be quan-
tum secure many-one non-malleable with respect to commitment for tags in [ℓ] if for every pair of tuples
({v1i }i∈[n]), ({v2i }i∈[n]) ∈ {0, 1}2np(λ), for every quantum polynomial-size MIM = {MIMλ, ρλ}λ∈N and
every quantum polynomial-size distinguisher D = {Dλ, σλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function η(·)
such that for all large enough λ ∈ N, and for all ({tagCi }i∈[n]), tagMIM where each tag is in [ℓ] such that
tagMIM 6∈ {tagCi }i∈[n], the following holds:∣∣∣Pr[Dλ(View-ValMIMλ〈C({v1i }i∈[n]),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[Dλ
(
View-ValMIMλ〈C({v2i }i∈[n]),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ
)
= 1]
∣∣∣ = η(λ) (5)
7.2 Non-Malleable Commitments for Small Tags
First, we provide an overview of our scheme for tags in [N ]whereN = λilog(c+1,λ). Wewill assume
non-interactive perfectly binding commitments and two-message SFE which can be broken with
advantage at most negl(λilog(c,λ)) by polynomial size quantum circuits. Recall that as discussed in
the technical overview, we will have the committer and receiver establish an erasure channel via
a two-party input-hiding SFE. This channel will transmit the committer’s value with probability
ǫ, depending on their tag. Here, we discuss our construction in more detail.
The committer on inputm ∈ {0, 1}p(λ) sends a perfectly binding, computationally hiding com-
mitment tom, denoted by Com(m). Next, the committer and receiver run an SFE execution, where
the receiver input is a uniformly random r1 and committer input is m along with uniformly ran-
dom s1 that is of the same length as r1, and m is transmitted to the receiver if and only if s1 = r1.
The length of r1 and s1 is carefully chosen so that the probability that they are equal is η
−tag, where
η = λilog(c+1,λ) is a small superpolynomial value. Additionally, the SFE scheme is such that eval-
uations of agreeing circuits are (subexponentially) statistically close. This essentially means that
no matter how a malicious committer or receiver may behave, the message m is revealed with
probability close to η−tag (with an error of negl(ηtag)).
Now, let us consider a setting where theMIM uses tagMIM and honest committer uses tagC such
that tagMIM < tagC . In this case, the SFE statistically hides the committed message except with
probability roughly η−tagC , and on the other hand, theMIM’s message is revealed with probability
roughly η−tagMIM , which is greater than η−tagC . Intuitively, this means that any MIM that tries to
maul or copy the committedmessage cannot succeed, at least in executionswhere theMIM’s value
was revealed but the honest committer’s was not. We generalize this to all transcripts by relying
on the fact that no MIM can actually tell whether the MIM’s value was revealed, and therefore
cannot behave any differently in transcripts where extraction occured vs where it didn’t.
Formally, we will prove that the joint distribution V1 of the MIM’s view and committed value
when the honest commitment is to v1, is indistinguishable from the joint distribution V2 when the
honest commitment is to v2. This is done as follows.
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• First, we use the input-hiding property of SFE to argue that any distinguisher D that distin-
guishes V1 from V2, must also distinguish these distributions when restricted to executions where
s1 = r1 in the right execution where theMIM is the committer. We prove that if this is not the
case, then D can be used to guess the input r1 of the honest receiver in the right execution,
contradicting the input-hiding property of SFE.
• Once this is established, we restrict ourselves to transcripts where s1 = r1 in the right execu-
tion.
• We rely on our setting of parameters to ensure that the transcripts where s1 = r1 in the left
execution can only form a negligible fraction of all transcripts where s1 = r1 in the right
execution.
• Roughly, this means that for an overwhelming fraction of transcripts where s1 = r1 in the
right SFE execution, the left SFE execution perfectly erases the honest committer’s message.
• As a result, any D that distinguishes between the distributions V1 and V2, also distinguishes
between these distributions when restricted to s1 = r1 in the right execution. We note that
conditioned on s1 = r1, the MIM’s message can be efficiently extracted, and therefore D can
be used to carefully break the (super-polynomial) hiding of the commitment Com.
This completes a sketch of our argument when tagMIM < tagC . In case tagMIM > tagC , this ar-
gument does not go through, since the honest committer’s message is revealed with probability
that is larger than the MIM’s message. To deal with this situation, we append another sequential
instance of SFE to our commitment, where the probability of extraction varies as a function of
2N − tag, instead of as a function of tag. This means that a committer with tagC will run two in-
stances of SFE, one which transmits the committed message with probability η−tagC , and another
that transmits it with probability η2N−tagC . Now, for tagMIM 6= tagC , in at least one of these ses-
sions, the probability that the MIM’s message is revealed will be larger than the probability that
the committer’s message is revealed. Moreover, since all these probabilities of revealing messages
are negligible, the other session will not reveal the committer’s message except with negligible
probability, and therefore, we can switch to a hybrid where the other session never outputs the
committer’s message. Finally, since proving security against synchronous MIM adversaries suf-
fices for our applications, we only focus on formally proving synchronous security here, but we
suspect that similar arguments would suffice to prove security of our construction against non-
synchronous adversaries.
7.2.1 Construction
Ingredients and notation: We will assume the existence of
• A non-interactive perfectly-binding quantum computationally hiding commitment scheme
Com where there exists a constant c1 > 0 s.t. no QPT adversary has advantage better than
negl(λilog(c1,λ)) in the hiding game.
• A two-message SFE satisfying Definition 3.8. This means that there exists a constant c2 > 0
s.t. noQPT adversary has advantage better than negl(λilog(c2,λ)) in the quantum input privacy
game.
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• Aquantum-secure zero-knowledge argument for NP (ZK.P,ZK.V). (We do not requiremulti-
verifier zero-knowledge for this section.)
Let c = max(c1, c2), η = λ
ilog(c+1,λ), and N = ilog(c + 1, λ). We describe the protocol for tags or
identities in [N ] in Protocol 3. Also, define the language
L =

(
c, ct1, ct2, ct
′
1,
ct′2, tag, N
)
: ∃
(
m, r, s1, s2,
u1, u2
)
s.t.
|s1| = tag · (log η),
|s2| = (2N − tag) · (log η),
c = Com(1λ,m; r),
ct1 = SFE.Eval(CC[Id(·), s1, (m||r)], ct′1;u1),
ct2 = SFE.Eval(CC[Id(·), s2, (m||r)], ct′2;u2)
 .
where Id(·) denotes the identity function.
Protocol 3
Common Input: 1λ and a tag ∈ [N ]. Set t1 = tag · (log η), and t2 = (2N − tag) · (log η).
C’s Input: A messagem ∈ {0, 1}p(λ).
Commit Stage:
1. C samples r← Uλ, and sends c1 = Com(1λ,m; r).
2. R samples dk1 ← SFE.Gen(1λ), r1 ← Ut1 , and sends ct1,R ← SFE.Encdk1(r1).
3. C samples s1 ← Ut1 , u1 ← Uλ and sends ct1 = SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s1, (m||r)], ct1,R;u1
)
and s1, where Id(·) is the identity function.
4. R samples dk2 ← SFE.Gen(1λ), r2 ← Ut2 , and sends ct2,R ← SFE.Encdk2(r2).
5. C samples s2 ← Ut2 , u2 ← Uλ and sends ct2 ← SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s2, (m||r)], ct2,R;u2
)
and s2, where Id(·) is the identity function.
6. C runs ZK.P(x,w) and R runs ZK.V(x) in an execution of ZK (with common input
(1λ)) for language L (defined above), where x = (c1, ct1, ct2, ct1,R, ct2,R, tag, N) and
w = (m, r, s1, s2, u1, u2).
Figure 3: A constant round non-malleable commitment for tags in [N ], where N = ilog(c+ 1, λ).
7.2.2 Analysis
In the reveal stage, the committer outputs (m, r) and the receiver accepts the decommitment if
c1 = Com(1
λ,m; r). Perfect binding follows due to the perfect binding property of Com, and
hiding follows by non-malleability, which we formally prove below.
Lemma 7.1. Protocol 3 is a non-malleable commitment according to Definition 7.1 for tags in [N ].
55
Proof. It suffices to show that for every v1, v2 ∈ {0, 1}2p(λ) and every QPT MIM = {MIMλ, ρλ}
and D = {Dλ, ρλ}, there exists a negligible function η(·) such that for large enough λ ∈ N, for all
tagC , tagMIM ∈ [ℓ] where tagC 6= tagMIM, the following holds.∣∣∣Pr[Dλ(View-ValMIMλ〈C(v1),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[Dλ
(
View-ValMIMλ〈C(v2),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ
)
= 1]
∣∣∣ = η(λ)
To that end, we define the distributions
{Hv1,σλ :=
(
View-ValMIMλ〈C(v1),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ
)}λ∈N,
{Hv2,σλ :=
(
View-ValMIMλ〈C(v2),MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagC , tagMIM), σλ
)}λ∈N
We also define the following collections of random variables (each indexed by λ). Each is defined
w.r.t. a (fixed) adversaryMIM = {MIMλ, ρλ}λ∈N, but we sometimes drop this adversary from nota-
tion for convenience. We will also sometimes condition on theMIM aborting in the left execution
(where it acts as receiver). By this, we will refer to an execution where the MIM sends a message
that causes an honest party to abort.
• Let PrAbortx be the probability thatMIM aborts inHx,σλ , where x ∈ {v1, v2}.
• LetHNo Abortx,σλ be the distributionHx,σλ conditioned on there not being an abort.
• LetHAbortx,σλ be the distributionHx,σλ conditioned on there being an abort. Note that by defi-
nition, in this distribution, the value committed by theMIM is always set to ⊥.
The following distributions will not be used explicitly in the hybrids, but will be convenient to
define for the proof.
• LetHx,σλ,⊥ be the distributionHx,σλ except whenever an abort occurs, the distribution out-
puts ⊥.
• LetHAbortx,σλ,⊥ be the distributionHx,σλ except whenever an abort does not occur, the distribu-
tion outputs⊥.
We show that {Hv1,σλ}λ∈N ≈c {Hv2,σλ}λ∈N via a sequence of hybrids. In particular, we show
that
Hv1,σλ
(1)
≡ (1− PrAbortv1 )HNo Abortv1,σλ + (PrAbortv1 )HAbortv1,σλ
(2)
≈s(1− PrAbortv2 )HNo Abortv1,σλ + (PrAbortv2 )HAbortv1,σλ
(3)
≈c(1− PrAbortv2 )HNo Abortv2,σλ + (PrAbortv2 )HAbortv1,σλ
(4)
≈c(1− PrAbortv2 )HNo Abortv2,σλ + (PrAbortv2 )HAbortv2,σλ
(5)
≡Hv2,σλ ,
where
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1. The equalities (1) and (5) follow by definition.
2. The indistinguishability (2) follows as a corollary of Claim 7.1. Indeed,Hv1,σλ,⊥ ≈c Hv2,σλ,⊥
in particular implies that the difference in the probability that theMIM aborts in both execu-
tions is negligible.
3. The indistinguishability (3) follows as a corollary of Claim 7.1. This can be seen by con-
sidering two cases. First, if the probability that the MIM aborts in Hv1,σλ is negligible, then
H
No Abort
v1,σλ
≈c HNo Abortv2,σλ directly follows from Claim 7.1, and the indistinguishability follows.
Otherwise, this probability is non-negligible, meaning that HAbortv1,σλ is efficiently sampleable.
Thus, a reduction to Claim 7.1 can sample from the distributionHAbortv1,σλ whenever it receives
⊥ from its challenger.17
4. The indistinguishability (4) follows as a corollary of Claim 7.5 via a similar analysis as the
last step.
Claim 7.1.
{Hv1,σλ,⊥}λ∈N ≈c {Hv2,σλ,⊥}λ∈N
Proof. Wewill prove this claim via the following sequence of hybrids. We set some notation before
defining these hybrids. We will set t1 = tagC · (log η) and t2 = (2N − tagC) · (log η). We also set
t′1 = tagMIM · (log η) and t′2 = (2N − tagMIM) · (log η). As a general rule, when refering to some
protocol variable y in the left execution, we will use the variable as is (and denote it by y), and in
the right execution, we will denote this variable by y′.
We letHv1,σλ,⊥ = H0.
H1 : In this hybrid, the challenger executes the simulator Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
18 for
Πzk on V
∗
λ, which denotes a wrapper around the portion of the MIM that participates in Step 6 of
the protocol, and an instance-advice distribution (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) defined as follows:
• Set the state ofMIMλ to ρλ.
• Execute Steps 1-5 of the protocol the sameway as in the experimentHv1,σλ,⊥, and set (x,w,L)
according to Protocol 3 on behalf of C.
• Let σ(xλ)λ denote the joint distribution of the protocol transcript, the state of the MIM at the
end of Step 5, and the value v′ committed by theMIM in Step 1.
If there is an abort during sampling, then output ⊥. Otherwise, the output of this hybrid is the
output of Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥. By Lemma 6.2,
H0 ≈c H1.
H2 : This is identical toH1 except the following change.
17Amore formal analysis of this can be found in [BS20, Lemma 3.2].
18Note that we drop the input I since there is only one verifier in this setting.
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In Step 3, C sends ct1 = SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s1, (0p(λ)+λ)], ct1,R;u1
)
and s1. Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
and V∗λ are defined identically to H1 except with the updated ct1 from Step 3, and the simulator
Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is executed. If there is an abort during sampling, then output
⊥. Otherwise, the output of this hybrid is the output of Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥. We prove in Claim 7.2,
that
H1 ≈s H2.
H3 : This is identical toH2 except the following change.
In Step 5, C sends ct2 = SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s2, (0p(λ)+λ)], ct2,R;u2
)
and s2. Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
and V∗λ are defined identically to H2 except with the updated ct2 from Step 5, and the simulator
Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is executed. If there is an abort during sampling, then output
⊥. Otherwise, the output of this hybrid is the output of Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥. We prove in Claim 7.3,
that
H2 ≈s H3.
H4 : This is identical toH3 except the following change.
In Step 1, C sets c1 = Com(1
λ, 0; r). Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) and V
∗
λ are defined identically toH3 except
with the updated c1 from Step 1, and the simulator Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is executed.
If there is an abort during sampling, then output ⊥. Otherwise, the output of this hybrid is the
output of Πzk.SimNoAbort⊥. We prove in Claim 7.4, that
H3 ≈c H4.
Claim 7.2.
∆(H1,H2) ≤ 2−t1 + negl(2t1)
Proof. Note that the output of SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s1, (m||r)], ct1,R;u1
)
is identical in both hybrids,
unless s1 = r1. Denote byH
′
1 the distribution that is identical toH1 except it outputs⊥when s1 =
r1. Denote byH
′
2 the distribution that is identical toH2 except it outputs⊥when s1 = r1. Now by
statistical circuit privacy, we have that there exists a constant c > 0 such that∆(H′1,H
′
2) ≤ 2−λ
c
.
Finally, note that in each one ofH1,H2,H
′
1,H
′
2,
Pr[s1 = r1] ≤ 2−t1 .
Thus we have,
∆(H1,H2) ≤ ∆(H′1,H′2) + 2 · Pr[s1 = r1] ≤ 2−t1 + 2 · 2−λ
c ≤ 2−t1 + negl(2t1)
where the last equation follows by our setting of t1.
Claim 7.3.
∆(H2,H3) ≤ 2−t2 + negl(2t2)
Proof. The proof follows nearly identically to that of Claim 7.2.
Claim 7.4.
H3 ≈c H4
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Proof. Throughout this proof, wewill use the notationPr[E|H] to refer to the probability that event
E occurs in the output of distributionH.
Suppose
Pr[MIM aborts|H3] = 1− negl(λ).
Then by hiding of the commitment Com
Pr[MIM aborts|H4] = 1− negl(λ),
so both hybrids output ⊥ except with negligible probability, and are therefore computationally
indistinguishable.
Thus for the rest of this proof, we will assume that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that:
Pr[MIM does not abort |H3] ≥ 1
p(λ)
.
By the hiding of the commitment Com,
Pr[MIM does not abort |H4] ≥ 1
p(λ)
− negl(λ).
For x ∈ [0, 4], we will denote by HNo Abortx the distribution Hx conditioned on the MIM not
aborting. Recall that whenever theMIM aborts, the two hybrids output ⊥. Therefore, it suffices to
prove that
H
No Abort
3 ≈c HNo Abort4 .
Now, recall that the variables r′1, s
′
1, t
′
1 and so on refer to the right execution in each experiment.
For r′1 ← Ut′1 and s′1 sampled independently of r′1, we have that Pr[s′1 = r′1] = 2−t
′
1 . Then, by
quantum input privacy of SFE according to Definition 3.8, there exists a negligible function µ(·)
such that for any x ∈ [0, 4], r′1 ← Ut′1 and s′1 chosen by theMIM inHx,
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ)) ≤ Pr[s′1 = r′1|HNo Abortx ] ≤ 2−t
′
1 + µ(λilog(c,λ)). (6)
Similarly, by quantum input privacy of SFE according to Definition 3.8, there exists a negligible
function µ′(·) such that for any x ∈ [0, 4], r′2 ← Ut′2 and s′2 output by theMIM inHx,
2−t
′
2 − µ′(λilog(c,λ)) ≤ Pr[s′2 = r′2|HNo Abortx ] ≤ 2−t
′
2 + µ′(λilog(c,λ)) (7)
Soundness of the ZK argument, together with setting x = 0 in equations (6) and (7) implies that
for i ∈ [2],
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′i(ct
′
i)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (s′i = r′i)
∣∣∣HNo Abort0 ]
≥ (1− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
i − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
. (8)
Note that for i ∈ [2], SFE.Decdk′i(ct′i)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)∧ (s′i = r′i) can be efficiently
checked by a challenger that samples dk′i and r
′
i.
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Therefore, by combining Lemma 6.2 with equation (8), we have that for i ∈ [2],
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′i(ct
′
i)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (s′i = r′i)
∣∣∣HNo Abort1 ]
≥ (1− negl(λ)− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
i − λilog(c,λ)
)
≥ (1− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
i − λilog(c,λ)
)
(9)
where the previous equation, for i ∈ [2], follows by considering a non-uniform reduction to
Claim 6.2 that fixes any transcript where SFE.Decdk′i(ct
′
i)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)∧ (r′i =
s′i).
Next, we split our analysis into two cases. Depending on whether tagC is greater or smaller
than tagMIM, one of the two cases will always be true.
• Case 1: tagC > tagMIM. In this case, t1 = tagC · (log η), t′1 = tagMIM · (log η).
Now combining Claim 7.2 and equation (9) with i set to 1, implies:
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (s′1 = r′1)
∣∣∣HNo Abort2 ]
≥ (1 − negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 − negl(2t1) (10)
Next, we will carefully combine equation (10) with Claim 7.3. First, we note that the check
SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1) → (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (r′1 = s′1) is performed before Step 5.
Additionally, the only difference between HNo Abort2 and H
No Abort
3 is in Step 5. As a result,
for every (fixed) prefix of the transcript until Step 4, the distribution of Steps 5 and 6 gener-
ated according toHNo Abort2 is at most 2
−t2 + negl(2−t2)-far from their distribution generated
according toHNo Abort3 . This implies:
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (s′1 = r′1)
∣∣∣HNo Abort3 ]
≥ (1− 2−t2 − negl(2t2)) ·
(
(1− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 − negl(2t1)
)
≥ (1− negl(λ)− 2−t2 − negl(2t2)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 + 2−t1−t2 − negl(2t1)
≥ (1− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 − negl(2t1) (11)
Combining equation (11) with the negl(λilog(c,λ))- hiding of the commitment Com,
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′) ∧ (s′1 = r′1)
∣∣∣HNo Abort4 ]
≥ (1 − negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 − negl(2t1)− negl(λilog(c,λ)). (12)
Combining equations (11), (12) with equation (6), for x ∈ [3, 4],
Pr
[
SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)
∣∣∣(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abortx ]
≥
(1− negl(λ)) ·
(
2−t
′
1 − µ(λilog(c,λ))
)
− 2−t1 − negl(2t1)− negl(λilog(c,λ))
2−t
′
1 + µ(λilog(c,λ))
≥ 1− negl(λ) (13)
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where the last equation follows by recalling that 2−t
′
1 = η−tagMIM , 2−t1 = η−tagC and tagC ≥
(tagMIM + 1), which implies
2−t1 = η−tagC ≤ η−tagMIM−1 = 2
−t′1
η
for η = λilog(c+1,λ).
Let us assume towards a contradiction that there exists a quantum polynomial size distin-
guisher D and a polynomial poly such that for large enough λ ∈ N:
Pr[D = 1|HNo Abort3 ]− Pr[D = 1|HNo Abort4 ] ≥
1
poly(λ)
. (14)
By quantum input privacy of the SFE scheme, for each x ∈ [3, 4],
|Pr[D = 1|(s′1 6= r′1),HNo Abortx ]− Pr[D = 1|(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abortx ]| = negl(λ)
which combined with equation (14) implies that there exists a polynomial q(·) such that
Pr[D = 1|(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abort3 ]− Pr[D = 1|(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abort4 ] ≥
1
q(λ)
(15)
Equations (13) and (15) together imply that:
Pr[D = 1 ∧ SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)|(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abort3 ]
− Pr[D = 1 ∧ SFE.Decdk′1(ct
′
1)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)|(s′1 = r′1),HNo Abort4 ]
≥ 1
q(λ)
· (1− negl(λ)) ≥ 1
2q(λ)
This, combinedwith equation (6) gives a distinguisher that distinguishesCom(m) and Com(0)
with advantage at least 2−2t
′
1 , contradicting the hiding of Com as desired.
• Case 2: tagMIM > tagC . A similar analysis as in Case 1 implies that for any distinguisher D
distinguishingHNo Abort3 from H
No Abort
4 , there exists a polynomial q
′(·) such that
Pr[D = 1 ∧ SFE.Decdk′2(ct
′
2)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)|(s′2 = r′2),HNo Abort3 ]
− Pr[D = 1 ∧ SFE.Decdk′2(ct
′
2)→ (m′, r′) s.t. c′1 = Com(1λ,m′; r′)|(s′2 = r′2),HNo Abort4 ]
≥ 1
q′(λ)
This, combinedwith equation (7) gives a distinguisher that distinguishesCom(m) and Com(0)
with advantage at least 2−2t
′
2 , contradicting the hiding of Com as desired.
Claim 7.1 follows by observing that in H4, we erased all information about either one of v1 or
v2. Therefore one can perform the above hybrids in reverse order, while arguing indistinguisha-
bility, until one ends up withHv2,σλ,⊥.
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Claim 7.5.
{HAbortv1,σλ,⊥}λ∈N ≈c {HAbortv2,σλ,⊥}λ∈N
Proof. Note that in this case, the value committed by the MIM is always ⊥. Therefore, proving
indistinguishability of these distributions is significantly more straightforward than in Claim 7.1.
The proof again relies on a sequence of hybrid experiments, that we define below. Recall that
when refering to some protocol variable y in the left execution, we will use the variable as is (and
denote it by y), and in the right execution, we will denote this variable by y′.
We letHAbortv1,σλ,⊥ = H0.
H1 : In this hybrid, the challenger executes one run of the simulatorΠzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
19
for Πzk on V
∗
λ, which denotes a wrapper around the portion of theMIM that participates in Step 6
of the protocol, and an instance-advice distribution (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) defined as follows:
• Set the state ofMIMλ to ρλ.
• Execute Steps 1-5 of the protocol the sameway as in the experimentHv1,σλ,⊥, and set (x,w,L)
according to Protocol 3 on behalf of C.
• Let σ(xλ)λ denote the joint distribution of the protocol transcript, the state of the MIM at the
end of Step 5, and the value v′ committed by theMIM in Step 1.
If there is an abort during sampling then output the transcript generated until the abort happens
and the state of theMIM. Otherwise, the output of the hybrid is the output ofΠzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ).
By Lemma 6.3,
H0 ≈c H1.
H2 : This is identical toH1 except the following change.
In Step 3, C sends ct1 = SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s1, (0p(λ)+λ)], ct1,R;u1
)
and s1. Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
and V∗λ are defined identically to H1 except with the updated ct1 from Step 3, and the simulator
Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is executed. If there is an abort during sampling then output the
transcript generated until the abort happens and the state of the MIM. Otherwise, the output of
the hybrid is the output of Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ). We prove in Claim 7.6, that
H1 ≈s H2.
H3 : This is identical toH2 except the following change.
In Step 5, C sends ct2 = SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s2, (0p(λ)+λ)], ct2,R;u2
)
and s2. Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
and V∗λ are defined identically to H2 except with the updated ct2 from Step 5, and the simulator
Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is executed. If there is an abort during sampling then output the
transcript generated until the abort happens and the state of the MIM. Otherwise, the output of
the hybrid is the output of Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ). We prove in Claim 7.7, that
H2 ≈s H3.
19Note that we drop the input I since there is only one verifier in this setting.
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H4 : This is identical toH3 except the following change.
In Step 1, C sets c1 = Com(1
λ, 0; r). Here (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) and V
∗
λ are defined identically to H3
except with the updated c1 from Step 1, and the simulator Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) is
executed. If there is an abort during sampling then output the transcript generated until the
abort happens and the state of the MIM. Otherwise, the output of the hybrid is the output of
Πzk.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ). We prove in Claim 7.8, that
H3 ≈c H4.
Claim 7.6.
∆(H1,H2) ≤ 2−t1 + negl(2t1)
Proof. Note that the output of SFE.Eval
(
CC[Id(·), s1, (m||r)], ct1,R;u1
)
is identical in both hybrids,
unless s1 = r1. Denote byH
′
1 the distribution that is identical toH1 except it outputs⊥when s1 =
r1. Denote byH
′
2 the distribution that is identical toH2 except it outputs⊥when s1 = r1. Now by
statistical circuit privacy, we have that there exists a constant c > 0 such that∆(H′1,H
′
2) ≤ 2−λ
c
.
Finally, note that in each one ofH1,H2,H
′
1,H
′
2,
Pr[s1 = r1] ≤ 2−t1 .
Thus we have,
∆(H1,H2) ≤ ∆(H′1,H′2) + 2 · Pr[s1 = r1] ≤ 2−t1 + 2 · 2−λ
c ≤ 2−t1 + negl(2t1)
where the last equation follows by our setting of t1.
Claim 7.7.
∆(H2,H3) ≤ 2−t2 + negl(2t2)
Proof. The proof follows nearly identically to that of Claim 7.2.
Claim 7.8.
H3 ≈c H4
Proof. Recall that both hybrids only output transcripts, the value committed by the MIM, and the
MIM’s state when the MIM aborts at some point. Otherwise both hybrids output ⊥. As such, the
value committed by theMIM in every transcript in the distributionsH3, andH4, is ⊥.
It remains to prove that the joint distribution of the transcript and state of the MIM in H3 is
indistinguishable fromH4, which follows immediately by the hiding of Com.
Claim 7.5 follows by observing that in H4, we erased all information about either one of v1 or
v2. Therefore one can perform the above hybrids in reverse order, while arguing indistinguisha-
bility, until one ends up withHAbortv2,σλ,⊥.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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7.3 Tag Amplification
Beginning with quantum-secure non-malleable commitments that support tags in [t], we describe
how to obtain quantum-secure non-malleable commitments that support tags in [2t/2], for any
t ≤ poly(λ). We will apply this compiler recursively a constant number of times to our base
construction to obtain a scheme for tags in [2λ].
The protocol itself follows nearly identically along the lines of existing tag amplification com-
pilers in the literature [Wee10, PW10]. Each larger tag (in 2t/2) is encoded into a set Stag of t small
tags, and this set satisfies the following property. For each pair tag, tag′ ∈ 2t/2 where tag 6= tag′,
there exists an element in the set Stag′ that does not lie in the set Stag. Now the committer on input
a message m and tag tag, generates t commitments, where the ith commitment commits via the
underlying non-malleable commitment to the the message m using as tag the ith member of the
set Stag. The committer then proves to the receiver (in zero-knowledge) that all the commitments
were correctly generated according to protocol specifications.
Now, the property of the tag encoding scheme guarantees that the MIM will always end up
using at least one small tag that is different from all small tags used by the honest committer. As
such, we can argue that the value committed by the MIM using this differing tag is independent
of the honest committer’s input.
We formally prove this via a hybrid argument, where we first rely on soundness of the ZK
argument to argue that we can “focus” solely on the values committed by the MIM using the
differing tag. Next, we simulate the ZK argument on behalf of the honest committer. Then we
modify the values committed via all the honest small tags, while arguing that the value committed
by theMIM under the differing tag does not change.
Finally, we point out an interesting feature of our amplification proof: we split the use of the
ZK simulator into two cases: one simulator that only outputs non-aborting views (and otherwise
outputs⊥), and a separate one that only outputs aborting views (and otherwise outputs⊥).
7.3.1 Construction
We describe our compiler that converts a tag-based non-malleable commitment scheme for tags
in t(λ), where t(λ) ≤ poly(λ), into one that supports tags in 2t/2, while adding only a constant
number of rounds. This is formalized in Protocol 4. We will let nmCom denote a non-malleable
commitment for tags in t(λ), and we denote the message length by p(λ).
Ingredients and notation: We will assume the existence of a quantum-secure zero-knowledge
argument for NP (ZK.P,ZK.V). (We do not require multi-verifier zero-knowledge for this section.)
7.3.2 Analysis.
In the reveal stage, the committer outputs (m, r1,C) and the receiver accepts the decommitment if
this produces is a valid decommitment of c1 according to nmCom. The perfect binding property
of the scheme in Protocol 4 follows directly from the perfect binding property of the underlying
protocol nmCom. Hiding follows from non-malleability, the proof of which is in Appendix A.
Lemma 7.2. Protocol 4 is a one-one non-malleable commitment according to Definition 7.1 for tags in
[2t/2].
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Protocol 4
Common Input: Security parameter 1λ, tag ∈ [2t/2] represented as {tagi}i∈[t/2]. Here tagi =
i||tag[i] where tag[i] denotes the ith bit of tag.
C’s Input: A stringm ∈ {0, 1}p(λ).
Commit Stage:
• Stage 1: In parallel, for all i ∈ [k], C runs nmCom.C(m; ri,C) and R runs R(ri,R) with
common input tagi. Let ci and φi denote the set of all messages generated by C and R
respectively in the ith parallel execution.
• Stage 2: C executes ZK.P(x,w,L) and R executes ZK.V(x,L) where:
– x = {ci}i∈[t/2], w =
(
m, {ri,C}i∈[t/2]
)
,
– L = {{bi}i∈[t/2] ∣∣∃(a, {si}i∈[t/2]) s.t. ∀i ∈ [t/2], nmCom.C(a, tagi, φi; si) = bi}
– where nmCom.C(a, tagi, φi; si) denotes the transcript output by Ci on input receiver
messages φi.
Figure 4: A constant round non-malleable commitment for tags in [2t/2].
We also have the following lemma, that follows by a standard hybrid argument, due to [LPV].
Lemma 7.3. Every quantum-secure non-malleable commitment satisfying Definition 7.1 also satisfies Def-
inition 7.2.
We conclude this section with the following theorem, that can be obtained by applying the
compiler in Protocol 4 (c + 1) times to the base non-malleable commitment from Protocol 3, and
then applying Lemma 7.3.
Theorem 7.1. Assuming there exists a constant c ∈ N such that at all quantum polynomial size circuits
have advantage negl(λilog(c,λ)) in distinguishing LWE samples from uniform, and spooky encryption for
relations computable by quantum circuits, there exist quantum-secure constant round non-malleable com-
mitments satisfying Definition 7.2.
Finally, we remark that a folklore technique [DDN91] where the committer and receiver par-
ticipate in rounds, sending ⊥ in every round, except for the committer sending ECom(m; r) in
round i (where i = tag) using a single-committer extractable commitment yields a one-to-one
non-malleable commitment for tag ∈ [N ] in the synchronous setting, in O(N) rounds, for any
N ≤ poly(λ). Setting N = ilog(c, λ) for any constant c ∈ N yields a protocol with O(ilog(c, λ))
rounds for ilog(c, λ) tags. Applying our tag amplification compiler to this scheme (c + 1) times,
yields a non-malleable commitment for tags in 2λ against synchronous adversaries, inO(ilog(c, λ))
rounds. The underlying extractable commitment can be instantiated using the technique of [BS20]
based on polynomial quantum hardness of LWE and polynomial hardness of QFHE. This yields
O(ilog(c, λ)) round post-quantumnon-malleable commitments from polynomial hardness assump-
tions.
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8 Quantum-Secure Multi-Party Coin-Flipping
We now combine the primitives constructed in earlier sections to build a constant-round coin-
flipping protocol secure against quantum polynomial-time adversaries. The protocol was de-
scribed at a high level in Section 2.4, and is given in full detail in Protocol 5. As explained in
the overview, each party will first commit to random strings ci, ri using a non-malleable com-
mitment, then commit to ci using our parallel extractable commitment with randomness ri, and
finally broadcast ci. The parties will output
⊕
i∈[n] ci as the common output if all parties manage
to prove in zero-knowledge that they behaved honestly throughout the protocol.
Proof Strategy. Our simulator will be structurally similar to the zero-knowledge simulator de-
scribed in Section 6, in the sense that we build a simulator SimNoAbort⊥ specifically for non-
aborting transcripts and a simulator SimAbort⊥ specifically for aborting transcripts. The bulk of
the work in SimNoAbort⊥ involves sampling instances and an advice state (consisting of the adver-
sary’s view through Step 5 of the protocol) for the final part of the adversary, which in particular
interacts with honest parties in order to verify their zero-knowledge arguments in Step 6. These
arguments are then simulated by (part of) the zero-knowledge simulator ZK.SimNoAbort⊥, which
takes as input the adversary and the sampled advice state.
However, as alluded to in Section 2.4, once this simulation is performed in the hybrids, it is no
longer possible to directly invoke the soundness of the adversary’s zero-knowledge arguments in
Step 6, when changing how SimNoAbort⊥ samples the advice state. Thus, we invoke soundness
in the very first hybrid to claim that the following “check” never fails, except with negligible
probability.
The check fails if the Step 1-5 messages sent by at least one of the malicious parties are not
explainable, yet the honest parties do not abort. If this check fails, we simply append check-fail to
the transcript. Now, this check will continue to be computed in later hybrids, but we can claim
that since (as we show) all later hybrids are indistinguishable from the first hybrid, check-failmust
also only appear with negligible probability in these later hybrids. When it comes time to invoke
the non-malleability of the honest party commitments, we can use the fact that check-fail appears
with negligible probability to show that a malicious party cannot even change its extractable com-
mitment based on the changing simulated view. If it could, then since non-malleability implies
that its previously sent non-malleable commitment couldn’t change, then it must be the case that
its messages are no longer explainable (since its two commitments are no longer consistent). Thus,
the check will fail and appear in the hybrid’s output, a contradiction. Of course, turning this in-
tuition into a formal proof requires much care, especially since this check is inefficient. Thus, we
will make liberal use of non-uniform fixing arguments.
We also remark that it would be most natural to rely on many-to-many non-malleable com-
mitments in this multi-party setting. However, we only have a post-quantum construction of
one-one commitments in Section 7. Thus, when invoking non-malleability, a reduction must iso-
late the commitment of a single malicious party that would constitute a mauling attack. We again
use both non-uniformity and the check-fail condition here, showing that any mauling attack would
cause check-fail to appear, and thus that there must exist somemalicious party for which the check
fails over specifically its messages. The identity of this party can then be given as non-uniform
advice to a reduction.
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8.1 Definition
Definition 8.1 (Quantum-Secure Fully-Simulatable Multi-Party Coin-Flipping). Let k = k(λ) be
any fixed polynomial. An fully-simulatable n-party k-coin-flipping protocol with quantum security is
given by n classical interactive Turing machines (P1, . . . , Pn) with joint input (1
λ, 1n) and outputs ri ∈
{0, 1}k(λ) ∪ {⊥}.
Given a coin-flipping protocol and an adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N that corrupts a set of parties S ⊂ [n],
let H denote [n] \ S and define the random variable Real(A∗λ, ρλ) to consist of the outputs of honest parties
{Pi}i∈H as well as the view VIEWA∗
λ
〈A∗λ(ρλ), {Pi}i∈H〉(1λ, 1n) of A∗λ after executing the protocol in the
presence of A∗λ.
We require the following security property. Fix any S ⊂ [n]. There exists a quantum expected
polynomial-time simulator Sim, such that for any quantum polynomial-size adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
that participates in the protocol, generating joint messages on behalf of all algorithms in S,
{Real(A∗λ, ρλ)}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ) | r← Uk(λ)}λ∈N, (16)
where for the “protocol output” part of its simulation output, Sim(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ) is restricted to output
either r|H| or ⊥|H|.
8.2 Construction
Ingredients: All of the following are assumed to be quantum-secure.
• A many-to-one non-malleable commitment nmCom = (nmCom.C, nmCom.R).
• A multi-committer extractable commitment eCom = (eCom.C, eCom.R).
• A multi-verifier publicly-verifiable zero-knowledge argument for NP ZK = (ZK.P,ZK.V).
Languages. Wedefine twoNP languagesL(eCom) andL(both). Let (x, y) := 〈nmCom.C(c; r), nmCom.Ry〉
denote the transcript of an execution of nmComwhere the receiver messages are fixed to y and x is
the set of resulting committer messages. Similarly, let (x, y) := 〈eCom.C(c; r), eCom.Ry〉 denote the
transcript of an execution between some eCom.C and eCom.R (which may be part of a larger eCom
transcript involving other committers) where the receiver messages are fixed to y and x is the set
of resulting committer messages. Then L(eCom) and L(both) are defined as follows.
L(eCom) :=
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣∣ ∃(c, r) s.t. (x, y) := 〈eCom.C(c; r), eCom.Ry〉}
L(both) :=
{
(x, y, x′, y′, c)
∣∣∣∣ ∃(r, s) s.t. (x, y) := 〈nmCom.C((c, r); s), nmCom.Ry〉,(x′, y′) := 〈eCom.C(c; r), eCom.Ry′〉
}
8.3 Security
Theorem 8.1. For any n and polynomial k(λ), Protocol 5 is a quantum-secure fully-simulatable n-party
k-coin-flipping protocol.
67
Protocol 5
Common input: Security parameter 1λ and number of parties 1n.
1. For all i ∈ [n], Pi samples ci ← {0, 1}k(λ), {ri,j , si,j}j∈[n]\{i} ← {0, 1}2(n−1)λ .
2. For all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n] \ {i}, Pi runs nmCom.C((ci, ri,j); si,j) with tag i and Pj runs
nmCom.R to produce(
α
(c)
i,j , α
(r)
i,j
)
← 〈nmCom.C((ci, ri,j); si,j), nmCom.R〉(1λ),
where α
(c)
i,j denotes the committer messages sent by Pi and α
(r)
i,j denotes the receiver
messages sent by Pj .
3. For all j ∈ [n], Pj runs eCom.R and each Pi for i 6= j runs eCom.Ci(ci; ri,j) to produce({
β
(c)
i,j
}
i∈[n]\{j}
,
{
β
(r)
i,j
}
i∈[n]\{j}
)
← 〈{eCom.Ci(ci; ri,j)}i∈[n]\{j}, eCom.R〉(1λ, 1n−1)
where β
(c)
i,j denotes the committer messages sent by Pi and β
(r)
i,j denotes the receiver
messages sent by Pj .
4. For all i ∈ [n], Pi runs ZK.P({xi,j , wi,j}j∈[n]\{i}) and each {Pj}j∈[n]\{i} runs ZK.Vj(xi,j) in
an execution of ZKwith common input (1λ, 1n−1) for language L(eCom) (defined above),
where xi,j = (β
(c)
i,j , β
(r)
i,j ) and wi,j = (ci, ri,j).
5. For all i ∈ [n], Pi broadcasts ci.
6. For all i ∈ [n], Pi runs ZK.P({xi,j , wi,j}j∈[n]\{i}) and each {Pj}j∈[n]\{i} runs ZK.Vj(xi,j) in
an execution of ZK with common input (1λ, 1n−1) for language L(both) (defined above),
where xi,j = (α
(c)
i,j , α
(r)
i,j , β
(c)
i,j , β
(r)
i,j , ci) and wi,j = (ri,j, si,j).
7. For all i ∈ [n], Pi runs the ZK verification algorithm on all 2n(n− 1) proofs provided in
Steps 4 and 6. If all proofs are accepting, Pi outputs
⊕
i∈[n] ci, and otherwise outputs⊥.
Figure 5: A quantum-secure constant-round coin-flipping protocol.
Proof. Fix a number of parties n, a polynomial k = k(λ), and a set S ⊂ [n] of malicious parties.
We construct a simulator Sim that for every quantum polynomial-size adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
corrupting parties in S, outputs a distribution
{Sim(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ) | r← Uk(λ)}λ∈N
that satisfies the conditions of Definition 8.1. Similar to the proof of zero-knowledge in Section 6.4,
the simulator Simwill make use of two sub-routines, SimNoAbort⊥ and SimAbort⊥.
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SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ):
1. Let i∗ denote the smallest index of a party in H. Define the machine V∗λ as follows. V
∗
λ will
act on behalf of verifiers {ZK.Vj}j∈S in the ZK session in Step 6 of Protocol 5 where party Pi∗
is the prover. Thus, it consists of the portion of A∗λ that interacts during this step as well as the
portion of the honest parties H that interact in the n− 1 sessions where Pi∗ is not the prover.
Wewill next describe how a particular instance-advice distribution ({xj}j∈S, σ{xj}j∈S) is gen-
erated for V∗λ. Generating this distribution will involve simulating Steps 1-5 of Protocol 5 for
adversary A∗λ. In particular, the advice state σ
{xj}j∈S will include the transcript τ (5) of the en-
tire simulated execution through Step 5, the inner state ρ(5) of A∗λ at this point, as well as the
witnesses {ri,j, si,j}i∈H\{i∗},j∈[n]\{i} to be used by parties {Pi}i∈H\{i∗} in Step 6 of Protocol 5.
The instances {xj}j∈S will be a subset of τ (5). In particular, for each j ∈ S, xj will be set to
(α
(c)
i∗,j, α
(r)
i∗,j , β
(c)
i∗,j , β
(r)
i∗,j, c
′
i∗), which are the messages exchanged by i
∗ and j during Steps 2 and
3 when Pi∗ was acting as a committer, as well the value c
′
i∗ broadcast by Pi∗ in Step 5.
This instance-advice distribution is generated as follows.
(a) For each party {Pi}i∈H\{i∗}, sample ci, {ri,j , si,j}j∈[n]\{i} as in Step 1 of Protocol 5.
(b) Set ρ(1) := ρλ to be the inner state of A
∗
λ, and interact with A
∗
λ to run Step 2 of Protocol 5
honestly, with the only difference being that party Pi∗ commits to (0
k(λ), 0λ). Let ρ(2) be
the resulting inner state of A∗λ, and let {α(c)i∗,j, α(r)i∗,j}j∈S be the messages sent between Pi∗
and S in commitments where Pi∗ was the committer.
(c) Define the machine C∗λ as follows. C
∗
λ will act on behalf of committers {eCom.Cj}j∈S in
the eCom session in Step 3 of Protocol 5 where party Pi∗ is the receiver. Thus, it consists
of the portion of A∗λ that interacts during this step as well as the portion of the honest
partiesH that interact in the n−1 sessions where Pi∗ is not the receiver. The advice state
σλ given to C
∗
λ will include the transcript τ
(2) of the execution so far, the inner state ρ(2)
of A∗λ at this point, and the messages and randomness {ci, ri,j}i∈H,j∈[n]\{i} to be used in
the commitments by honest players in Step 3, where ci∗ = 0
k(λ) and ri∗,j is uniformly
and independently sampled from the rest of the transcript. The view of C∗λ at the end
of this interaction includes the updated execution transcript τ (3) as well as the updated
inner state ρ(3) of A∗λ.
Now, compute
({τj}j∈S, st, {c′j}j∈S)← eCom.Ext(1λ, 1n−1,S,C∗λ, σλ),
and parse ({τj}j∈S, st) to obtain τ (3) and ρ(3), where τ (3) in particular includes the mes-
sages {β(c)i∗,j, β(r)i∗,j}j∈S exchanged by Pi∗ and S in commitments where some party j ∈ S
was the receiver. If eCom.Ext produced an abort transcript, then return ⊥, and other-
wise continue, setting ρ(3) to be the state of A∗λ.
(d) Interact with A∗λ to run Steps 4 and 5 of the protocol honestly, with the only difference
being that party Pi∗ broadcasts c
′
i∗ :=
⊕
j∈S c
′
j
⊕
j∈H\{i∗} cj ⊕ r in Step 5.
(e) If there exists j ∈ S such that the output cj of Pj in Step 5 is not equal to c′j , then
return ⊥. Otherwise, let τ (5) denote the transcript so far and let ρ(5) denote the state
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of A∗λ at the end of Step 5. For each j ∈ S set xj = (α(c)i∗,j , α(r)i∗,j, β(c)i∗,j, β(r)i∗,j, c′i∗), and set
σ{xj}j∈S = (τ (5), ρ(5), {ri,j , si,j}i∈H\{i∗},j∈[n]\{i}).
2. Now, compute
VIEW ← ZK.SimNoAbort⊥(1λ, 1n−1,S, {xj}j∈S,V∗λ, σ{xj}j∈S).
If the proofs (which are included in VIEW) output by A∗λ are accepting, then output VIEW,
and otherwise output ⊥.
SimAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ):
1. Set ρλ as the initial state of A
∗
λ. Execute Steps 1-6 with A
∗
λ using honest party strategy accord-
ing to Protocol 5 on behalf of parties {Pj}j∈H. If sampling this distribution leads to an abort
at any point, halt and return the view of A∗λ. Otherwise, return⊥.
SimComb⊥(1
λ, 1n, I,A∗λ, ρλ): With probability 1/2, execute SimNoAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, I, {xi}i∈[n],V∗λ, ρλ)
and otherwise execute SimAbort⊥(1
λ, 1n, I,A∗λ, ρλ).
Sim(1λ, 1n, I,A∗λ, ρλ): Let SimComb⊥(·) := SimComb⊥(1λ, 1n, I,A∗λ, ·) be the circuit SimComb⊥ with
all inputs hard-coded except for ρλ, and output R(SimComb⊥, ρλ, λ), where R is the algorithm
from Lemma 3.1.
This concludes the description of the simulator. Before proceeding to the proof of indistin-
guishability, we define the following collections of random variables (each indexed by λ). Each
is defined with respect to the adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N that we are considering. Throughout,
whenever we say abort, we mean that either one of the parties controlled by the adversary aborts,
or it fails to prove one of its statements.
• Let SimNoAbort⊥(A∗) := {SimNoAbort⊥(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ)}λ∈N.
• Let SimAbort⊥(A∗) := {SimAbort⊥(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ)}λ∈N.
• Let SimComb⊥(A∗) := {SimComb⊥(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ)}λ∈N.
• Let Sim(V∗) := {Sim(1λ, 1n, r,A∗λ, ρλ)}λ∈N.
• Let RealNoAbort⊥(A∗) be the distribution Real(A∗), except that whenever an abort occurs, the
distribution outputs ⊥.
• Let RealAbort⊥(A∗) be the distribution Real(A∗), except that if an abort does not occur, the
distribution outputs ⊥.
• Let SimComb(A∗) be the distribution SimComb⊥ conditioned on the output not being ⊥.
Next, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8.1.
RealNoAbort⊥(A
∗) ≈c SimNoAbort⊥(A∗)
Proof. This can be proved via the following sequence of hybrids.
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• H0 : RealNoAbort⊥(A∗).
• H1 : This hybrid is the same as H0, except that it attaches check-fail to the output if the
following (inefficient check) on Steps 1-4 of the transcript, fails.
Let i∗ denote the smallest index in H. For j ∈ S, let yj := (α(c)j,i∗ , α(r)j,i∗, β(c)j,i∗ , β(r)j,i∗ , cj) be the
messages exchanged between Pi∗ and Pj in Steps 2 and 3 when Pj was acting as the commit-
ter, along with the message broadcast by Pj in Step 4. The check fails if there exists a j ∈ S
such that yj /∈ L(both).
• H2 : Let V∗λ be the machine defined in the description of SimNoAbort⊥. Sample instance-
advice distribution ({xj}j∈S, σ{xj}j∈S) as described below.
1. Execute Steps 1-4 of the protocol identically toH2. Let τ
(4) denote the transcript gener-
ated so far, let ρ(4) denote the state ofA∗λ at the end of Step 4, and let {ri,j, si,j}i∈H\{i∗},j∈[n]\{i}
be strings drawn in Step 1 of the protocol.
2. If the check described inH2 fails, then attach check-fail to the transcript.
3. For j ∈ S, let xj := (α(c)i∗,j , α(r)i∗,j, β(c)i∗,j, β(r)i∗,j, c′i∗) be the messages exchanged between
Pi∗ and Pj in Steps 2 and 3 when Pi∗ was acting as the committer and Pj was act-
ing as the receiver, along with the message broadcast by Pi∗ in Step 4. Set σ
{xj}j∈S =
(τ (4), ρ(4), {ri,j , si,j}i∈H\{i∗},j∈[n]\{i}).
Now, compute
VIEW ← ZK.SimNoAbort⊥(1λ, 1n−1,S,V∗λ, ({xj}j∈S, σ{xj}j∈S)).
If the proofs (which are included in VIEW) output by A∗λ are accepting, then output VIEW,
and otherwise output ⊥.
• H3 : Sample instance-advice distribution identically to H2, except that in Step 2, party Pi∗
commits to (0k(λ), 0λ).
• H4 : Sample instance-advice distribution identically to H3, except that in Step 4, the ZK
session where Pi∗ is the prover is simulated.
• H5 : Sample instance-advice distribution identically to H4, except that in Step 3, for all
j ∈ [n] \ {i∗}, party Pi∗ commits to 0k(λ).
• H6 : Sample instance-advice distribution identically to H5, except that in Step 4, the ZK
session where Pi∗ is the prover is performed honestly, with witnesses {(0k(λ), ri∗,j)}j∈S.
• H7 : Let C∗ = (C∗λ, σλ)λ∈N be the machine and corresponding non-uniform advice as defined
in the description of SimNoAbort⊥. Sample instance-advice distribution identically to H6,
except that the values committed by A∗ in interaction with Pi∗ are extracted as in the de-
scription of Sim. Additionally, this hybrid outputs ⊥ if the values {cj}j∈S output by parties
{Pj}j∈S in Step 5 do not match the extracted {c′j}j∈S.
• H8 : This hybrid is the distribution SimNoAbort⊥(A∗). The only differences betweenH7 and
H8 are the check introduced inH1 is removed, and:
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– InH7, the challenger generates Pi∗ ’s message in Step 4 by sampling uniformly random
ci∗ .
– InH8, the challenger generatesPi∗ ’s message in Step 4 as ci∗ =
⊕
j∈S c
′
j
⊕
j∈H\{i∗} cj⊕r.
Now we show that each consecutive pair of hybrids is indistinguishable. We let BADi be the
event that in hybrid Hi, check-fail appears in the output distribution (meaning that the check
introduced in H1 failed AND there was no abort).
• H0 ≈s H1 : It suffices to show that Pr[BAD1] = negl(λ), which follows directly from the
quantum computational soundness of ZK.
• H1 ≈c H2 : This follows from Lemma 6.2.
• H2 ≈c H3 :We define distributionsH′2 andH′3 that are identical toH2 andH3 respectively,
except that H′2 and H
′
3 do not perform the additional check described in H1, and as such,
never attach check-fail to the output.
To prove that H2 and H3 are computationally indistinguishable, it suffices to prove that
H2 ≈c H′2, H′2 ≈c H′3, and H′3 ≈c H3. The first indistinguishability follows from the fact
that H2 ≈c H1 and Pr[BAD1] = negl(λ), which means that Pr[BAD2] = negl(λ). The second
indistinguishability follows directly from the hiding of nmCom (implied by Definition 7.1).
In what follows, we show that Pr[BAD3] = negl(λ), which implies thatH
′
3 ≈c H3.
Let BAD3,j be the event that, in hybrid H3, yj /∈ L(both) (where yj was defined in H1) and
yet the hybrid did not abort. Now suppose that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for
large enough λ ∈ N, Pr[BAD3] ≥ 1/p(λ). Assuming that n = poly(λ), this implies that there
exists a polynomial p′(·) such that for large enough λ ∈ N, there exists some j∗λ such that
Pr[BAD3,j∗] ≥ 1/p′(λ).
We will use this to contradict many-to-one non-malleability of nmCom, by building a QPT
man-in-the-middle adversaryMIM = {MIMλ, σλ}λ∈N that usesA∗ to contradict Definition 7.1.
MIMλ obtains as non-uniform advice i) the index j
∗
λ that maximizes Pr[BAD3,j∗ ] and ii) A
∗
λ’s
advice state ρλ. It simulates the first two steps of the coin-flipping protocol in the presence of
A∗λ. During Step 2, it interacts with a challenger on the left committing to either (ci∗ , ri∗,j) for
each j ∈ S, or to (0k(λ), 0λ) for each j ∈ S, on behalf of Pi∗ . It forwards these to A∗λ on behalf
of Pi∗ and uses the strategy inH2 to generate messages on behalf of all other honest parties.
When A∗λ outputs committer messages computed on behalf of Pj∗λ in its interaction with Pi∗ ,
MIMλ forwards these to a challenger on the right, and in return obtains receiver messages
on behalf of Pi∗ .
In other words,MIMλ’s interaction with its challengers generates either the random variable
(defined in Definition 7.1)
View-ValMIMλ〈{C(ci∗ , ri∗,j)}j∈S,MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi∗ , tagj∗λ)
or the random variable
View-ValMIMλ〈{C(0k(λ), 0λ)}j∈S,MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi∗ , tagj∗λ),
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depending on which strings the challenger on the left is committing to.
We now show the existence of a quantum polynomial-time D = {Dλ}λ∈N that succeeds
in distinguishing these distributions with non-negligible advantage, which contradicts the
non-malleability of nmCom as defined in Definition 7.1. The distribution received by Dλ
includes the message (c∗, r∗) committed by MIMλ in its interaction with Pi∗ on the right,
along with the final view VIEW ofMIMλ, which includes A
∗’s view after Step 2 of Protocol 5.
It then simulates the remainder of the coin-flipping protocol in the presence of A∗λ, with
one difference. Instead of implementing the check introduced in H1, it checks only that
yj∗
λ
∈ L(both), using themessage (c∗, r∗). If this check failed and there was no abort, it outputs
1 and otherwise outputs 0.
Now observe that
Pr
[
Dλ(View-ValMIMλ〈{C(ci∗ , ri∗,j)}j∈S,MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi∗ , tagj∗λ)) = 1
]
= Pr[BAD2,j∗
λ
] ≤ Pr[BAD2] = negl(λ), and
Pr
[
Dλ(View-ValMIMλ〈{C(0k(λ), 0λ)}j∈S,MIMλ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi∗ , tagj∗λ)) = 1
]
= Pr[BAD3,j∗
λ
] ≥ 1/p′(λ),
which establishes that D has a non-negligible advantage, a contradiction.
• H3 ≈c H4 : This follows from the quantum zero-knowledge of ZK. The non-uniform advice
given to the malicious verifier derived from A∗ will include the transcript of the first two
rounds of Protocol 5 executed with adversary A∗, along with the openings (if they exist) of
the commitments made by A∗ in Step 2. The final view of this verifier will also include these
openings, allowing the reduction to efficiently simulate the remainder of the protocol, in
particular using these openings to efficiently implement the check introduced inH1.
• H4 ≈c H5 :We consider a sequence of sub-hybridsH4,0, . . . ,H4,|S|. Associate the set Swith
the set [1, |S|], and define H4,j so that in Step 3, Pi∗ commits to 0k(λ) when interacting with
adversarial parties Pk for k ≤ j and commits to ci∗ when interacting with adversarial parties
Pk for k > j. Observe thatH4 = H4,0 andH5 = H4,|S|.
We now show that for any j ∈ [1,S], the indistinguishability H4,j−1 ≈c H4,j follows from
the quantum computational hiding of eCom. Indeed, define a receiver R∗ = (R∗λ, ρλ) that
interacts with a single committer committing to either ci∗ or 0
k(λ) as follows. It takes as
non-uniform advice ρλ the transcript of the first two rounds of Protocol 5 executed with ad-
versary A∗λ, along with the openings (if they exist) of the commitments made by A
∗
λ in Step 2.
It then simulates the remainder of the protocol, interacting with the challenger to implement
Pi∗ ’s messages in Step 3 during the eCom session when Pj is the receiver. Observe that R
∗
can indeed efficiently simulate the entire protocol, in particular it can implement the check
introduced in H1 since it has the openings to the commitments given by A
∗
λ in Step 2. Any
efficient distinguisher that distinguishes between H4,j−1 and H4,j with non-negligible ad-
vantage immediately implies that R∗ distinguishes with non-negligible advantage, breaking
quantum computational hiding of eCom.
• H5 ≈c H6 : Same argument asH3 ≈c H4.
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• H6 ≈c H7 :Assume that there exists a distinguisherD that can distinguish between the out-
puts of these hybrids with non-negligible advantage. We build a compliant20 distinguisher
D′ that breaks the extractability property of eCom.
D′ will receive as non-uniform advice i) the transcript of the first two rounds of Protocol 5
executedwith adversaryA∗, ii) the state ofA∗ at this point, and iii) the openings (if they exist)
of the commitments made by each party in Step 2. Note that the non-uniform advice given to
the committer C∗ defined in the description of SimNoAbort⊥ is a strict subset of this advice.
Now, D′ will forward this subset (which consists of the state of A∗ and the commitment
openings of parties {Pi}i∈H) to its challenger, and receive either the real or simulated view
with respect to committer C∗. It can then efficiently generate the rest of the distribution using
its non-uniform advice and the view it received from the challenger, additionally returning
an abort if the messages {c′i}i∈S it received as part of the challenge distribution do not match
the messages {c′i}i∈S broadcast in Step 5. If during Step 4, any of the parties {Pi}i∈S fails to
prove it ZK statement, D′ outputs 0. Otherwise, it queries D with the final distribution and
outputs what D outputs.
It remains to show that i) D′’s advantage is negligibly close to D’s advantage, and ii) D′ is
compliant. The first point requires two observations. First, whenever D′ does not query D,
it means that A∗ failed to prove one of it ZK statements, so D’s input would have been ⊥
anyway. Next, we need to show that when D′ does query D with a transcript, it is a faithful
execution of either H6 or H7, depending on whether eCom was simulated or not. If eCom
was simulated, the distribution is equivalent to H7. If not, the distribution is equivalent to
H6, except for the extra abort condition carried out by the reduction. However, observe that
the probability that the reduction produces an abort but H6 does not is at most Pr[BAD6].
Since H6 ≈c H1, and Pr[BAD1] = negl(λ), this quantity is negligible. Now it remains to
argue that D′ is compliant, but this follows directly from the quantum computational sound-
ness of ZK.
• H7 ≈s H8: First, Pr[BAD7] = negl(λ), since H7 ≈c H1. Next, switching Pi∗ ’s message in
Step 4 is perfectly indistinguishable since r is uniformly random.
Now, note that RealAbort⊥(A
∗) ≈c SimAbort⊥(A∗) follows by definition. Then, it follows identi-
cally to the proof of Theorem 6.1 that Real(A∗) ≈c SimComb(A∗), and then by applying Lemma 3.1,
that Real(A∗) ≈c Sim(A∗).
9 Quantum-Secure Multi-Party Computation
9.1 Definition
We follow the standard real/ideal world paradigm for defining secure multi-party computation
(MPC) as in [Gol04], replacing classical adversaries with quantum adversaries.
20Recall that such a distinguisher is guaranteed to output 0 with overwhelming probability on input any non-
explainable view.
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Consider n parties P1, . . . , Pn with inputs x1, . . . , xn that wish to interact in a protocol Π to
evaluate any functionality f on their joint inputs. The security of protocol Π (with respect to a
functionality f ) is defined by comparing the real-world execution of the protocol with an ideal-
world evaluation of f by a trusted party. Informally, it is required that for every quantum ad-
versary A = {Aλ}λ∈N that corrupts some subset of the parties I ⊂ [n] and participates in the real
execution of the protocol, there exists an adversary Sim, also referred to as a simulator, that can
achieve the same effect in the ideal world. In fact, we provide a strictly stronger definition that allows
the adversary A some arbitrary non-uniform quantum advice {ρλ}λ∈N thay may even depend on
the inputs x1, . . . , xn.
We now formally describe the security definition, which only considers the case of fully mali-
cious adversaries. Let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the set of inputs.
The Real Execution. In the real execution, the n-party protocol Π for computing f is executed in
the presence of a quantum polynomial-time adversary A = {Aλ, ρλ}λ∈N, where A corrupts some
set I ⊂ [n] of the parties. The honest parties follow the instructions of Π, and A sends all messages
of the protocol on behalf of the corrupted parties following any arbitrary quantum polynomial-
time strategy.
The interaction of (Aλ, ρλ) in the protocolΠ defines a random variable REALΠ,A(λ, ~x, ρλ)whose
value is determined by the randomness of the adversary and the honest parties. This random
variable contains the output of the adversary (which may be an arbitrary function of its view and
in particular may be a quantum state) as well as the outputs of the honest parties.
The Ideal Execution. In the ideal execution, an ideal world adversary Sim interacts with a trusted
party, as follows.
• Send inputs to the trusted party: Each honest party sends its input to the trusted party.
Each corrupt party Pi, (controlled by Sim) may either send its input xi, or send some other
input of the same length to the trusted party. Let x′i denote the value sent by party Pi.
• Trusted party sends output to the adversary: The trusted party computes f(x′1, . . . , x′n) =
(y1, . . . , yn) and sends {yi}i∈I to the adversary.
• Adversary instructs trusted party to abort or continue: This is formalized by having the
adversary send either an abort or continue message to the trusted party. In the latter case,
the trusted party sends to each honest party Pi its output value yi. In the former case, the
trusted party sends the special symbol ⊥ to each honest party.
• Outputs: Sim outputs an arbitrary function of its view, and the honest parties output the
values obtained from the trusted party.
The interaction of Sim with the trusted party defines a random variable IDEALf,Sim(λ, ~x, ρλ).
Having defined the real and the ideal worlds, we now proceed to define our notion of security.
Definition 9.1. Let f be an n-party functionality, and Π be an n-party protocol. Protocol Π securely
computes f if for every quantum polynomial-time real-world adversary A = {Aλ}λ∈N corrupting a set of
at most n− 1 players, there exists a quantum polynomial-time ideal-world adversary Sim such that for any
set of inputs ~x ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n and any non-uniform quantum advice ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N,
{REALΠ,A(λ, ~x, ρλ)}λ∈N ≈c {IDEALf,Sim(λ, ~x, ρλ)}λ∈N.
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9.2 Construction
Given the construction of quantum-secure multi-party coin-flipping from Section 8, it is straight-
forward to achieve quantum-securemulti-party computation, due to the following lemma adapted
from [KOS03]. For completeness, we give a sketch of the proof.
Lemma 9.1. Given a quantum-secure multi-party coin-flipping protocol and a quantum-secure protocol Π
for computing f in the common random string (CRS) model with straight-line black-box simulation, the
natural composition of the two is a quantum-secure protocol for computing f with no setup assumptions.
Proof. (sketch) Consider any adversary (Aλ, ρλ) for the composed protocol. Aλ may be split into
two parts: A1 interacts in the coin-flipping protocol and produces a state st, which is passed to
A2, who interacts in Π. We now construct a simulator Sim for the composed protocol as follows.
It begins by running the straight-line black-box simulator SimΠ for Π until it outputs a CRS r
(note that since SimΠ is straight-line, this CRS-generation step is independent of the adversary
and advice, and does not require a call to the ideal functionality). At this point, Sim runs the
simulator for the multi-party coin-flipping protocol on input r, adversary A1, and non-uniform
advice ρλ. This simulation produces a final state st. Finally, Sim completes the execution of SimΠ
on input A2(st) and outputs what SimΠ outputs.
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A Tag Amplification: Analysis
Here, we prove Lemma 7.2.
Let tag ∈ [2t/2] denote the tag used by the committer in the left session and tag′ ∈ [2t/2] be the
tag used by the MIM in the right session. Observe that, two sets of decomposed tags {tagi}i∈[t/2]
and {tag′i}i∈[t/2], derived from two distinct tags, tag and tag′, are such that ∃α ∈ [t/2] s.t. ∀i ∈
[t/2] : tag′α 6= tagi
For any values u (respectively v) committed to by C in the left session, denote by u′ (respec-
tively v′) the value committed to by the MIM in the right session. Additionally, let ui (resp, vi)
denote the value committed to by C in the ith parallel execution of nmCom as part of the left com-
mitment and let u′i (resp, v
′
i) denote the value committed to byMIM in the i
th parallel execution of
nmCom as part of the right commitment.
The soundness of ZK ensures that when the proof verifies:
Pr[u′ 6= u′α] = negl(λ) and Pr[v′ 6= v′α] = negl(λ) (17)
where the probability is over the randomness of honest verifier, and α denotes the first index in
the real (resp., simulated) experiments such that for every i ∈ [t/2], tag′α 6= tagi. Whenever the
proof does not verify, the commitment is not ‘valid’ and u′ (resp. v′) = ⊥.
83
Next, recall that in the real world, VIEWMIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′) denotes the joint
distribution of the view of MIM along with the value u′ committed to in the right session when
the left committer obtains input u. Similarly, VIEWMIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′) denotes
the joint distribution of the view ofMIM along with the value v′ committed to in the right session
when the right committer obtains input v.
By Equation (17), whenever the MIM’s proof verifies, v′ can be replaced by v′α in the distri-
bution VIEWMIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′) to yield a statistically indistinguishable distribu-
tion VIEW′MIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′). Similarly, u′ can be replaced by u′α in the distri-
bution VIEWMIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′) to yield a statistically indistinguishable distribu-
tion VIEW′MIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′).
It suffices to prove that:
{VIEW′MIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′)}λ∈N ≈c VIEW′MIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′)
(18)
To that end, we define the following collections of random variables (each indexed by λ). Each
is defined with respect to the adversary MIM = {MIMλ, ρλ}λ∈N that we consider. Throughout,
when we say abort, we mean that MIM∗ aborts before Step 2, or that the MIM fails to provide an
accepting proof.
• LetPrAbortu (MIM) be the probability thatMIM aborts inVIEW′MIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′).
• LetPrAbortv (MIM) be the probability thatMIM aborts inVIEW′MIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′).
• Let VIEWu(MIM) := {VIEW′MIMλ〈C(u),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′)}λ∈N.
• Let VIEWv(MIM) := {VIEW′MIMλ〈C(v),MIM(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tag, tag′)}λ∈N.
• Let VIEWNo Abortu (MIM) be the distribution VIEWu(MIM) conditioned on there not being an
abort.
• Let VIEWAbortu (MIM) be the distribution VIEWu(MIM) conditioned on there being an abort.
• Let VIEWNo Abortv (MIM) be the distribution VIEWv(MIM) conditioned on there not being an
abort.
• Let VIEWAbortv (MIM) be the distribution VIEWv(MIM) conditioned on there being an abort.
The following distributions will not be used explicitly in the hybrids, but will be convenient to
define for the proof.
• Let VIEWv,⊥(MIM) be the distribution VIEWv(MIM), except that whenever an abort occurs,
the distribution outputs ⊥.
• Let VIEWAbortv,⊥ (MIM) be the distribution VIEWv(MIM), except that if an abort does not occur,
the distribution outputs ⊥.
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• Let VIEWu,⊥(MIM) be the distribution VIEWu(MIM), except that whenever an abort occurs,
the distribution outputs ⊥.
• Let VIEWAbortu,⊥ (MIM) be the distribution VIEWu(MIM), except that if an abort does not occur,
the distribution outputs ⊥.
We show that VIEWu(MIM) ≈c VIEWv(MIM) via a sequence on hybrids. In particular, we prove:
VIEWv(MIM)
(1)
≡ (1− PrAbortv (MIM))VIEWNo Abortv (MIM) + (PrAbortv (MIM))VIEWAbortv (MIM)
(2)
≈s(1− PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWNo Abortv (MIM) + (PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWAbortv (MIM)
(3)
≈c(1− PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWNo Abortu (MIM) + (PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWAbortv (MIM)
(4)
≈c(1− PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWNo Abortu (MIM) + (PrAbortu (MIM))VIEWAbortu (MIM)
(5)
≡VIEWu(MIM),
where
1. The equalities (1) and (5) follow by definition.
2. The indistinguishability (2) follows as a corollary of Claim A.1. Indeed, VIEWu,⊥(MIM) ≈c
VIEWv,⊥(MIM) in particular implies that the difference in the probability that theMIM aborts
in the real interaction versus the simulated interaction is negligible.
3. The indistinguishability (3) follows as a corollary of Claim A.1. This can be seen by con-
sidering two cases. First, if the probability that the MIM aborts in the real interaction is
negligible, then VIEWNo Abortv (MIM) ≈c VIEWNo Abortu (MIM) directly follows from Claim A.1,
and the indistinguishability follows. Otherwise, this probability is non-negligible, meaning
that VIEWAbortv (MIM) is efficiently sampleable. Thus, a reduction to Claim A.1 can sample
from the distribution VIEWAbortv (MIM)whenever it receives ⊥ from its challenger.21
4. The indistinguishability (4) follows as a corollary of Claim A.3 via a similar analysis as the
last step.
Claim A.1.
VIEWu,⊥(MIM) ≈c VIEWv,⊥(MIM)
Proof. We prove this via a sequence of hybrids. We useHk to denote the joint distribution ofMIM’s
view (consisting of commitment and proof transcripts along with MIM’s state) and the value that
MIM commits to in the right session of Hybrid k, using tag tag′α, where α denotes the smallest
index such that tag′α 6= tagi for every i ∈ [t/2].
H1: In this hybrid, the challenger executes the simulator ZK.Sim(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) on V
∗
λ, which
denotes a wrapper around the portion of theMIM that participates in Stage 2 of the protocol, and
an instance-advice distribution (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) defined as follows:
21Amore formal analysis of this can be found in [BS20, Lemma 3.2].
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• Set the state ofMIMλ to be ρλ.
• Execute Stages 0 and 1 of the protocol the same way as in the experiment VIEWu,⊥(MIM),
and set x,w,L according to Protocol 4 on behalf of C.
• Let σ(xλ)λ denote the joint distribution of the protocol transcript, the state of the MIM at the
end of Stage 1, and the value v′α committed by theMIMwith tag tag
′
α.
If there is an abort during sampling, or ZK.Sim causes V∗λ to abort (this includes theMIM failing to
provide an accepting proof), then output ⊥. By Claim 6.2,
VIEWu,⊥(MIM) ≈c H1
H2: In this hybrid, the challenger behaves identically to H1, except when generating (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ),
it replaces the commitment to u with a commitment to v in the first parallel repetition, with tag1,
of nmCom (while executing all other parallel repetitions the same way as H1). If there is an abort
during sampling, or ZK.Sim causes V∗λ to abort, then output ⊥.
We prove in ClaimA.2 that by one-to-one non-malleability of nmCom, for every u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ),
H1 ≈c H2
Hi for i ∈ [3, (t/2 + 1)]: In this hybrid, the challenger behaves identically to Hi−1, except when
generating (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ), it replaces the commitment to u with a commitment to v in the (i − 1)th
parallel repetition, with tag tagi−1, of nmCom (while executing all other parallel repetitions the
same way as Hi−1). If there is an abort during sampling, or ZK.Sim causes V
∗ to abort, then
output ⊥.
We prove in Claim A.2 that by one-to-one non-malleability of nmCom, for every u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ)
and every i ∈ [3, t/2 + 1],
Hi−1 ≈c Hi
Finally, by claim 6.2, we have that
H(t/2+1) ≈c VIEWu,⊥(MIM)
Next, we state and prove Claim A.2.
Claim A.2. For all u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ) and all i ∈ [2, t/2 + 1],
Hi ≈c Hi−1 (19)
Proof. Suppose Claim A.2 is false. Then there exists values (u, v), some i ∈ [2, t/2 + 1] and a
polynomial poly(·) such that for infinitely many λ ∈ N,
|Pr[MIM(Hi) = 1]− Pr[MIM(Hi−1) = 1]| ≥ 1
poly(λ)
(20)
Wewill demonstrate an adversaryMIMβ that contradicts the non-malleability of nmCom according
to Definition 7.1, i.e. we will show that for infinitely many λ ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr[MIMβ(VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(v),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1]
− Pr[MIMβ(VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(u),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1]
∣∣∣ ≥ 1
poly(λ)
(21)
86
where the two distributionsMIMβ
(
VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(v),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1 and
MIMβ
(
VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(u),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1 correspond to honest commitments to
v and u respectively, for the small-tag commitment scheme.
MIMβ is defined as follows:
1. Obtain input values v, u, and begin an interaction with a challenger for nmCom.
2. Emulate the role of honest committer and honest receiver in an interaction with MIM exe-
cuting Protocol 4. In more detail, in the role of a committer in a left session, participate in a
session of Protocol 4 withMIM as receiver. At the same time, play the role of the receiver in a
right session withMIM as committer. Recall that Protocol 4 contains k repetitions of nmCom
and ZK.
3. In the left session, embed the challenger’s messages in the (i − 1)th instance of nmCom, and
forward the response ofMIM corresponding to the (i−1)th instance to the challenger. Execute
remaining instances according to the strategy inHi−1.
4. In the right session, forward the message obtained from MIM in the αth instance of nmCom
to the challenger, and embed the challenger’s response for that round as receiver message
in the αth instance. Use honest receiver strategy for all other instances of nmCom in the right
session.
5. Obtain value v′α from the challenger of the non-malleable commitment (representing the
value in the commitment sent byMIMβ to the challenger on the right).
6. Use the transcript, the obtained value v′α and the state of MIM to define the instance-advice
sample, and then execute ZK.Sim(1λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ).
7. If an abort occurs at any point, output ⊥.
We now analyze the probability thatMIMβ successfully contradicts Definition 7.1. To this end,
we note that:
Pr[MIMβ
(
VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(u),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1] = Pr[MIM(Hi−1) = 1] (22)
Pr[MIMβ
(
VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(v),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1] = Pr[MIM(Hi) = 1] (23)
Therefore, for infinitely many λ ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr[MIMβ(VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(u),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1]
−Pr[MIMβ(VIEW
MIM
β
λ
〈C(v),MIMβ(ρλ),R〉(1λ, tagi−1, tag′α)
)
= 1]
∣∣∣ =∣∣∣Pr[MIM(Hi−1) = 1]− Pr[MIM(Hi) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ 1
poly(λ)
which is a contradiction, as desired.
This completes the proof of Claim A.1.
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Claim A.3.
VIEWAbortu,⊥ (MIM) ≈c VIEWAbortv,⊥ (MIM)
Proof. We prove this via a sequence of hybrids. We use Hk to denote the joint distribution of the
MIM’s view (consisting of commitment and proof transcripts along with the MIM’s state) in Hy-
brid k.
H1 : In this hybrid, the challenger executes one iteration of the simulator ZK.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ )
on V∗λ, where V
∗
λ denotes the portion of theMIM that participates in Stage 2 of the protocol, and an
instance-advice distribution (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) defined as follows:
• Set the state ofMIMλ to be ρλ.
• Execute Stage 1 of the protocol the same way as in the experiment real(MIM), and set x,w,L
according to Protocol 4 on behalf of C.
• If an abort occurs, output the transcript and state of theMIM until the abort.
• Otherwise, let σ(xλ)λ denote the joint distribution of the protocol transcript and the state of
theMIM at the end of Stage 1.
If ZK.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ) outputs a non-aborting transcript and state, output⊥, otherwise
return the output of ZK.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ). By Claim 6.3,
VIEWAbortu,⊥ (MIM) ≈c H1
H2: In this hybrid, the challenger behaves identically to H1, except when generating (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ),
it replaces the commitment to u with a commitment to v in the first parallel repetition, with tag1,
of nmCom (while executing all other parallel repetitions the same way as H1). If a non-aborting
transcript is produced, then output ⊥.
We prove in Claim A.4 that by hiding of nmCom, for every u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ),
H1 ≈c H2
Hi for i ∈ [3, (t/2 + 1)]: In this hybrid, the challenger behaves identically to Hi−1, except when
generating (xλ, σ
(xλ)
λ ), it replaces the commitment to uwith a commitment to v in the (i−1)th par-
allel repetition, with tag tagi−1, of nmCom (while executing all other parallel repetitions the same
way asHi−1). If a non-aborting transcript is produced, then output⊥. We prove in Claim A.4 that
by hiding of nmCom, for every u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ) and every i ∈ [3, t/2 + 1],
Hi−1 ≈c Hi
Finally, by claim 6.3, we have that
H(t/2+1) ≈c VIEWv,⊥(MIM)
Next, we state and prove Claim A.4.
88
Claim A.4. For every u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ) and all i ∈ [2, t/2 + 1],
Hi ≈c Hi−1
Proof. Suppose Claim A.4 is false. Then there exist u, v ∈ {0, 1}p(λ), some i ∈ [2, t/2 + 1], a PPT
distinguisherD and a polynomial poly(·) such that for infinitely many λ ∈ N,
|Pr[D(Hi) = 1]− Pr[D(Hi−1) = 1]| ≥ 1
poly(λ)
(24)
We will demonstrate a receiver that contradicts the hiding property of nmCom, i.e. we will show
that there exists R∗ such that for infinitely many λ ∈ N,
|Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(u),R∗〉) = 1]− Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(v),R∗〉) = 1]| ≥ 1
poly(λ)
(25)
R∗ obtains input u, v, and begins an interaction with a challenger for the hiding of nmCom. It then
emulates the role of honest committer and honest receiver in an interaction with MIM, executing
Protocol 4. In the left session, it embeds the challenger’s messages in the (i − 1)th instance of
nmCom, and forwards the response of MIM corresponding to the (i − 1)th instance to the chal-
lenger. It executes the remaining instances in the left session, and all instances of the right session
according to the strategy in Hi−1. Next, it uses the transcript and state of the MIM to define the
instance-advice sample, and executes one iteration of ZK.SimAbort⊥(1
λ, xλ,V
∗
λ, σ
(xλ)
λ ).
If an abort occurs at some point, then R∗ runsD(τ, st)where τ and st denote the transcript and
the state of the adversary until the point in the protocol where the abort occurs. If no abort occurs
throughout the protocol, then R∗ outputs 0.
We now analyze the probability that R∗ successfully contradicts Definition 7.1. Here, we note
that:
Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(u),R∗〉) = 1] = Pr[D(Hi−1) = 1] and,
Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(v),R∗〉) = 1] = Pr[D(Hi) = 1]
Therefore, for infinitely many λ ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(u),R∗〉) = 1]− Pr[R∗(nmCom〈C(v),R∗〉) = 1]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[D(Hi−1) = 1]− Pr[D(Hi) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ 1
poly(λ)
which is a contradiction, as desired. This completes the proof of Claim A.4.
This completes the proof of Claim A.3.
Together, these claims complete the proof of Lemma 7.2.
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B Multi-Committer Extractable Commitments against Arbitrary Dis-
tinguishers
Recall that in the setting of multi-committer extractable commitments 5.1, we only considered
computational indistinguishability against any compliant non-uniform polynomial-size quantum
distinguisher D. We will now demonstrate how to upgrade any multi-committer extractable com-
mitment secure against any compliant non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher to
one which is secure against against any arbitrary non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distin-
guisher. The resulting commitment admits an extractor that makes use of the Quantum Rewind-
ing lemma 3.1 to successfully generate both explainable and non-explainable transcripts.
Construction. Let eCom denote any multi committter extractable commitment protocol which ad-
mits an extractor Ext. Consider a modified version of the protocol eCom′ which is identical to eCom
except that at the very end, each of the committers {Ci}i∈[n] sends a constant-round ZK argument
to the receiver attesting to the fact that the committer messages were explainable. If the verifica-
tion check passes for all the arguments, the receiver accepts all the commitments. Otherwise it
rejects all the commitments, and the committed value is set to ⊥. We denote this by Reject.
Analysis. Assuming eCom admits an extractor Ext which satisfies the extractability property
against compliant distinguishers, we will construct an extractor Ext′ for eCom′ which satisifies
the extractability property against arbitrary distinguishers. The extractor Ext′ consists of a ran-
domized extractor Extcomb will consist of two sub-extractors, namely Extr and Extnr. The purpose
of Extr is to simulate a transcript which generates a Reject whereas the purpose of Extnr is to
simulate a transcript which does not generate a Reject.
At a high level, Extcomb will randomly call one of the two sub-extractors and try to produce
a transcript which is indistinguishable from the real view. Looking ahead, this will result in the
Extcomb outputting a quantum state OUT that is indistinguishable from the real verifier output
conditioned on OUT 6= Fail. Furthermore, OUT 6= Fail will occur with probability negligibly close
to 1/2 (due to random choice of executing either Extr or Extnr and the computational indistin-
guishability of the view generated by Extr and Extnr). In other words, Extcomb is going to succeed
in extraction only with probability (negligibly close to) 1/2. Once we have this, we can apply Wa-
trous’ quantum rewinding lemma 3.1 to amplify the success probability from ≈ 1/2 to ≈ 1.
We will now show the construction of Extnr,Extr,Extcomb and finally Ext
′.
Extnr(1
λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρ):
1. Execute the extractor Ext(1λ, 1n, I, C∗λ, ρλ) on the adversary C
∗
λ (which controls a subset I of
committers).
2. Participate as a honest verifier in |I| ZK argument sessionswith C∗λ where C∗λ sendsmessages
on behalf of the prover.
3. Execute the verification algorithm on all |I| argument transcripts. If verification check passes
for all |I| arguments, then accept all the commitments. Otherwise, say Reject occurs.
4. If Reject occurs, discard all information saved so far and output Fail. Otherwise output C∗λ’s
inner state and the extracted value.
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Extr(1
λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρ):
1. Interact with C∗λ as an honest receiver of eCom
′. If the verification check fails for some ZK
argument transcript, count it as a Reject.
2. If Reject does not occur, discard all information saved so far and output Fail. Otherwise
output C∗λ’s inner state, the transcript and ⊥ as the extracted value.
Extcomb(1
λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρ): Sample b
$←− {r, nr} and execute Extb.
Ext′(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρ):
1. Generate the circuit Extcomb,C∗
λ
which is the circuit implementation of Extcomb with hardwired
input C∗λ, that is, the only input to Extcomb,C∗λ is the quantum state ρ.
2. Let R be the algorithm from Lemma 3.1. The output of the extractor is R(Extcomb,C∗
λ
, ρ, λ)
The following claim is similar to the definition of multi-committer extractability stated in Sec-
tion 5.1 but generalized to handle arbitrary distinguishers (instead of just compliant ones).
Claim B.1. For any arbitrary non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D′ = {D′λ, σλ}λ∈N,
there exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for all adversaries C∗ = {C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a subset
of n committers, namely, {Ci}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n], the following holds for all polynomial-size sequences
of inputs {{mi,λ}i/∈I}λ∈N and λ ∈ N.∣∣Pr[D′λ(VIEW′msgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[D′λ(Ext′(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ), σλ) = 1]
∣∣ ≤ µ(λ).
Here VIEW′msgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)) is defined to consist of the following:
• The view of C∗λ on eCom′ interaction with the honest receiver R and set {Ci(mi)}i/∈I of honest
parties; this view includes a set of transcripts {τi}i∈I and a state st.
• A set of strings {mi}i∈I , where each mi is defined relative to τi as follows. If there exists
m′i, ri such that R(1
λ, τi,m
′
i, ri) = 1, thenmi = m
′
i, otherwise,mi = ⊥.
We will prove the above claim in several steps:
1. Simulating non Reject interactions using Extnr
2. Simulating Reject interations using Extr
3. Applying Watrous rewinding lemma on the combined extractor Extcomb
First, we introduce some notation:
• Let Extr,⊥ be the same distribution as Extr(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ) except that whenever a Reject
does not occur, the distribution output is ⊥
• Let Extnr,⊥ be the same distribution as Extnr(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ) except that whenever a Reject
occurs, the distribution output is ⊥
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• Let VIEW′r,⊥ be the same distribution as VIEW′msgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)) except
that whenever a Reject does not occur, the distribution output is ⊥
• Let VIEW′nr,⊥ be the same distribution as VIEW′msgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)) except
that whenever a Reject occurs, the distribution output is ⊥
We use τ ′ to denote the input to the distinguisher D′ where τ ′ can either be Ext{r,nr},⊥ or
VIEW′{r,nr},⊥.
Claim B.2. For any arbitrary non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D′ = {D′λ, σλ}λ∈N,
there exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for all adversaries C∗ = {C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a subset
of n committers, namely, {Ci}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n], the following holds for all polynomial-size sequences
of inputs {{mi,λ}i/∈I}λ∈N and λ ∈ N.∣∣Pr[D′λ(VIEW′nr,⊥, σλ) = 1]− Pr[D′λ(Extnr,⊥, σλ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(λ).
Proof. Conditioned on the event that Reject happens, both distributions (VIEW′nr,⊥ and Extnr,⊥)
output ⊥ by definition. Therefore, in such a case, these two distributions will be prefectly indis-
tinguishable.
Conditioned on the event that Reject does not happen, we can say that τ ′ is explainable with over-
whelming probability. This holds due to the soundness of ZK. Having said that, we now prove
that D′ cannot distinguish between real and simulated τ ′.
Suppose there exists an arbitrary non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D′ =
{D′λ, σλ}λ∈N, a polynomial function poly(·), C∗ = {C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a subset of n commit-
ters, namely, {Ci}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n], s.t. the following holds for inifintely many polynomial-
size sequence of input {{mi,λ}i/∈I}λ∈N and λ ∈ N.∣∣Pr[D′λ(VIEW′nr,⊥, σλ) = 1|¬Reject]− Pr[D′λ(Extnr,⊥, σλ) = 1|¬Reject]∣∣ ≥ 1/poly(λ).
We can use D′ to build a compliant distinguisher D which contradicts the multi-committer
extractability of eCom as per Definition 5.1. D first obtains a eCom transcript τ (and adversary’s
state) as a challenge. It then interacts as an honest verifier with C∗λ in |I| ZK argument sessions
whereC∗λ proves that τ is explainable. D then verifies the ZK argument and outputs 0 if the argument
rejects. Otherwise, it forwards the entire transcript along with C∗λ’s internal state and the value
inside commitment to D′. If D′ returns 1, D returns 1. Otherwise D returns 0.
Note that since non-explainable transcripts that are not rejected occur with negligible proba-
bility (due to soundness of ZK), the probability that D outputs 1 on receiving a non-explainable
transcript is negligible. Therefore, D is a compliant distinguisher. Moreover, the following holds:
Pr[Dλ(VIEW
msg
C∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)), σλ) = 1] = Pr[D′λ(VIEW′nr,⊥, σλ) = 1|¬Reject] and
Pr[Dλ(Ext(1
λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ), σλ) = 1] = Pr[D
′
λ(Extnr,⊥, σλ) = 1|¬Reject]
Therefore, ∣∣Pr[Dλ(VIEWmsgC∗
λ
(〈R,C∗λ(ρλ), {Ci(mi,λ)}i/∈I〉(1λ, 1n)), σλ) = 1]
− Pr[Dλ(Ext(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρλ), σλ) = 1]
∣∣ ≥ 1/poly(λ).
which gives a contradiction.
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Claim B.3. For any arbitrary non-uniform polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D′ = {D′λ, σλ}λ∈N,
there exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for all adversaries C∗ = {C∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N representing a subset
of n committers, namely, {Ci}i∈I for some set I ⊆ [n], the following holds for all polynomial-size sequences
of inputs {{mi,λ}i/∈I}λ∈N and λ ∈ N.∣∣Pr[D′λ(VIEW′r,⊥, σλ) = 1]− Pr[D′λ(Extr,⊥, σλ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(λ).
Proof. Conditioned on the event thatReject does not happen, both distributions (VIEW′r,⊥andExtr,⊥)
output ⊥ by definition. Therefore, in such a case, these two distributions will be prefectly indis-
tinguishable.
Conditioned on the event that Reject happens, the distribution produced by Extr is identical to the
distribution produced by an honest reveiver. This holds due to the construction of Extr
To complete our proof, we will introduce some additional notation:
1. Let PrReject
VIEW′
be the probability that a Reject happens in VIEW′
2. Let PrRejectExtr be the probability that a Reject happens in Extr
3. Let PrRejectExtnr be the probability that a Reject happens in Extnr
Following [BS20], we now show that VIEW′ = Extcomb via a sequence on hybrids. In particular,
we show that:
VIEW′
(1)
≡ (VIEW′|Reject)PrReject
VIEW′
+ (VIEW′|NoReject)(1 − PrReject
VIEW′
)
(2)
≈c(VIEW
′|Reject)PrRejectExtr + (VIEW′|NoReject)(1 − Pr
Reject
Extnr
)
(3)
≈c(VIEW
′|Reject)PrRejectExtr + (Extnr|NoReject)(1− Pr
Reject
Extnr
)
(4)
≈c(Extr|Reject)PrRejectExtr + (Extnr|NoReject)(1− Pr
Reject
Extnr
)
(5)
≈sExtcomb
where
1. The equality (1) follows by definition.
2. The indistinguishability (2) follows as Corollary of Claim B.3 andClaim B.2. Indeed,VIEW′r,⊥ ≈c
Extr,⊥ in particular implies that the difference in probability that Reject happens in the real
interaction versus the simulated interaction is negligible, and likewise for VIEW′nr,⊥ ≈c
Extnr,⊥.
3. The indistinguishability (3) follows as a corollary of Claim B.2. This can be seen by con-
sidering two cases. First, if the probability that Reject happens in the real interaction is
negligible, then VIEW′|NoReject ≈c Extnr|NoReject directly follows from Claim B.2, and
the indistinguishability follows. Otherwise, this probability is non-negligible, meaning that
VIEW′|Reject is efficiently sampleable. Thus, a reduction to B.2 can sample from the distri-
bution VIEW′|Reject whenever it receives ⊥ from the challenger.
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4. The indistinguishability (4) follows as a corollary of Claim B.3 via a similar analysis as the
last step.
5. The indistinguishability (5) follows from the definition of Extcomb
Also, by an analysis similar to [BS20] Corollary 3.1, 3.2, we can say that the sucess probability of
Extcomb is negligibly close to 1/2 and therefore the success probability of Extcomb is input-oblivious.
Nowwe can apply the Quantum rewinding lemma 3.1 to amplify the success probability from
≈ 1/2 to ≈ 1 following an analysis similar to [BS20]. Consider the quantum circuit Extcomb,C∗
which is the circuit implementation of Extcomb with hardwired input C
∗
λ, that is, the only input
to Extcomb,C∗
λ
is the quantum state ρ. By denoting the success probability for input ρ by p(ρ) and
setting ǫ := negl(λ) + 2−λ·
3
4 , p0 := 1/4, and q := 1/2, we can satisfy all the conditions for Quantum
Rewinding Lemma 3.1.
This implies that trace distace between R(Extcomb,C∗, ρ, λ) and Extcomb is bounded by a negligi-
ble function. Therefore, our final extractor Ext′(1λ, 1n, I,C∗λ, ρ) = R(Extcomb,C∗λ , ρ, λ) completes the
extraction successfully with probability negligibly close to 1.
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